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INTROD UCTION 
The existing literature pertaining to Kenya ' s political, 
economic and social development has been written by non-Afri-
can writers, mostly British. There is nothing wrong with a 
non-African expressing his views about a particular African 
situation. But there is something to be said about the way 
he does it. Much too often a European (or an American) \'lri t-
er ends up giving a distorted picture of affairs in Kenya. 
The . majority of Europeans who have assigned to them-
selves the task of appraising Kenya 's problems have been eithe 
active in propagation and maintenance of British imperialism 
or in sympathy with it. This includes the British authors who 
are settled in Kenya, the representatives of the British gov-
ernment in London and Nairobi , and the emissaries of Christi-
anity in Kenya • . 
Those who wrote in defense of imperialism hardly gave a 
conscious thought as to what Africans might wish to say or to 
do or to have in their country. Little attention was given to 
the exploitative nature of imperialism. Apparently it did not 
occur to non-African writers that the European ideas as to how 
Kenya should be run might clash with the ideas which Africans 
held. 
Due to a number of reasons1 it has not been possible 
1Including: s evere educational limitations exemplified 
! 
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for Africans to do their O\ICU political 'Nriting. This is un-
fortunate because Kenya is replete with explosive material 
which at the hands of an angry writer might provide absorbing 
reading . 
It is clear then that the Kenya African faces a chal-
lenge he cannot escape. Now that he is to be freed from the 
fetters of colonial laws, 2 now that his educational opportun-
ities are increasing, he is in a better position to express 
himself as a writer. Upon his shoulders l ies a t\'tin respon-
sibility. First , he must correct historical writing. Tha t 
part of history which \ las written to justify and to glorify 
imperialism must be revised so as to convey t he true meaning 
of European exploitation . The wrongs and injustices of Brit-
ish imperialism in Kenya, ~hich have hitherto been minimized 
or concealed, must be exposed . It is also his duty to make 
it known that although the people of Kenya succumbed to a 
strong external force, they never accepted it , nor did they , 
while they were captives, lose the sense of dignity for Which 
they always stood and still stand . 
Reconstruction of the past is but the half-way mark in 
the ful l port rait of Africa. The future makes tho other half. 
by the fact that Kenya had its first college in 1956 and im-
prisonment threats for writing "seditions" matters (see Chap-
ter II) . 
2The British government announced in november, 196l,tlnt 
a constitutional conference on Kenya will be held in February1 1962. I t is believed that that conference will fix the date 
for Kenya's independence . African nationalists believe Kenya 
will be free by the end of 1962, 
r-
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The future of Kenya, like the future of the continent , belon~ 
to the Africans. An African author, like any other dutiful 
and responsible citizen, has a part to play in guiding and 
maintaining the spirit of a nation. He must help to charter 
the new course, to reinforce the aspirations of his compatri-
ots, to maintain the pride and morale of the nation. He must 
be a devoted servant in building the new society. 
These are the feelings which a person born into coloni-
alism and brought up in it comes to possess. In deciding to 
write on certain aspects of the British Colonial policy in 
Kenya I have in mind: first, to present facts as they relate 
to specific situations or problems; secondly, to interpret or 
comment upon such facts as they affect the people of Kenya. 
My thesis will consist of seven chapters. Chapter I 
will contain general information about the people and the 
country. A brief mention of the political administration 
will be made. In regard to the people, a general account 
\.'ill appear. This will encompass the four social groups in-
volved - Africans, Indians, Arabs and Europeans . Attention 
will be centered on each group's vocat ional , soci al and poli-
tical position, special characteristics, and their inter- ; 
group relationship . Information on the country will include 
geographical location, climate, geographical divisions and 
the size . 
Chapter II ~ill deal with communications, primarily the 
press. Major and minor daily and weekly newspapers will be 
named and their content to some extent analyzed . The press 
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law as it functions in Kenya, as a colony, ~ill be discussed 
followed by a description of a few press problems. Radio pru-
gramming and operations ~ill also be a part of this chapter. 
General information pertaining to Kenya's economic situ-
ation will constitute one part of Chapter III. Figures on 
agricultural production will be quoted to illustra te Kenya's 
dependency on cash crops such as coffee and tea. Evidence of 
industrial development based on secondary industries will al-
so be shown. The other part of the chapter \~ill deal \'lith 
the transportation system--air\\ays, railroads, roads and wa-
ten"lays. 
Chapter IV will concentrate on the ioportant problem of 
land as a result of European settlement. The presentation 
~ill open by sho~ing the role ~bich a royal chartered company, 
the Imperial British East Africa Company, played in opening 
up colonial exploitation in Ke~ya. This will be follo~ed by 
the steps which the British go~ernment took, particularly dur-
ing the early period of colonization, between 1900 and 1920, 
to implement ~bite settlement. The steps taken were mainly 
of a legal nature ~;hich formed the basis upon which Africans 
were deprived of their lund and it was given to European farm-
ers. The subsequent problems--forced labor, land shortage 
among Africans , restrictions imposed on African farmers, po-
litical implications (most of them still unresolved)-- will be 
brought to light. 
Constitutional development will constitute Chapter V 
and further references to the land issue will be made . The 
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I two subjects--land and politics--are so intertwined that it u 
impossible to separate one from the other and still retain a 
coherent picture of what is under discussion. In this chapte 
the major political changes which have taken place since Ken-
ya became a British possession will be reviewed. The period 
covered stretctes from 1910 to 1960. It \'lill become evident 
that fro?: the be~inning of the British rule in Kenya the po-
licie~ applied lacked sufficient realism. Conflict of politi· 
cal interest among the various racial groups resulted. Each 
group asserted political aspirations often contradictory to 
aspirations of other groups . ~henever a constitutional crisi1 
developed, as it did often, it ~.as the duty of the Britiah 
goven1ment in London, holding the ultimate responsibility ovel 
Kenya, to intervene and devise new measures to resolve th~ 
crisis. The course of action the British government usually 
took involved introduction of new constitutional refor~s. An 
analysis of the refcrms suggested and implemented as \'Jell as 
the resulting problems will be presented. 
u 
It should be borne in mind that at the time of writing, 
fall of 1961, Kenya is still a British Colony. wbile it is 
agreed in ;>rin=iple that Kenya ~ill become independent, no 
date for independence has yet been set. It is generally be-
lieved, however, that Kenya ~~11 bo free of colonial rule by 
the end of 1962. 
In cr4pter VI African nationalism ~ill be discussed. 
The pressure l.lhich thif: ne'l: force put en the British \i:ill be 
shown by the steps which the Dri tish government reluctantly 
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took to accelerate the political change. Attention v1ill be 
focussed on political upheavals of 1920's and post-war politi 
cal development during which time African nationalism assertec 
itself more aggressively. The moods and reactions created 
within Kenya by new co..11sti tutional declarations, especially 
among dissident. European settlers, l·lill be portrayed. 
Chapte r VII \vill be the final chapt.er of the thesis. 
It will deal exclusively with the Kenya Constitutional Confer· 
ence which was held in London in 1960. This conference marked 
a turning point in Kenya's political relations '!.\lith Britain. 
The resultinB proposals confirmed at least theoretically the 
transfer of legislative control from Europeans to Africans. 
In other words, it signified British admission th~t Kenya 
could no longer be thought of as "a t,.;hite man's country." 
Colonialism had given NlY to African nationalism. 
The material for my thesis comes from several sources. 
They include books, periodicals, government docuoents and 
manifestoes issued by various political parties that have ex-
isted in Kenya at one time or another . The authors quoted 
range l idely in their viel"'S and represent varying und not in-
frequently conflicting interests. There are extremist vie~s 
expressed by men who strongly believed in t!hi te rule and ,.;hite 
settlement. T~1s group includes Lord Delamere , Colonel E~art 
s. Grogan, Air Commodore Howard-Williams and Group Captain L. 
R. Briggs, all of ~hom settled in Kenya. There are views of 
former British officials represented by such men as Sir Char-
les Eliot . Lord Altrincham and Sir Phillip Mitchell , all for-
-7-
mer governors of Kenya. Views of the various colonial secre-
t aries are also included. To this group of settler extremis 
and official spokesmen must be added the name of Elspeth Hux-
ley, a notable author in her own right, who is generally re-
garded as the most un"mvering propagandist for the settler 
cause . 
Their vie'\1'15 a re balanced and often \'Jeakened by the fact 
provided by authors of liberal thought. The outstanding ones 
are McGregor Ross and Norman Leys, Englishmen who ho.d the op-
portunity to live in Kenya for many years; the late George 
Padmore, the prolific West Indian writer ~ho devoted conside 
able time in his writing to Pan-African affairs; Richard K. 
Pankhurst who has given a penetrating analysis of the Dritish 
colonial policy in Kenya, and finally, D.H. Rawcliffe. Jomo 
Kenyatta is the only African author who has been quoted fair-
ly widely. He became a distinguished scholar and active na-
tionalist long before others and a~alyzed Kenya's problems in 
an impassionate and balanced style. He is the personifica-
tion of African nationalism in Kenya. These men have criti-
ci zed British administr&tion with fairness and objectivity. 
In bettt1een these two groups are the vie'\'t·s of advocates 
of "multi-racial government" headed by Michael Blundell, L.s. 
B. Leaky and SPsan Wood. References \\<1.11 be made also to the 
scholarly work of Lord Hailey who has painstakingly done vo-
luminous investigation of the colonial question in Africa. 
Allowance, holH~ver, must be mde for Lord Hailey's bias '1.,1hich 
colors his work. 
-8-
Finally, as a native son of the co1.ntry j.n c;.uestion. I 
hold cert~in ideas, opinions, vi~\s and feelings ~hich I have 
tried to fit where they belong :!.n the course of this thesis. 
I have tried to speak with objectivity and & sense of balance 
On the other r~nc it in impossible to detach myself froc the 
circumstances \':hich h&vt'! so much molded my personnlity. I 
cannot fore~ myself to be a straneer or indif~erent to prob-
lems of ny o'JJ country. I have called injustico by n&me where 
it existed. Another person, especially a British colonial &d· 
winistrator, Ir"Y not gener&lly agree \\·ith \hat I stly. A cri-
tic has the right to differ in the same manner thC~t I have 
the right to criticize a colonial u.dcinistration. I £tm fully 
responsible for porsorwl flXpressions. 
The reader's nttention is C[dled to the fact that the 
information obtained in these seven chapters of the thesis 
does not constit.ute &. c<.~mplc~te picture or Kenya. In " contem-
plnted book, l-lhich a.c~ording to plLr s l'lill be s.n extension of 
this tt1esis, at least thrae: more chapters \oiill be added. 
One such additio11al chttptor, the ninth, lolill concen-
trate on the la~or sit.uati n both inclustrial and £ifricultural4 
It will attP.mpt to treat in detail such aspects of labor as 
recruitment, \'lUges . trade unionism and l.abor-gov<'rnnlent rela-
tionship. 
Chapter X will analyze the educational system in Kenya 
from the time it ~as introduced into the country by Scottish 
and English missionaries. The efforts of the missionaries , 
the government, and the Africans themselves to "improve" edu-
..---
n 
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f cation in 11:hatever manner each group thought bE·st ~ill be care • 
fully analyzed. The advantages and disadva.r"tages of the edu-
cational system in Kenya ~ill b£ consicered . 
The final chapter of the book, Chapter XI, will exa~ine 
the ~lau .Mau revolt ....-rich broke out in Kenya itJ 1952 and con-
tinued for several yenrs. The years between 1952 and 1960 , 
during \'hich time a state of emergency was enforced , \vere the 
most perilous, delicate a~d difficult ye&rs in Kenya ' s history 
The aim of the discussion 'Will be to bring out the complexity 
of the situation and ~he political effects of the r·evolt. 
As for the selection of my audience, the contemplated 
book may be read by t~o types of readers: specific and gea-
eral. By specific audience is meant certain groups or indi-
viduals who may have a particular tnterest in Ke.1ya . In this 
l i~ht the bock may serve a purpose to university researcbers , 
!government officials, and others who may uish to have facts 
!pertaining ~o such prob!.oms ae land, education , constJ.tution, 
economy and climate . 
In re3arrl to genoral audience the book is intP.nded to 
~?peal to the general public ; that is, it should meet the 
icur1osi ty of a reader who is seeking i n.for:nat1on about African 
~ffairs ;dthout beiug a scholar. , 
In view of the twin-purpose described, the projected 
~ook uill most likely be considered for publication on a mass 
~a sis by a coiamercial publishing establishrnent. A nu.'llbor of 
publishing houses in England hi;ve for a lon~ tiDHl published 
~ooks dealing with colonial matters. These include most of 
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I the book3 quoted in this thesis. T~n possible publishers, .. all 
i n London, are Faber and Faber, Hutchinson and Co., Independ-
ent Publishing Co., Dobson Books Ltd., Hogarth Press, Seeker 
and Warcurg, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., Frederick Muller 
Ltd., ThamP.s and Hudson, and Chapman Hall. 
In the United Stntes an increasi"lg number of publishing 
houses have taken a marked interest in the market for books 
on Africa . Each of the fcllo\;1ing companies has published at 
least one book on African nationalism in recent years: Harpe~ 
sr.~d Brothers; J,!cGrat -Hill; Charles Scribner's Sons; Dodd, Meac 
snd Co.; Houghton Mifflin; John Day; Mscmillen; Prentice-Hall 
Frederick • Praeger end Creative Age. Most of them are lo-
cated in Ne · York. 
In addi tion, univereity presses in both En~lar.d and the 
United States have increased their nroductton rate of books on 
African affairs. Qy£ord University Press, for example, issuee 
e booklet, Oxford B0Qks on Afric§, each year announcin~ books 
nveileble throu~h its own f~ctlities. Cambridge University 
Press is engaged in a similar operation. 
Correspon~ir.g production is carried out by uri vers:i. ty 
presses in the Uri ted States, the ovtstanding among ,_,hich are 
Hcrv~rd, Stanford, Cornell and Jor.n Hopkins. 
I hop~, that among these publishers in England and Ameri -
ca, there \'Jill be one or more interested 1n publi~hing my boo~ 
en Keny3.. 
! 
u 
CHAPTER I 
Kenya is named after a distinguished mountain• Kiri 
Nyaga or Mount Kenya. When the British came to the country, 
they found themselves confronted with unfamiliar and difficult 
names. To overcome this problem, they resorted to a system of 
anglicizing any name that proved difficult to pronounce. It 
so happens that most African names, for persons or places, con 
tain some meaning associated with greatness, historical events 
customs, catastrophes, and myths. ~ben the new nomenclature 
was adopted, it became impossible in many instances to retain 
the meaning of the names. Some names \'Jere so altered that it 
is no longer possible even to guess what they meant or stood 
for. 
Characteristically, the name or the country was angli-
cized. The name "Kenya," as the country is known today 
throughout the world, has no meaning whatsoever. But "Kiri 
Nyaga," which is the original and proper name, literally meana 
"That Which Contains God"; in other words, the Seat of God. 
It is unlikely that the British knew what the name ~t. 
I£ they have sin~e learned, there has been no attempt to re-
store the original name. At any rate, their arbitrary action 
must be decried, because it tended to remove from the people's 
-11· 
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minds the spiritual significance of their country's name. 
How did the country get its name in the first place? 
According to a Kikuyu1 legend, after God had "furnished the 
people of Kenya with a land that never runs short ot food, wa-
ter and grazing grounds,n2 He retired to His self-built, self· 
chosen mountain home to watch over his appreciative children 
as they set out on a difficult journey into life. The story 
concludes that God has ever since remained in the mountain. 
When the white man came to Kenya. he was overwhelmingly 
enchanted by the sight of the mountain. Anxious to know the 
name of it, presumably to tell of his discovery to the folks 
back home, he was told and, stumbling over the pronunciation, 
ended up corrupting it. The statutes never speak of Kiri 
Nyaga, but of Kenya. Although the spelling has been altered, 
Africans think it is necessary to retain the original meaning 
of the name . This is important because to t he people of this 
country the mountain means a number of things. It is a symbol 
of sacredness, and to those who still pray f acing Mount Kenya 
there is a spiritual comfort and joy to cherish. And to many 
the mountain is an undying piece of evidence that the country 
is their gift from God, and that when the white man came and 
took the best part of it for himself he was violating God's 
will, which to them is inviolable. 
1Kikuyu is one of the languages spoken in Kenya. 
2This is a rough translation of a few lines of a popular 
poem, "This is My Land," which school children used to recite 
in Kenya. The British banned such literature later because it 
was allegedly teaching extreme nationalism. 
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~ Kenya covers 224,960 square miles, almost two-and-one-
halt times the size of the United Kingdom, or equal to France 
and Belgium put together. It is slightly smaller than the 
state of Texas. 
Kenya lies in the eastern part of Africa. It is boundec 
in the south by the self-governing United Nations Trust Terri-
tory of Tanganyika, in the west by the British Protectorate oJ 
Uganda, and in the north by the independent states of Sudan 
and Ethiopia. It shares about half of its eastern border ~itt 
Somaliland, another independent state, ~bile the other half 
forms a coastal line on the Indian Ocean. It should be noted 
that the Equator almost bisects the country. This may lead 
one to think that Kenya's equatorial belt is intolerably hot. 
On the contrary, it is admirably cool, owing to the high alti-
tude. 
Kenya may be divided into four geographical regions. 
The Coastal Region is kno~n for its humid and rather uncom-
fortable climate, althouzb the mean shade temperature is only 
80°F. This area enjoys abundant rainfall. The second region, 
rising to about 3,000 feet above sea level, occupies about 
half of the entire country. It includes the area stretching 
from near the coast to the bottom of Mount Kenya and the nor-
thern part embracing the Lake Rudolf area. Because of inade-
quate rainfall, this region is sparsely populated. 
The third region contains the famous highlands of Kenya. 
The highlands actually consist of two alternating features: 
mountain ranges and hi~h plateaus. The mountainous section 
II 
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includes the Mau Escarpment ( 10,000 teet), Mount Elgon (14,000 
feet), and, of course, lount Kenya (17,040 feet). The pla-
teaus range from about 3000 to 9000 feet. Perhaps the most 
interesting feature in this region is the Great Rift Valley. 
It has its origin in Palestine and moves southward passing 
through Kenya. In some parts it is very wide; in other parts 
deep and narrow. 
Anyone's first stare out over the unbe-
lievable space of the Great Rift, says one 
observer, is an emotional experience that he 
will never forget. There is a sheer drop here 
of 2000 feet , like n wall , straight down the 
Kikuyu Escarpment. It makes you gasp. It 
takes you several minutes to ge5 both your 
brain and your eyes into focus. 
The climate in the highlands is perhaps Kenya's greatest 
asset. It is healthful, invigorating , and conducive to bounti· 
ful agricultural production. The mean temperatures range be-
tween 55 and 65 degrees. 
Legally, Kenya is a British Cro~ Colony. The Governor , 
appointed by the Queen of England , is the highest official in 
the Colony. He is vested with reserve po~ers which he is ex-
pected to use at his own discretion to veto the legislative 
council and the council of ministers. The current Governor , 
Sir Patrick Renison , 50, had had experience in colonial ser-
vice before c~ing to Kenya two years ago. His name hit the 
world press in 1953 when , as the Governor of British Guiana , 
he suspended the country's constitution to avert what was des-
3Negley Farson , Last Chance in A!rica (New York: Har-i""'",..... lh•; ,... .,..,..,f ~.... 1 0~0 l ""' ~JI 
...- -
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cribed as a possible communist take-over. In vielf of the con· 
stitutional development which is taking place in Kenya, Sir 
Patrick is expected to be Kenya's last governor. 
The council of ministers , ~hich replaced the executive 
council in 1954, is roughly equivalent to the presidential ca-
binet in the United States. The ministers are appointed by 
the Governor. By custom some of them must be ex-officio, that 
is, members of the civil service. The ministries of defence, 
finance, agriculture, an d legal affairs are usually reserved 
for senior civil servants--all Europeans. The rest of the 
ministries are distributed by means of appointment among elec-
ted and nominated members of the legislative council, To be 
appointed to the council of ministers one must first of all be 
a member of the legislative council. 
The legislative council, popularly kno~ as the Leg. Co. 
consists of members representing the various racial communi-
ties. Throughout Kenya's colonial history the legislature has 
been dominated by Europeans. But the 1960 Constitution chan6~ 
the pattern and gave the Africans a majority of seats. 
There are three ways through which one can become a mem-
ber of the Kenya legislative council. The first is through 
communal {racial) election. Each racial community is eiven a 
fixed nucber of seats to be filled by means of election. ~· 
peans vote for Europeans, Africans for Africans, and so on. 
The second method is by nomination. The Governor nominates 
~homever he wishes, with the understanding that such nominees 
would support government policies. Finally, the legislative 
ll 
I 
council, sitting as an electoral college, elects a designated 
number or individuals to fill up "national" (foruerly "spec~" 
seats ~hich are divided up among the racial groups. 
Administratively, Kenya is divided into six provincss~­
central, southern, northern, rift valley, coast, and nyanza. 
Nairobi , the capital, enjoys special status as a district. It 
is located in the central province. 
Heading each province is a commissioner hho administers 
with the advice and help or professional and technical experts 
on agriculture, police, education , veterinary and medical sci-
ence. 
Each province is in turn divided into a number of dis-
tricts . A district commissioner is in charge or the district 
administration. Several "locations" make up a district , each 
location being under the general supervision of a chief. A 
petty chief is responsible for one location, whereas a senior 
chief controls several . All chiefs--all or them Africans--
are government-appointees and the district commissioners' sub-
ordinates . A location may be divided into a sub-location (that 
means a village or several villages) headed by a headman , the 
lowest agent of the government . 
The people who live in Kenya consist of Africans and 
three immigrunt groups. 
Arabs were the earliest aliens to come to Kenya. For 
ten centuries , between the sixth and sixteenth, the Arabs of 
Oman engaged in commerce end politics along the east coast of 
·17-
hfrica.4 
They were fo llo~~ed by Portuguese, \~ho este.blished their 
influeHce on the ee:::;t Afric~m coast from the fifteenth cen-
tury. 5 They dP.feated th~ Arabs in a stru~le for pol,er , and 
for two hundred years, accorrline; to Elspeth Huxley • an Englist 
author \~·ho has written extensively on Kenya , lived in peace 
~ith the Arabs, who still controlled a few coustnl towns, in-
cluding Mombasa , Kenyn' s main port. J~fter regaining the 
strength they had once lost, the ~rabs drove the Portuguese 
out by 1700 and established themse.lv~s on a permant:nt basis. 
Portuguese as a group are no lon~er found in Kenya, but Arabs, 
numbering 35,000,6 are represented in the Kenya legislative 
council. 
The Asians, \lho no~ number 165 ,000, began to come to Ken 
ya in significant numbers towards the end of t he nineteenth 
century. They were brought in to help with the construction 
of Kenya's main railway. Before then there \'.ere a few Indians 
confined to the coast engaged in commerce. Henry ~en \':eller 
points out that there were a few I ndian businessmen along Ken-
ya 's coast in 1769. This was Istore than a century before the 
British arrived. 
None of these early comers decided to cross the coastal 
~lspeth Huxley, East Africa (London: Harrison and Sons, 
Ltd., 1940J, p. 21. 
5Honry 0\.;en v:eller, Kenya \4thout Prejudice (London: 
East Africa, Ltd., 1931), p. 1. 
6 Kenya Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Commerce and 
Industry ip Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer , 1958) , p. 60. 
.- --
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belt and settle in the interior. All of them--Arab, Portu-
guese, and Asian--confined their activity along the coast. The 
~nly contact they made with the hinterl~~d, especially the 
~rabs , was through the slave trade . Perhaps the human trade 
~as so lucrative that it was not necessary for the coastal 
~liens to seek other znerchandise. 
The Europeans, mostly British, who came later , penetratec 
into the interior where they made plans for permanent occupa-
tion. There are about 65 ,000 Europeans in Kenya today. These 
are not the descendants of criminals and undesirables, such as 
those who were deported to Australia, American colonies,? and 
other parts of the British Empire. They are in general a pro-
fessional group . They differ in several respects from other 
tlhite communities in Africa. 
First, there is no class of poor \.hites in Kenya. For 
~his reason Kenya Europeans do not engage in semi-skilled or 
~anual labor. They are usually placed in the higher positions 
7The fact that English criminals were deported to Amer~ 
is often obscured . A noted American sociologist says that un-
der George I an act waa passed in 1717 "authori zing the send-
~ng of criminals to America. " The act warned , "Any person co~ 
~icted of any offense for which he is liable to be whipt or 
[burnt on the hand, or shall be ordered to any workhouse ••• may 
~e sent to some of His Majesty ' s colonies and plantations in 
~merica . " In fact, as early as 1619 J ames I had ordered "a 
~undred dissolute persons to be sent to Virginia , " and lateran 
~he judges were empowered either to hang or to transport to A-
~erica certain traitors. As a result "Colonies became the re-
ceptacle of a large Share of her (England ' s) cricinal popula-
~ion . " Estimates range from 15 ,000 to 100, 000 of convicts sent 
~o America . One English writer , ~~rgaret Wilson, claims that 
American hist orians have minimized this factor in the American 
population. See Harry E. Barnes and Negley K. Teeters , New 
Horizons in Cr iminolo£v {Nett York : Prentice-Hall , 1943 ; pp. 
r.t37- 4J8. 
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although some of them are not qualified f.or such positions. 
S~ccnd, a large number of them are military men. Kenya 
h&s been said to h&ve "the greatest proportion &mong its in-
habitants of ex-soldiers, zenerals, colonels, ~ajors , of any 
country in the " orld. "g 
Third , they ~re ;;lmost enti~ely of British stock. This 
tends to gi ve the Europeen coo~unity in Kenya a sense of cohe-
sion and hox:1ogeneity. 
As for their occupations, t he:r·e s re .miesior aries who 
brought Chrieti&.nity to the country. There arc businessa1Em 
who usually occupy managerial positions. There are civil ser-
vants tthose loye.lty to the .British Cro\•n is immense, ilnd "hose 
performance is steadfast and praisel'~orthy. l·lany of these 
f aithful servants hope t hf.t their de0.1cation will one day earn 
them Queen's titles and honors in addition to a handsome pen-
sion upon retireQen t. 
By far the most important European segment in Kenya is 
C(lHprised of the> uettlers. It is difficult to fathom the mind 
of a typical Kerya settlf'lr . His whole attitude to\mrds the 
Africw;s sholi'S contenpt , disrespect, and a complete lack of 
appreciation of his blacl: n~ighhors ' feelings a nd aspirations. 
The Kenya settler has a very low opinion of the African, 
associat~~l n£; him with savagery and inferiority. This is demon-
strated by utterances l>Jhich have been made by t he Kenya set-
gNegley Farson , Behind God's Back (Ne~ York: Harcourt, 
Brace und Co.) 19h0) , p . 234. 
tl~rs themselves. 
Colonel E;·:c.r~ S. Crogan i3 .;. ca'Je in point. At almcst 
90, he 15 one of K:mya's old~st settlcrn, havin~ ccm~ into the 
country sixty years ago. He acquired fame as s young man for 
allegedly trav~lir~ on foot 5ix thousand miles from the Cape 
(South Africa) to Cairo. He th~n acquirGd large estates in 
Keny~ and settled. Cl">lonel Grcg3!l sho\\s a poor assessn:ont cf 
the Afric.:ns. He cr.ca declarec, 
His (Af~can) character is ~ada up of con-
tending elements , and is best explained by 
s~ying t:.at he ~s nc character a.t all. It 
is a blend9of the child and the beast of the field. 
'rhe Colonel a.ddsd that the .African "never tells the truth, 
anrl consequently never expects to hear it." After describing 
the Africans &s "hordes or savagea" who are "but slightly su-
perior to the lower animals," he recommended a sound system of 
compulsory Labor to educate them. That was in 1900. One 
\\ould think that the intervening years ~ould have made the 
colon~l a~preciate the difficulties under which African! ~ere 
laboring and lihat they were a~piri""lg to. But in the 1950's, 
-when Kenya \''ao gripped by a revolt, Colonel Crogan offered his 
recom~~ndation for ending the crisis. "Hang the rascals for 
treason," he said, "s.nd confiscate all the land" thE"'Y O):n.lO 
He was referring to the l'.au Mau members liiho were opposing the 
~Ewart s. Grogan and Arthur H. Sharp, F!om the Cape tQ 
CairQ {I.ondon: Hurst and Blackett, Ltd. • 1900, p • .355. 
10\. Alphaeus Hunton, Djcision in Africa (Ne\'' York: In-
ternational Publishers, 1957 , p. 23. 
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Br~t:nh colon:al!sm ~ith violrnce. 
The fact t:•a t.. ~1.cueu have chun_;nd so e .... . u t.l)' ::;eems to 
iP.g and vmtts 1~0 Live in the past. D.J:. na~·cliffe , an Engli.sl 
1.\r.iter of libel'al thO'lght , says that the SP,tulQX' '~has an out-
look too ueepJ y rooted in pu•Jt ~plendcu~u of Gro\ru and Empire 
to be ..tblc t;r.> adapt hlro3el! su\!cessfully to the cha.agi.ng lifl"'i· 
CWl SC!!ne • nll 
The t rouble bee:tJS to be that ~he Kenya settlo:t~ is ob-
sessed 1\lth lLis O\.n superi ori t!' an d, as u pur let of white su-
premacy, he rejee~s the i dea of e qu&lity \vith the .Africans. 
George Delf, a J'OUllg rn~li9hr.:an living in Kenya, ";.hinks that 
vJwt the settler \ltants is "freedom to rule, not only hiraself 
ur.d the other set tlers , but the entire population of Afri cans 
a~d Indiang as \ell";12 and would l i ke to convert Kenya " into 
a full-blown \,hi te dlc tatorship on tho lines of South Afrlca.."l3 
Since it is sheer folly to lot th•! Afri cans enjoy thP 
human right;s they are entitled to , the !(cnya settlr.n· \\Ol:.ld bo 
pre~ared to use his ~ealth and influence to i~pede , if not to 
stifle , the Afri can march towa.r•ds freedom. That is \•hy he i3 
excesoi vely indignant when Af-ricans are granted small politi-
c&l concessions . 
Lln. H. Rawcliffe, The Struggle for Kenya (London: Vic-
tor Goll&ncz, Ltd., 1954), p. 132 . 
12~eorge Delf, JQmo Konya tta (NE>~'J York: DoubledC~.y and 
Co ., 1961) , p. 127. 
13Ibid,, p . 128. 
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The typical Kenya settler also believes that Africans 
are morally depraved . One of them says, 
African corruptibility is one of the facts 
of dai ly life and it is a reason why the 
European intends that something of a color 
bar shall continue for an appreciable time 
longer in positions of trust,14 
The writer estimates that only a small proportion of Africans 
are capable of British standards of honesty, and that the 
very few who have integrity at all ~ould break do~ under 
pressure wunless they have strong European backing against 
which to lean. n15 
The European leadership under which the Africans must 
live must be based on Christian principles. This is essentia 
for African development, because the "concept of the brother-
hood of man is quite foreign to the African's mentality,nl6 
The settler' s 
wish is to make Kenya into a projection of 
western Christian civilization in Africa , 
and it is his hope that under his influ-
ence the African who has only barbarism 
behind him can be educated into a service-
able African product of7western civiliza-tion and Christianity. 
The same author in another book opines that the elements of 
true Christian civilization ~hich nilluminate such a large 
proportion of the homes of Britain are as yet almost complete 
l4J F • • Lipscanb, 
ber , 1956), p . 122. 
15Ibig. 
16Ibid,, p . J8 , 
17Ibid •.• p, 126. 
White African§ (London: Faber and Fa-
I 
-23-
ly absent f rom the homes of the great majority of the Afri-
cans . "18 
What we have seen above is a sample of the knowl edge 
that t he majority of Kenya settlers have of the Africans. We 
have also seen some of the ideas- -ideas based on the British 
standards and Christian precepts--which the settlers advocate 
for improving the Africans. 
The settler's knowledge of the African is scanty at best. 
His ignorance is more apparent than his knowledge of the Afri-
cans , and his views are to be pitied rather than admired . By 
and large , the Kenya settler "has been isolated from the gen-
eral changes which have been taking place throughout Europe 
since 1939,"19 and more so from the maelstrom of African na-
tionalism ~ithin Kenya itself. The African he knows a little 
about is his house servant , his laborer--the type that is ac-
qui escent and subservient; even with this type, effective com-
munication based on human understanding and sympathy does not 
exist . It is a master-servant relationship. The settler has 
had no wholesome contact ~ith the educated African. 
He likes the simple , uncritical, uned-
ucated African . He \~ould be happy surround-
ed by such Africans all day, if necessary , 
but he detests the educated African40he just does not know how to deal with him.• 
l8J. F. Lipscomb, We Built a Country (London: Faber and 
Faber , 1955), p. 193 . 
19Rawcliffe , QP• cit., P• 133 . 
20 
I bid., p. 134. 
~· 
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The settler who extols the Christian way of life has 
done more to corrupt Christian principles than to strengthen 
them. It is ridiculous that he should present himself as a 
symbol of Christian purity. The things he has done in Kenya , 
as we shall see later, including forced labor , confiscation o1 
African land, depriving Africans of their political and econo-
mic rights, advocating \hito supremacy--all these practices 
are most unchristian in thought, in deed, in spirit. 
The Kenya settler is not a logical man. ke is not ra-
tional . Thirty years ago he 'Was confident and determined. To 
day he is unsure of himself and confused and, above all, a ver:! 
troubled man. His behavior is regulated by a common denomina-
tor: fear. 
Susan \'tood, a Kenya resident, thinks t his fear has three 
elements in it: (1) that his "whole way of life may be 
swamped by people of an entirely different culture"; (2) that 
if Africans are granted power, "the European community, with 
all its experience in administration, agriculture, and economy 
will no longer have any influence or say in t he affairs of the 
country"; and (J) that economically an African government 
"might terminate the leases \~hich the settler holds, or expro-
priate his land, ignoring individual property rights . n21 
From the settler's point of view these fears may be jus-
tified . As a people who "have come to feel that the superior!~ 
21susan wood~ Kenya , Thj Tensions of Progress {London : 
Oxford University Yress, 1960 , pp. 11-13. 
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I ty given them by history is inherent in their race,n22 the set 
tlers want to maintain the status quo. 
I 
\.bat the settler is primarily in-
terested in is the preservation of his 
broad acres, his privileged status, his 
servants, his high standard of living, 
and, perhaps, the satisfactory feeling 
of s~yeriority that these have given 
him. 
From the African point of view, settlers' fears are not 
to be taken seriously for the simple reason that settlers ' in-
terests are not the only interests to be looked after. Their 
interests must be subordinated to national interests. This 
writer knows for certain that once Africans are in power im-
mediate measures will be taken to eradicate injustices emana-
ting from colonialism. These include unfair distribution of 
land, unjust appropriations of educational funds, government 
representation, and so on. It is hoped that for the first 
time in Kenya's history the settlers will become acquainted 
with the principles of justice and equality. 
Africans know the settler's game. They see him as an 
amusing conjurer who, in order to gloss over his crimes and 
failures, would concoct all sorts of stories to lay claim on 
other people•s property and give an exaggerated picture of his 
own importance and achievement. He is in the African's eyes a 
stumbling block to their progress. 
The settler's old dream , "to cast the 1frican in his own 
22 
Ibid,, P• 11. 
23Rawcliffe, 2Pt cit . , P• 132. 
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4mage" in a "process that will take centuries to mature,n24 is 
~orever shattered. He must recognize and accept the change--
~he change that has brought the Africans to the forefront , 
ready to take over the reins of government. The settler has 
posed as a modern Canute. It is to be hoped that he possesses 
"that monarch's sagacity to bow to the inevitable before it is 
25 too late." 
Africans are by far the largest group. Due to lack of 
reliable devices to establish population census, the exact num 
~er of Africans in Kenya is not known. The 1957 estimates put 
~t at 5,990,000. It is perhaps a million more. At any rate, 
pn the basis of population figures given, Africans outnumber 
~he Europeans roughly at the rate of 100 to 1 . Put in a dif-
~erent way, Africans constitute about 97 per cent of the total 
~opulation, the Asians 2 per cent , and Europeans 1 per cent. 
~his is an important fact to remember . On the one hand, it is 
~ reminder that sheer numbers are not necessarily a great ad-
~antage. For more than half a century Kenya ' s political nower 
~as been in the hands of this tiny group of Europeans. On the 
pther hand, population preponderance of one particular group 
~ecomes a decisive factor when the mass is aroused and deter-
mined to secure social justice. 
For one who is interested in an anthropological approach 
24Ibid,, p. 132. 
25Ibid. 
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to the Africans of Kenya, they fall into three major eth~ic 
groups. The Nilotic group embraces the Nandi , the Lumb~a, the 
Luo, the Suk, and the Turkana, all of whom occupy the northern 
and western parts of the country. TI1e Bantu, represented by 
the \ akikuyu and the \'!akamba , inhabit the central part of the 
country. The Nilo-Hamitic group, in the south, is exemplified 
by the soldierly, lion-fighting l~sai. 
Kenya Africans speak different languages, about forty of 
them. The presence of the various languages presents many 
difficulties ~hich clog the avenues of communication not only 
in Kenya but in the whole African continent. In Kenya, howe~ 
tho problem is considerably reduced by the presence of more or 
leas a common language, Swahili. Anyone who has some knowle~ 
of either Swahili or English (besides his mother tongue) will 
~et along reasonably well, and one ho speaks both will find 
~ittle difficulty in being understood. s~ahili has its own 
~iterature and a large vocabulary. It has borro~ed some words 
from Arabic, Portuguese, and English. ~~ny of its words have 
in turn been incorporated into a few foreign languages. Such 
St1ahili 'ords as "safari," "bwana," and "mama" have become a 
~rt of the English language. But Swahili is in the first 
place a language by itself. It has an infinite capacity of 
growth and can extend into scientific, medical , and literary 
fields. "S~ahili is rich in ~ords, ideas and concepts, and is 
capable of conveying subtle differences and shades of meaning 
~hat escape even the most refined western languages , " says one 
.--
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language student. 26 It is expected that one day it will be-
come the East African official languag~. 
The African society is in a process of transition. Tril: ~ 
al organization as kno' n to our forefathers has been broken 
down. This has destroyed some of the finest ingredients in 
human relations. Those who look upon the tribe as a symbol o1 
stability and continuity and as a repository of cultural heri-
tage have reason to be grieved. (I personally share this ~1 
to a degree, because I should like to see certain cultural fea~ 
tures, aa practised in the olden days, preserved.) There is, 
for example, tremendous stability , 11armony, and cohesion built 
around the family. This ought to be saved. Jtfricons will 
have less to gain and more to lose by changing their family 
relationship. There are also methods, practices , und proce-
dures, connected with marriage , administration of justice, and 
communal life, l'lhich are of superior quality. They would servE 
the people better than any foreign substitutes. But how to 
preserve these beautiful values of the tribe is a question thai 
remains unresolved. 
Inasmuch as there is something good to look for in the 
tribal way, it is unanimously agreed that tribalism belongs to 
the past and that it cannot be maintained ~ithout endangering 
national goals and national unity. The search now is for a 
political and social system of a l'~igher order which will amal-
gamate the people of Kenya into one nation state, This is a 
26l-Iario Pei, "A Living Language, Swahili , " Holiday, 
(April . 1959) . p . g3. 
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lise choice; in fact, it i~ the only choice. Nationalism s.nd 
tribalism cannot coexist. One must give way to the other. 
Nationalism surrenders to nothing. 
The majority of Africans in Kenya live in rural villages 
as peasant farmers, herdsmen , and tradesmen. Most of the pea-
sants engage 1n subsistence agriculture because they are not 
trained for scientific farming; even if they were , they would 
not find enough arable land to use, since most of it is by law 
a preserve of European farmers. The herdsmen keep cattle, 
sh~cp and goats for food, sale , and matrimonial purposes. The 
tradesmen operate in market places ns retailers, mechanics , 
and butchers. Fishermen engage in their trade along the coast 
and around Lake Victoria. There is a large number of Africans 
estimated at a quarter of a million, who live on European 
farms lis lf.bo.,...ers. 
Out there in the country they live in grass, wooden, or 
stone houses, depending on the means of support. Kenya is 
still a men's country. The man heads his family consisting of 
a wife or wives and children. The 'Wife, ho\;ever , has an im-
portant role to play in caring for the children, tilling the 
soil, and cooperating with her husband, mindful of the fact 
that the husband has the veto in many matters . 
An inc~easing number of Africans live in cities and ~~ 
Urban life in the interior of th~ country is a thing of roc~nt 
past. ~~st of Kenya's to~s and cities have come into exist-
ence in the last forty or f1fty years. They grew as a result 
of commercial rather than industrial enterprise . According to 
,.----
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the latest available fi gures, Nairobi, the capital,las a popu-
lation of 234,000; .ombasa, the second largest city, has 
145,000.27 
Urban Africans are doing 1mport3nt jobs to keep the in-
dustries, the businesses, communications, and the government 
going. In Nairobi, ·:iombasa, Kisumu, Voi, Machakos, Nyeri, 
~akuru, Eldoret, Kitale, Kitui, Kakamega, Torero, and other 
to~ms, one would find fricans playing increasingly important 
positions in economic , ~ocial and political life of the coun-
try. After a day ' s ~;ork urban Africans return to their living 
quarters specifically deaignaced for them according to the 
segregation la~s in residential areas. 
There is another class of urban Africans that is expand-
i ng rapidly; that is , a class of professional men and women. 
Today, unlike fifteen years ago , one would meet a host of Af-
rican lawyers, doctors, nurses, legislators, politiciar s , 
journalists, college lecturers, economists, chemists, social 
~nthropologists, historians, labor leaders. The future of Ken 
~a lies in the hands of these trnined people who would be the 
~irst to be called upon to direct the machinery of the govern-
~ent. At present th~y stand as the vanguard of the opposition 
~o British imperialism, and the mass is behind them. 
27Ea§t Africa Inrormation D~geet (London : East Africa 
Pffice, 1960), p . 10. 
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CHAPTER II 
COJ·!tiUU: CATIONS 
Press 
There are five daily newspapers in Kenya today. T~o of 
~hem, the East Arrican Standard and the Mombasa Time§ , are pub· 
~ished by the East 1frican Standard , Ltd., an English newspape1 
phain which also o~~s dailies in Tanganyika and Uganda. The 
pther three dailies are the Daily ChrQnicle, the Kenya Daily 
Mail and the Nation. 
The East African Standard (eire . 21,000)1 is by far the 
~oat important of all newspapers in Kenya and the rest of East 
~£rica. It is published daily in Nairobi, except Sunday, and 
~ppears in a special enlarged weekly edition on Friday. Its 
~ize is normally 24 pages. 
Its news coverage is quite comprehensive. Its front 
page is filled with important foreign and national news with 
~ccompanying pictures. Although it uses banner headlines it 
~an by no means be described as sensational . In fact it is on 
~e ~hole a conservative ne spaper. Technically it is well or· 
;anized. Other items include ads, fashion, society , sports , 
etters to the editor, and special features . 
1Helen Kitchen , The Press in Africa (\lashington , D.C.: ~uth Sloan Associates, Inc., 195oY , p . 29. 
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Edito!'ially it claim<) to be .tndPpend~nt but upon close 
exauination there is evidence that it generally reflects a 
European point of view ,:J.nd supports Government policies. 
The Morobasa Times, with less circulation , i~ modeled on 
the East Africp,n Standard, its ~)arf nt news1'>aper, and it is 
published in Homba~a. 
The Daily Chronicle is also published in the capital by 
the African and Colonial Press Agency, Ltd.. Indian-o~ned , it 
is published in English and Gujerati and appears daily except 
Sunday. Its editorial policy is definitely anti-colonialism 
e.nd therefore anti-Government. Its former editor M. Pinto , 
was arrested and detained for sevf:r.al years because of his 
political activity. The Datly Chronicte appeals to Africans 
\''ho do ,not have their 0\vn daily ne\lSpaper. 
The fot·rth daily, the K§nya Daily l•lail , is also ovmed by 
Indians. Founded in 1926, 2 it has a small circulation (2,000 
daily , 3,000 l'leekly). It is moderately anti-colonialism and, 
like cost of smaller Indian papers, it caters primarily to 
sociul anc busint:-ss ir,terests o.r.d reports regularly ne-ws from 
Indi~. It appears in both English and Gujerati. 
Finally , th~ Nation , which became a doily in 1960, hav-
ing been a \-:eekly for nearly tto years. 'I'he f!atiQn is pub-
lished by the Ee1st African Nel':·spapers , Ltd. , the second Eng-
lish nel:sp£<per chain in East Africa. The Nation is distin-
-
guished from other dailies in that it is the only important 
I 
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afternoon ne~spaper and the only one that appears in t~o edi-
tions simultaneously, one in English and the other in s~ahili . 
This makes the N§~ion a double daily. Editorially it is inde-
pendent and conservative. 
Kenya is likely to have a sixth daily, Jicho , (the ~) 
~hich is already in circulation as a bi-~eekly but which is in 
tended to be established ae a daily soon. 
Reuters news service supplies Kenya's daily newspapers 
~ith ~orld news. Supplementary news is supplied by the South 
African News Service. 
Weekly and fortnightly newspapers are found in large num 
bers. Some of these will be mentioned. 
Barazi , published every Saturday by ~he East African 
Standard, Ltd., is ~holly designed to appeal to African read-
ers. It is the African newspaper. It is published entirely 
in s~ahili except for special features which may appear in 
~oth English and S~ahili , and the editorial is al~ays bi-lingu 
~1 . Baraza has African editors, African reporters and African 
~olumnists. But policy making is in the hands of its publish-
~rs. ~ataza reports mainly national news but it also includes 
~!rica's and world news . Its circulation, according to Helen 
~itchen , author of Tbe Press in Africa, is 40,000. This is 
~ut a guiding figure . The total readership is perhaps double 
~his number. One copy of Baraza may be read by one family and 
~hen passed to another; or it may be read to a group of inter-
ested listeners ~ho cannot read themselves. This shows that a 
paper with a small circulation may have a tremendous reader-
~-
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ship. Baraza is distributed throughout East Africa. 
The KenYA Weekly New§ is published every Friday at taku-
ru, an agricultural town in the heart of Kenya highlands. Com 
pared with other newspapers , it is bulky with an average of 70 
~ages. Its editorials, commentary and special features show 
clearly its pro-European, and particularly its pro-settler, at 
titude . It is opposed to what it regards as rapid African po-
litical progress. It contains national news, special features 
summaries of world news, short stories, africa 's news, sports 
and heaVY advertising. Technically, like most of Kenya news-
papers , it is proficiently organized. 
Other newspapers include the Co~onial Times , a Hindu-
owned, middle-of- the-road weekly which supports the views of 
~he Indian National Congress but remains sympathetic to the 
~uropean point of view; the Citizen (eire . 6 ,500), Indian-
owned, which carries syndicated news and cartoons from the 
~nited Kingdom press; the Catholic Times of Eas~ Africa , found 
ed in 1937 and published at Mombasa , which features world news 
of interest to Catholics; the ~' the organ of the Protestant 
church; the Observer , appearing in English and Gujerati; the 
Goan Voice , a weekly, aimed at local Goan nationalists opposed 
to Portugal •s dictatorship and Rafiki Yety (Our Friend} , anoth 
er missionary propaganda paper. 
It has not been possible to organize African press on 
permanent, stable basis because of certain forbidding factors . 
Pne such factor is the cost. Helen Kitchen has estimated in 
~er book that in order for a newspaper to succeed "something 
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on the order of 150,000 pounds ($420,000)" is needed in the 
initial stages. This is a difficulty that many Africans can-
not overcome. 
Another factor is created by laws which have been enact-
ed for the express (not admitted officially) purpose of curb-
ing the freedom of information. The Book and Newspaper Regis-
tration Ordinance of 1906 authorizes the Government to issue 
3 
registration of books and ne~spapers. The printers and pub-
lishers are supposed to submit brief reports indicating the 
title of the ne~spaper, the names and addresses of the pro-
prieters and t he circulation. The official vie point used to 
be that this ordinance did not impose control over the press , 
but when in 1950 the Penal Code was amended, giving the courts 
the power to confiscate presses used in the printing of "sedi-
tious" literature, it was no longer possible to defend the of-
ficial position. A little later, in October 1952, a further 
blow was dealt to the freedom of the press. The Printing 
Presses Ordinance was passed, empo~ering the Registrar of 
Printing Presses to cancel any licence if it were established 
that the licensee was keeping or using a printing press for 
"unlawful purposes or for the printing of any document prejudi 
cial to, or incompatible with, peace or good order in the 
colony." 4 
3Great Britain, HistQrical Suryef of the Origi8 and 
Growth of ~mu ~~u (London: Her Majesty s Stationeryffice, 
~9oOJ, Cmd. 1030, p . 193. 
4 Ibid., p . 193 . 
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Basically the Law of the Press in Kenya is an adaptation 
of the English Press La~ which was formulated in the eighteent} 
and nineteenth centuries -when the monarchy and the Parliament 
~ere struggling over the control of the press. But it has 
been slightly modified to meet the particular situations found 
in Kenya . The implementation of the Preas Law in Kenya a~rs 
in the African eyes as a calculated measure to interfere with 
the goals of African nationalism. Sedition is officially de-
fined as an intention "to promote feelings of ill-will and hos 
tility between different classes of the population of the col-
ony."5 African society is not stratified into definite econom 
ic classes such as those that exist in England. It is there-
fore meaningless to allude to hostility that may be based on 
African classes . The different classes t hat actually exist in 
Kenya are the classes of the rulers and the ruled, that is, 
the Europeans and the Africans. Any African newspaper which 
attacks the status quo or suggests abolition of the privileged 
position of the Europeans is immediately indicted for seditWn 
It is because of the harsh laws, aggravated by the high 
cost of operating a newspaper, that the African press has re-
~ined undevelopod . 
It is true that a measure of freedoc of inforcation ex-
ists and , as a matter of fact, criticism of the Government is 
~olerated to some extent. This concession, however , is en-
~oyea only by pro- Government newspapers . The Government has 
5Ibid., p . 194. 
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on many occasions suppressed ne\':lspapers that criticised the 
colonial policy and called for reasonable constitutional 
changes. Similarly a lot of books ~hich have attacked and ex-
posed the injustices of British administration in Kenya have 
been banned from the country and their authors , if local Euro-
peans, deported. 
The difficulties cited were responsible for the extinc-
tion of Rsdio Posta. the first African daily founded in 1947. 6 
Since then many African ne\spapers, daily and weekly , have canE 
and vanished before they were properly established. Proscribe 
newspapers included Mumenyereri (Guardian), a political organ 
first published in 1920's; Sauti ya Mwafrikg (African Voice), 
~other party ne,~s paper; Muramati (Searcher) ; Habari ( Uews) , 
1walimu (Teacher), and Uhytu wa Mwafrika (African Freedom). 
These African-o~ned newspapers were generally knohn to 
~e on the Attorney General ' s list. It did not surprise any-
body, although some protest could be heard, "hen they began to 
disappear one by one. All of them were virulently anti-Coloni 
al rule and hammered constantly and f~arlessly on the theme of 
~reedom. Many of the editors were fined or jailed. 
African ne~~spapers have not been the only victims of the 
~overnrnent's stringent measures. It is known that at least 
pnce in Kenya's history the Government did ban a European news-
~aper, the Kenya Comment. This occurred in 1960. Kenya Com-
:nent was an extremist political or~San O\>ned by extremist right· 
6Richard K. Pankhurst , Kenxa: The Higtory of Two Nations 
London: Independent Publishing Co. s) p. 2 • 
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wing settlers. It fanatically preached the doctrine of ~hite 
~upremacy, attacked the Government in scathing and barbaric 
~erms for tending to give in to Af rican nationalism and , even 
~n harsher language, denounced Africans for questioning the 
~uropean rule and for asking for freedom. In an effort appar -
~ntly designed to placate Europeans for this unprecedented ac-
~ion , the Government decided to ba simultaneously Uhuru (Free· 
~om) , a paper owned by an African political party. 
Kenya i s s t ill vir tually wi thout African ne~spapers. 
~here are numerous newsheets and part y ne~spapers such as 
Sauti Ya Kanu {the voice of the Kenya African National Union) 
~ut nothing good enough to compare wi th European or even Indim 
newspapers . 
The Government itself plays a prominent role in distribu· 
~ion of information mainly for propaganda purposes . The De-
partment of Information is ntrusted ~ith this important func-
~ion . The Government papers ar e produced in multi - languages . 
~Y 1956 Hel en Kitchen , in he r book , says there were at least 
~ 3 such Government - produced or Government-supported papers . 
razama (Look) and Kenya Calling are t ypical examples of Govern-
Dent papers . 
The missionari es , Catholics and Protestants , also publisr 
~heir o~n ne~spapers to promot e their ~ork and faith . 
Broad castine: 
In the sphere of broadcasting the Government has a vir-
[ ~ual monopoly. The Kenya Broadcasting Service , under the di-
.____ 
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rection of the Department of Information, dominates news broad 
casting throughout the country. 
The KBS operates two major programs, national and region 
al. The national programs are transmitted from Nairobi in Eng 
11sh and Swahili for a total of 43i7 hours a week. These pro-
erams can be itemized as follms: 
music and variety 
n~ws ~nd news talk 
features and drama 
religious hour 
BBC relays 
miscellaneous 
19 3/4 
6 9l 
2 
~t 
hr 
hr 
hr 
hr 
hr 
hr 
Total 43~ hours 
The regional programs are carried out by three regional 
stations, each covering a wide area of the country. 
1 . Sauti ya Mvita , at Mombasa , broadcasts 53 3/4 hours a 
week in Arabic , S~ahili , KiMvita , and Somali . The program is 
~ore or less a carbon copy of the national program. 
2. The West Kenya Station uses six languages (Luo, Swahi 
li Luluhya , Kalenjin and Kisii , Jk hours each; Swahili 25 hoUM 
and 30 minutes; and English li hours ) for a total of 39i hours 
a week . 
3. The Mount Kenya Station , at Nyeri , makes use of only 
two languages, Kikuyu and Kikamba , for 40i hours a week. 
The KBS also produces two programs for overseas broad-
casting organizations . One program is sent to the British In-
formation Services in New York which in 1958 circulated among 
7Kenva 1958 (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1959), p. 92 • 
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more than 200 independent radio stations in the United States. 
The other program consists or a series of traditional African 
music ~hich is produced for the Central Program Division of 
the BBC in London. 8 
The Kenya Broudcasting Service encourages its listeners 
to \.rite, comment, and suggest, on the programs. It is esti-
mated that on the average 300 letters are received daily for 
the national proerarns. For regional programs the input. is 
less. 
Before 1958 l\ihen the establishment of KBS \'fas proposed,9 
news broadcasting '~as shared by the Cable and \\'ireless, Ltd. , 
a private English concern , and the Department of Information, 
~hich then ran a reduced program . ~~en the KBS was finally 
created, it \\as announced that the Government \\'ould hence-
forth assume the total responsibility of ne\~S broadcasting . 
It meant that Cable and ~ireless, ~hich had been in operation 
for nearly thirty years, had to go out of business. What ac-
tually happened ~as that the Government refused to rene~ the 
contract of the Cable and Wireless . The Government ~1ent on to 
say that KBS l".'ould initially be operQted by the Government but 
later t-•ould become- an independent corporation. 
The only independent radio station in Kenya today is the 
Forces Broadcasting Services ~rhich provides lighter programs 
for the British troops stationed in the colony. 
8 Iy1g,, p. 93. 
9Kenya Calling, April 19 , 1958. 
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CHAPTER III 
ECONO~Y AND TRANSPORTATION 
Economv 
Kenya's econouy 1 based .?l"imari ly on agriculture. Cof· 
fee , twhich \'las introduced in Kenya from hrabia it~ 1S96, 1 . is 
the la:-t,;est export crop and places Kenya next to Uganda as the 
ln.rgest producer of ~offC"e in the British Commony.ealth. Be-
sides coffef\ other importnnt cro,>~ arc tea, hheDt , corn , sisal 
pyrethr~)m , suJ;~r and barley. The follo~1ing table of gross 
r~venue 2 ~ho~Js what ~c..ch crop notted during the 1957-59 peri-
od. 
Coffee 
Tea 
\iheat 
)laize 
Sisal 
1957 
£8 ,9.38 ,000 
£.3,040,000 
!3 , 589 ,000 
.£.2, 427 ,000 
£2,144 ,000 
1958 
8 ,306 ,000 
4,424,000 
2,927 ,000 
2, .372 ,000 
2, 4.33 ,000 
1959 
7,700 ,000 
4,991,000 
2,702,000 
1 ,576,000 
.3 , 628,000 
The tota1 agricultural revenue for 1959 , the high~st of 
the three, was .3.3,959 ,000 pounds . Thi s included a small re-
venue obtained from animal industry - cattle, sheep, pigs, 
1Elspeth Huxley , Uhite Man's Country (London: )~cmillan 
& Co., Ltd., 19.35), I, 9.3. 
2 
Econanic Survey l$60 (Nairobi, Govcrnmmt Printer, 1958), p. 27 . 
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hidP3, nnd skins. 
There \·iere in 1957, 62 ,ooo3 J\frican coffee grot,~rs shE.r-
ing a total acreac;e of 16,783, that is, roughly 3. 7 acrf)s to a 
farmer. EuropPon acreage 'His put at 60,000. The exact number 
of Euro poa n farmers engaged in coffee ir~clustry \~Qa not given , 
bt..t it must be a frt ction of "EuropeUl farmin coeumuni ty of &-
bout 2700 fe.r1ilies 't4 that 11 ve ir- I:eny". 
Ke~ya ' s i ndustrial development is concent rated on second ~ 
CJ.ry 1r.dustries hc;sod on imported ar.d locE.lly available rD.ll ma-
terials. 
Y~ny industri~ s ar~ engag~~ ir processing ?ri~ary agri-
cultural products such c,e coffee , tea , ~·heat , corn , ougar and 
r1.. ce . Soe? , fats an'' glue re manufactured , so O;re pyrethrum 
e."'d ~ attle e>:tract; sisel t'\'·i .... e , rope and ba s. Ther~. are fac 
tories fer producing ins~cticides and f rtilizers; for c~nning 
of locElly ~ro~n pineapple, beans , pe&~ , ffi£at , ~utter unc 
cr€am , &nd fer the spin~in~ and ~eaving of impcrtcd jute. Al-
so there 2r€ large fJctories , lP.t alor.c small cnea , for ~nu­
~acturing machine-mEde boots and stoes for local rearket ~r.d ex 
bort . Blankets and t~xtiles ~re manuf~ctvred fro~ ~oolen and 
5ynthetic yarns at Nakuru , and a large factory at ~o~bara is 
producing alurrinum sheets frc rn imported ingots. ~etal ~indows 
pnd metal door frames are in production. 
Gereent is manufactured locally; glass factories are pro-
JKenya 19~Z (Nairobi , Government Printer , 1958) , p . 27. 
4The Gugrdian (~~ncheater) , Apri l 27 , 1961, p . 2 . 
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ducLTig bottles , jars and elusJware. 1 .. number of b:-e"Weries pro 
duce several varieties of excell13nt beer, and various brands 
of cigarettes are manufactured locally. Othe~ locally manu-
fac~ured articles include pl&~tic goods , ply~oods , houseclean-
ing ms.terluls , soup and bru:1hes . J\ Gove:"IUill1nt report estiw~ec 
t '1ut in 1931., cllere '.,e::-e at least 130 di fferent artlcles manu-
factured in Ken1a . Heavy injust:i es ~re non-existent but pl~ 
are u..11der -...yay to ir.crease second .... !""'/ ru1d light iudu:Jtrios. " .. 
ootor :ar assembly plru1t !~s beeJ p:-oposed and engineorin~ con 
s ,..ructional l\'ork h&s l;:)ee:l sterted. \~i th cstcJ.blishruent of sttel 
rolli~. 
•-<-st of Kenya's exLernel t r-dc ic; \d th the Unitec Kihg-
dom , f ollollerl by Japan , Indi& • the N ct.he!'l ...nds • l'letlt Gcnn&ny 
"":nd t .. e United :Jtat~s. Tr c..C.e .:it ' 1 oth~r .P.fr!<.:an countries is 
on t,he ri~e ..:..r.d . rab c~ur.-::-ies have shoY.n interest. 
Yd~er~l producti on is o~ a smull ~cale. The cou~nt ry 's 
l!iner a l '>otenticd is nc~ kno".·:n sir..ce cnly 1.,6 per cent o ... ~he 
COll."ltry hr1s been sur··;; _d , .::..c cording tc t he 195S Gover11r.1ent 
report quot e d. earlier. :•.ining ir..du3try for tha1. year arnoU!lt-~d 
to only 4 , 305 ,159 ?Ounds compared to )2 , 734 , 000 pounds in agri 
cultjurul revenue for the same year. The lea.ding mineral pro-
puct i s soda a~h , for export , extrc.~ted .,:'roc Lake l · ladl . Ot-
her important tniner~ls are diu.tome which is produced on a con-
siderable scale , gold , u.nd :-efined silver. Carbon dio.>.ide gas 
r;raphite, columbite, felspar , limestone , quartz , pumice, ar.d 
Pypsum are produced in small quantities . 
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i Curre_nc_.y 
I 
Kenya has common currency with Uganda, Tanganyika , Zanz1 
bar {island) , and the Aden Protectorate . The standard coin is 
~he Eaet African shilling. T enty shillings is equal to one 
~ound sterling ($2. 60). A shilling (lJt) is divided into 100 
~ents. East African currency is at parity with sterling and 
~t is exchangeable at the same rate as sterling. 
tl'ranaoortation 
Kenya also shares common transportation systems with 
pther East African territories. The Government- controlled East 
~trican Railways and Harbours, with headquarters in Nairobi, 
pperates freight and passenger services by rail, by road ser-
~ice , and by inland waterway. 
The Kenya- Uganda rail~ay line runs a distance of 10825 
~ilea, traversing Kenya , from ·~mbasa at the coast to Kesese , 
~ear the Uganda-Congo border. ~thin Kenya principal branches 
~re found. These are: Nakuru-Kisumu line (131 miles), Voi-
~he line (94) , Nairobi-Nanyuki (145), and Tororo-Soroti (in 
~ganda, 100). It is significant that the terminals of these 
~ranches are in the Kenya Highlands. The purpose of the rail-
~ay network as originally conceived, and as it turned out to 
pe , was to serve European-populated areas. 
The inland waterway service is centered on Lake Victoria 
~he largest lake in Africa, which is strategically located in 
~erma of inter-territorial trade and travel for the East Atri-
5East Africa Information Digest 1960 , op. cit . , p. 29. 
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can countries. There are six ports around the lake. 
Mombasa is the principal port for both Kenya and Uganda 
and to a lesser degree for northern part of Tanganyika and 
parts of the Congo around Lakes Albert and George. The harbor 
is at Kilindini. It has ten berths capable of accommodating 
ocean-going vessels. Plans for extension are under way . 
The Road Authority established by a 1950 ordinance is 
responsible for road policy and administration of the Road 
Fund . Nairobi is the focal point of road network. From the 
capital the road system spreads to various points in the coun-
try including roads to: Mombasa (307 miles) , Tororo (284), 
Nyer~ (98), Kisumu {210) and Kericho (173). 
Air services in Kenya are operated by the East African 
Airways . A modern airport, meeting international standards 
and incorporating latest designs and ideas for the facilities 
of passenger and freight handling, was opened in 195S at Em-
bakasi, outside Nairobi . There are at least 12 major airlines 
using this airport. Smaller aerodromes exist at almost all 
centers of population. 
~--
i 
! 
CHAPTER IV 
EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT AND L ND PROBLEM 
England established her influence in Kenya in the late 
nineteenth century. Before 1888, when the Imperial British 
East Africa Company was given a Royal Charter to open up the 
hinterland of Kenya, East Africa had been the scene of sharp 
rivalry between England and Germany. Parties of explorers re-
presenting the two nations had gone up and do~n the country 
surveying the lands that might soon pe declared the property 
of one of these governments . 
The struggle for territorial gains in East Africa be-
tween these two imperialist countries symbolized a wide-scale 
scramble for Africa in which at least seven European nations 
were embroiled. The spheres of interest of these nations were 
unchartered and the confusion that ensued aggravated the pre-
vailing rivalry and hampered rather than facilitated the reali 
zation of European imperialistic aims. 
In order to avert possible armed hostilities and to in-
sure a permanent control of Africa, t he colonial powers met in 
1 ~erlin in 1884-85 and agreed to partition Africa. According-
~y, Africa ~as sliced into spheres of i nfluence to meet t he 
1The story of this unfortunate event has been told many 
~imes , most recently by Colin Legum, Cgngo Disa§ter (Baltimore 
Penguin Books , 1961), p. 20 . 
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imperialistic demands of Europe. 
Although the Berlin Act lessened considerably the intra-
European conflict over Africa, the situation was not complete· 
ly calmed until l ater on. England and Germany sought means tc 
bring to an end once for all their rivalry over East Africa. 
The first effective step ~as the Anglo-German agreement of No-
vember 1, 18$6. w. McGregor Ross , an English liberal who was 
once employed as an engineer by the Kenya government, explain~ 
that the agreement provided the limits of the Sultan of Zanzi-
bar's sovereignty and delimited spheres of influence for Brit-
ain and Germany in East Africa . 2 The inclusion of the Sultan 
in the agreement at the time signified that Arabs constituted 
a force to reckon ~ith, at least along the East coast of Afri -
ca, a fact that stands undisputed today. But it was not until 
18903 that the final agreement to end the Anglo- German con-
flict was concluded . The two agreed to share the domination 
of East Africa . England took over the control of Kenya and 
Uganda; Germany was content with Tanganyika, the largest ter-
ritory of the three . The Sultan held steadfastly to his is-
land (Zanzibar) . The scene has, of course , changed since then 
Germany lost her territory to t he League of Nations following 
the end of the Second World War. As a mandate territory, and 
after 1945 as a trust territory , Tanganyika has been adminis-
tered by Britain. In fact , Britain gained another colony. 
2\.Y . f.1cGregor Ross , Kenya from V.ithin (London: George Al-
len and Unwin Ltd., 1927), P• 34. 
3 
Handbook of British East Africa. 1912 o. 3 • 
.______ .______ 
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The Sultan Bradually came under increased control of Britain, 
thus making Britain the undisputed boss of East Africa~ 
An Englislu:lan named Lord Lugard4 was the first to sug-
gest that Kenya was suitable for European settlement. Writing 
in the 1890's, Lord Lueard expressed his opinion that the Ken-
ya high plateau ~would be the site upon which to attempt the 
experiment of Luropean settlements."5 He spoke of "extremely 
rich soil tl and "a bun dan t rainfall" and went on to liken the 
climate in the Kenya highlands to that of England ut certain 
times of the year. 
Initially the British Government did not have unchal-
lenged right to do ~hat it wished in Kenya. There was in its 
way the Imperial British East Africa Company, a private con-
cern wielding considerable power. The Government had either 
to dissolve the conpany or absorb it and appar~ntly it decided 
on the former. Before doing away with the company , the Govern 
ment did try to use it as an instrument to promote imperialism 
in Kenya. The company was authorized to acquire territory 
from native chiefs by "treaty" , by "purchase" or "otherwise", 
and to exercise all the rights pertaining to sovereignty over 
4He is better kno~n for introducing into British Coloni-
al administration in Africa his doctrine of Indirect Rule 
whereby highly paid chiefs, appointed or hereditary , are made 
to serve as agents of the government, givin~ a mira6e of an 
attempt by the British to preserve African culture and to rule 
through popular and recognized men . 
5Lord Lugard, The Rise of Our East AL~i~an EmPire (Lon-
don: William Black~mod nnd Son , I·1DCCCXCil i ) , I , 419 . 
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I acquired districts. 
It is appropriate to question acquisition of land by 
"treaty", a method that ~as considered right and sensible. 
Internatior .. al la'\1; does aclrno\\ledge the legality of decisions 
reached through treaties. But st.1ch treaties, in order to be 
valid, wust be concluded between t\.'0 or more sovereign states . 
No sovereign state existed in Kenya ~ithin the concept of in-
ternational lall when the British came; o.nd , in addition , tne 
chiefs \ ·ho supposedly negotiated the treaties hed no pOl·,er to 
c!o so because they did not personally 0\-m the l and they sur-
rendered. Furthermore , the chiefs were illiterate and could 
not understand tre terms of a treaty. Taking advantage of 
their i gnorance, however, the company officials concluded that 
the thumb marks placed by the chiefs on the "treaties" ~ere 
legally sufficient coc..litMents . 
The second method to acquire land as v:e have seen \'las by 
"purchase". Today this sounds very logical; but in those days 
it ·as difficult enoueh to appraise correctly the value of thE 
land to be purchased , let alone to find a comnon medium of ex-
chanr;e. The British cur l·fmcy could not be used because it '\#Uls 
completely valueless in terms of t he African economic systenL 
of the day. But soon eno~h the British found a workabl~ sys-
tem which involved exchanc;;e of land with st.range articles of 
British civilization such as brieht rolls of cloth, rings and 
other uncommon ornaments . These curios could not by any 
stretch of i maginRtion be equivalent in value to the land 
"purchased . " 
,..... 
-50-
What the third means of obtai ning land, "otherwise," 
means is not explained but the rr~aning of it is not hard to 
find. The zeal to colonize has al \';ays been accompanied by thE 
show of force or violence . If the British could not obtain 
land by "treaty" or by "purchase," they could seize it by 
force and retain it by force. This did happen. As if calcu-
lated to ~ive the impression in England that the Im~erial 
British East Afr~ca Company had nothing but peaceful and good 
intentions in Kenya, a clause in the Royal Charter cautions 
the colonizers to pay careful regard to the customs and laws 
of the people, especially "'dth regard to the holding, posses-
sion, transfer and disposition of lands."6 As we shall see 
later, no heed was given to the claims and rights of the Afri-
cans. Once the spree to seize the African land had begun, 
t he re was no intention to interfere with it. 
The company lasted for seven years . Due to financia~ 
and administrative difficulties , worsened by the death of its 
guiding spirit, Sir \dlliam l.cKinnon, the British Government 
assumed the responsibilities of the company in 1395.7 
The British Government inherited from the IBEAC certain 
regulati ons pertaining to land acqui sition. 
One such regulation created in 1S94 speci-
fies that leases not exceeding 21 years 
could be made avail~ble to bidders for 
country lots; grazing leases , not more 
6 Ibid ,, p . 35. 
7HandhQQk Qf British Ea§t Afri ca , op . cit ., p . 3. 
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then 20,000 acres, could be had i n a 
block at the rate of t penny an acre. 8 
Information is also given on the size and duration of leases 
for agricultural lands and homesteads. 
The idea of the land leases, first introduced by the 
IBEAC, gave the British Government some foundation on ~hich to 
develop its future land la~s. The first action which the Brit 
ish Government took, once the company was out of the way , was 
to issue its own land regulations. Such ~ere the regulations 
of 1897 which did not essentially differ from the laws laid 
down by the company. They empowered the territory's Governor, 
then known as the Commissioner, to grant a certificate to the 
applicant entitling him to land "Unlimited in size•9 for a 
period of 21 years, at the end of ~hich the certificate might 
be renewed. The renewal of the application ~as subject to cer 
tain conditions ~ich a prospective planter was obliged tom~t 
The land granted, for example, had to be planted within five 
years in coffee, cocoa, cotton, indigo , rubber and other p~ts 
approved by the Governor. This was the advice given by Lord 
Lugard. Mineral rights, according to ·cGreggor, were express-
ly reserved to the Government. 
The above regulations concerned only those lands that 
were leased by the Government to individuals. A question a-
rose in regard to those lands which were known to be privately 
owned--in t his case by Africans. Was the Government going to 
gRoss, op. cit,, p. 44. 
~~====~=====9~H~ux;;l~e~y~, ~o~p~,~c~it~,~'~P~·~7~4~·===========================i======~. 
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~espect African land rights as recommended by the company? 
This ~as an urgent matter ~hich called for i mmediate reeolut1on 
because plans ~ere under way to build a railroad whi ch ~~uld 
traverse occupied and cultivated lands. At the same tim~ agi-
tation was growing in England to send the first l arge batch of 
settlers. 
For a solution the Government fell back on the Indian 
~and Acquisition Act of 1894. Essentially, this act amounts 
Ito what is known in the United States ns the Lat' of Public Do-
•ain. Theoretically, thP. act empowered the Government to ac-
quire private land provided that it paid current value and com 
~ensation . The Governmf'nt, hm~ever, was in no mood to let its 
~ctions reBt on canons of justice. ~ontrny to the principle 
of fair compensations, recalls Norman Leys, e critic of Brit-
~Sb colonial administration in Kenya, 
land l';as taken \''ithout compensation, for 
Government building, roads and so forth, 
and ~hen the route of the tT.ganda rail~ay 
was decided upon , a strip of land a mile 
wide , on either iide of the line ~as 
similarly taken . 0 
Mean~ile agitation of prospective settlers continued to 
increase . They complained of stiff conditions for settlement 
and sought the Government to liberalize them. Consequently, 
the British Government decided to study carefully the land 
laws ~hich had been applied successfully in other British do-
minions and possessions. Teams of experts were sent to Canada 
Ne Zealand, Australia and Natal. The findings were a curious 
10Norman Leys, Kenya {London: Hogarth Press, 1926), PP• 93- 94. 
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hybrid of laws which to say tho least ~ere hardly suited to 
conditions prevalent in Kenya. 
It is helieved that it ,,as c.. bout this time, 1900, that a 
far-reaching decision \~as made to flood Kenya \'Ji th British set 
tlers. Two personali tie e appeared on the scene \'1i thout \';hom 
the ambitious scher.ie of settlement \'.ould r..ave perho.ps collapsed 
In 1900, S1.r Charles Eliot as appointed the Governor of 
~h~ colony. 11 An ardent lhite supre~acist , he immediately cast 
~imself into the role of progenitor of lhite settlement. His 
enthusiasm, says Lord Hailey, a long established scholar on 
colonial question, led him to declare that Kenya "t·ould in a 
short time become a lhite man's country, in which native ques-
ltions would present but little interest.nl2 
~~ile Sir Charles ~qs the official spokesmLn for British 
~mperialism in Kenya, Lord Delamere est6blished himself as the 
spokesman of his fellow settlers. He could not agree more 
~Jith the Governor's ide~s of creating a white colony. 
Elspeth Huxley says that Delamere assigned to himself a 
role of capitalist experimenter. His great 
ambition was to be the first to show that 
in East Africa , England had possessed her-
self of a miniature new dominion , a little 
New Zealand ••• ~here yet another cuttinb 
from the British parent stock could be 
planted and would grow and flourish. 
ais heart ~as indeed imbued with the spirit of imperialism and 
~e seemed to have but a single purpose from which nothing could 
llHuxley, OR• cit,, P• 75. 
12Lord Hailey, An African Suryey (London: Oxford Univer-
~ity Press , 1938), p. 743. 
....--
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deflect him. East Africa, he was convinced, "was a white 
man's country ••• places where people settled for good and triec 
to build a replica of England that l\Ould endure so long as thE 
British race itself persisted. nl3 
In order to implement effectively their theory of heavy 
white immigration, the two leaders agreed that Kenya needed 
settlers and not planters . There is a difference between the 
two types. A planter, who was favored by the IBEAC, is a per· 
son who goes to a newly acquired territory determined to ex-
ploit it and its inhabitants principally for his personal 
gains. Once his coffers are filled, or hardships begin to in· 
crease. he is ready to suspend his enterprise. He is an op-
portunist ~o goes where the good fortune calls and cleverly 
selects his base of activity, usually the country of his birth 
in this case, England. 
A settler shares certain goals with a planter. He is 
also an exploiter, bent on squeezing the last penny from the 
land and the local labor. But he differs from the planter in 
that he wants to live in the colony permanently, not merely 
as a successful farmer, which he aspires to be, but also as a 
ruler with his tentacles of power stretching to all phases of 
lite. He is not scared away by incurring nationalist erup-
tions , nor does he pretend to be sympathetic to aspirations o1 
the local people. He is on the alert to crush any movement 
which is aimed to dislodge him from his seat of supremacy . 
lJa uxley, QP• cit., PP• 94-95. 
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Lord Delamere and Governor Eliot had their ~ay open now 
to induce settler-immigrants to come to Kenya. One inducement 
was the East Africa Lands Ordinance in Council , 1901. It pro-
posed that the African land to be alienated for European pur• 
poses must first of all be declared Crown property. Crown 
property was defined as 
all. public lands which for the time being 
are subject to the control of His Majesty 
by virtue of any treaty convention or a-
greement, or may hereafter be acquired by 
His Majesty .l4 
The ordinance went on to authorize the Governor to make grants 
or leases of any Cro~n lands on such terms and conditions as 
he may think fit, subject to any direction of the Colonial 
Secretary.15 
Prospective settlers dismissed the ordinance as vague 
and warned that the stiff conditions still being demanded adgh 
defeat the purpose of European settlement. Consequently, a 
new law, the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902, was carefully wore~ 
ed so as to be unmistakably attractive. It specified that thE 
applicant could initially take up 160 acres up to a maxium of 
640 acres. This provision was based on the homestead princi-
ple, Canadian in origin. The Ordinance provided further that 
those who wanted to purchase freehold land could do so in lot1 
amounting to 1000 acres. These were generous offers, the bes1 
so far, and they tended to strengthen the belief among the in· 
14Ha1ley, op. ci~., p. 744. 
15Leys, op. cit., P• 94. 
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coming settlero that the British Government was going to abide 
by its promises. 'Having paved the way to dispossess Africans 
of their land the ordinance repaid a lip service that the 
Cro~n should pay regard to the rights and requirements of the 
natives. Hailey says that the Governor actually "could grant 
leases of land containing native villages." This means that 
Africans could be evicted from their homes to make room for 
Europeans. 
The Lands Ordinance of 1902 must have been ~ great dis-
appointment to the specialists of colonization. Only a hand-
ful of settlers came as a result . In a state of desperation 
new proposals ~ere hastily advanced and it began to appear 
that it was not so essential to depend on British settlers. 
Other settlers might be as good. But when it was suggested 
that an Indian colony be created , the local settlers assailed 
the idea, saying that the understanding was that the settle-
ment must be for and by white people. 
It was on this premise it was proposed to establish in 
Kenya a national home for the Jews. This proposal dramatical-
ly plunged European settlement schemes into a crisis . Inter-
estingly , the idea was conceived and inspired by Joseph Cham-
berlain , a Zionist fellow traveller, after paying a visit to 
Kenya i n 1902 as Colonial Secretary . He worked feverishly on 
thi s plan, trying to convince his opponents that what he was 
suggesting was humane and morally right . 
On behalf of His Majesty's Government , he made an attrac~ 
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tive offer to the Zionist leaders in 1903. He recommendedthat 
priority for settlement should be given Je s reported to be 
suffering in Poland and the Soviet Union. The site selected, 
Uasin-Gishu plateau, right in the healthful highlands, con-
sisted of 5,000 square miles. That is to say, the Jews were 
to be given 3,200,000 acres to keep and to hold. The British 
Gove~nment pledged tr~t the Jews could elect their own Gover-
nor, excercise freedom of religion including Jewish religious 
customs and rituals, and guaranteed to them self-government 
soon. Britain promised to stand by as a protective ally. 
It was up to the Jews to accept or reject the offer. A 
Zionist meeting was called at Baste, Switzerland, in 1903, to 
decide the issue. Huxley says the vote was 595 to 177 in fa-
vor, pending further consideration by a larger convention. Lt 
~as an occasion marked ith intense emotions. For some there 
was jubilation; the long road to Zion had suddenly been out 
short and now Kenya ~ould b~come the headquarters of the ~orld 
Jewry. The thought ~as irresistible. But others had second 
thoughts and counseled caution. 
Meanwhile in Kenya realities had to be facod. Would thE 
Bri~ish settlers , who considered themselves tho first and the 
only rightful colonizers, allow their interests to be super-
seded by those of the Jews? Their reaction ~as a vicious out· 
burst of anti- Semitism which ~as aimed at torpedoing Jewish 
settlement . They accused the British Government of betraying 
their cause by promising a national home to undesirable, non• 
Englieh speaking aliens. The beautiful land, they complained ~ 
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was to be given to non-agricultural, poverty- stricken ghetto 
Jews. The settlers bitterly attacked favors promised the Jews 
- free land, right to self-government - and pointed out that 
many among them ~ho had applied for title deeds and occupation 
licenses were told to wait indefinitely until the Jewish ques-
tion was settled. Had the settlers not been told that theland 
would be reserved for people of their otm race? Most of them 
could afford the 300 Pounds ( 840), the initial sum required 
for settling. The Jews could not even afford three shillings 
(43~). \'by then should priority be given to these "paupers" 
who constituted a "mean white" class? To add salt to the 
wound, a Je~ish delegation arrived in Kenya in 1904 to exacine 
their land gift. They returned to Europe in time to report to 
another Zionist Congress. 
Not to be outdone, the fe~ British settlers in Kenya, 
with full cooperation of the Governor, decided to seek means 
t o bring to Kenya settlers of their own choice. The Governor 
sent a deputation to South Africa in September, 1903, to re-
cruit White families. It was a timely gesture; South Africa 
was in a ntate of political turooil and economic depression 
consequent upon the concluded Boer War. The future looked 
bleak for most . 
White South Africans began to arrive by hundreds in Nai-
robi; so many came so soon that the Government was unprepared 
to handle them. While temporarily housed in tents, they began 
to complain about their diminishing savings. They demanded 
homesteads as they had been promised. 
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Whereupon the government, to placate agitated ne~comers, 
descended upon Southern Kikuyu and ~ithout regard for the land 
rights of Africans , marked out the ne~ lots for the ~hites . 
Mean~hile the Zionist Congress reached a surprising ver-
dict: it rejected the offer of free land; there seemed to be 
a general agreement among tr.e Jews thct t Kenya was not a good 
enough substitute for Zion. They preferred 
to continue to risk massacre QI1d n,ut1la-
t1on rather than to endanger the attain-
ment of their ideal by permitting the 
movement to be shunted onto a siding. 6 Zion , and Zion alone , was their goal.l 
The settlers were overjoyed. 
The official and public support which the Jewish settle-
ment scheme had received in England convinced the local set-
tlers that their own settlement was threa tened and that it 
might even collapse if faced with a similar plan in the futurE 
To counteract such possible threats and to secure their posi-
tion, they decided to establish themselves as ~he masters of 
the highlands. Land alienation began in earnest. 
In the scramble, the East African Syndicate got 320 ,000 
acres in Naivasha . Lord Delamere helped himself to 100 ,000 
acres while the Grogan Forest Concession settled for 200 ,000 
acres. Another cartel, the East J.frican Estates Limited , re-
ceived 200 ,000 acres on the coast and 100 ,000 acres in the 
Teita District . Notable members of the British aristocracy 
r 
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were involved in the land grab. Lord Francis Scott , uncle to 
the Duchess of Gloucester and the Earl of Plymouth, secured 
350 ,000 acres between them . The son of the Duke of Abercorn 
got 30 ,000 acres. ,.essrs. Chamberlain and ilemming got 32,000 
acres each. 17 
Their success spoiled them and made them more daring. 
Their audacity led to t\vo incidents , bet'lteen 1904 and 1906 , 
~hich increased African distrust of Buropeans . 
The first was the dishonorable manner in which the iasa:i , 
a pastoral tribe , were driven out of their beautiful grazing 
lands which also contained rich volcanic soil , 1'he new rail-
way ~as no~ complete and for a considerable distance it ran 
through the ·!Clsai land . 
The settlers who ~ould soon be importers and exporters 
argued t hat it would be economically advantageous for them if 
the Masai 'Were removed from the railway belt . The Governor 
concurred , emphasizing that the grazing lands were not essen-
tial to the welfare of the tribe .18 ~bile debate was going on 
as to how and when to remove the ~sai from the Rift Valley , 
their ancestral home , and where to take them , a British offi-
cial , Lord Lansdowne , was negotiuting l'fith the East African 
Syndicate about the grant of 500 square miles right in the Ma-
sai area , This deal aroused much protest but it was soon f or -
17Huxley op. ci t , 1 pp . 820- 821 . George Padmore , ~ IAfficanism or Coomun!§m \London: Dennis Dobson , Ltd., } pp . 234 
235. Pankhur st, op. cit., pp. 29-30. 
18Leys , OR• cit ,, P• 115 , 
LJ 
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gotten . 
Finally , in August 1904, the British government announce 
a treaty ~ith the ~s&i , providing the creation of two re-
serves , Northern and Southern , \.hich \>ere to belong to the 
tribe exclusively "eo long as the l.'.as&i as a race shall ex-
ist.nl9 
hen the Blue Book , a Governruent publication, came out 
it was admitted that the suggestion to evict the :.asai was 
made in the interests of the Briti&t community , some of ~hom 
had c~st their eyes enviously on the grazing lands, The two 
reserves were , according to the terms of the treaty, to be 
linked by a road constructed on a piece of land 60 miles long 
and one mile wide. This was never fulfilled; the land in be-
tween ~as instead transferred to the settlers. 
In 1909 the settlers, fei~1ing that it ~as morally wrong 
to split the ~~sai , began to campaign for the unification of 
the tribe , by removal of those ~ho had settled on the Laikipia 
plateau (Northern reserve) . Norman Leys describes this re-
serve "as fine a piece of country as there is in Kenya with 
rich soil and perennial streams . n20 Sir Percy Girourd , the 
new Governor and a strong advocate of a ~hite-dominatedoolony , 
accepced the proposal . 
In flagrant violation of the terms of the 1904 treaty , 
the Government removed the suffering ·~sai in 1911 to the 
19Ibid., p . 118. 
20Ibid., p. 120. 
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southern reserve, under supervision of a~ed troops . The ~­
sai opposed the plan and ~ent as far as suing the British Gov-
ernment for breach of faith . Their legal action , ho\tever, wae 
a failure . By 1913 Laikipia ~as securely in the hands of l!;urc~ 
peans. 
The second l.ncidcnt was an actual rebellion. It involvec 
another group, the Nandi . Tension had been mounting bet~een 
t.he local settlers and the Government on the oLe hand , and the 
Nandi people on the other. The andi had become apprehensive 
of the unmitigated manner in 'tihi ch the land had been alienated ~ 
They resolved to protect their part of the country. The Brit-
ish knew they ~ere facing a strong opposition. It was feared 
that the Laibon , the spiri~ual and political leader of the 
Nandi , "will \o.eld the Nandi into a formidable fighting force 
hlch in c. fe\~ years might cballenge our position in East f -
rica."21 
Apparently groping for an excuse to drive out tne Nandi 
fro~ their l nds, the Govornwcnt accused them of stealing cat-
tle and property belonging to the company that was conatruct~ 
the railroad. 
There were sporadic att"-cka on both sides. When tno Gov .. 
ernment realized that the unrest might affect other groups , th• 
Goveraor, Sir Donald Ste~art , issued an ultimatum. It demand-
ed ''a fine of 300 cattle lllhich are to be delivered up within 
21Colonel R. Meinertzhagen, Kenya Diary 1902-1906 (Edin· 
burgh : Oliver and Boyd , 1957) , p. 211. 
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three weeks,"~' as a gU&.rantee of good behavior for a year. 
F.silir..g to do so, a military expedition \o'ould be sent against 
the NCJldi. 
At their meeting , che h&.ndi not or.1ly reject.ed the ulti-
matum , but reiterat ed their determination to defend t.hemaelves 
and to drive all British Government officials and troops from 
their district . 
To test the strength of the Nandi's determination , the 
Government sent t~x collectors to pressure the ~andi to pay 
their taxes, an obli6&tion they had decided to ignore . One 
coll ector was beheaded and his head sent to the Government of-
fice t-.1t:.h a caption: "'l'his is the hut tax of the Nandi . n23 
That \';as the last stra'W. rearing that the Nandi Afri -
cans might ignite a national revolt l'ohlct. mieht undercut the 
British strategy in Keny" , the Government swiftly made a pu.'l'li-
tivc expedition to break up a p&triotic uprising. 
Troops l'.ere .Jlassed from K€r.ya , Uganda and Nyasalsnd , ac-
cording to fiuxley . Col . l·.einertzha6en, 't'fho was hi.nself ciirect~ 
ly i nvolved in crushinJ the uprising , has given the size of 
the .force . It consisted of four cclumns which were operated 
fro;:n four different points: Ra.vine Sc.ation , Lumb\\a Station , 
Muhoroni , and N&"ldi Fort . 
The ~hole force w&s composed of : 
22 
540 men , 1st King ' s African Rifles (the 
name f or Kenya's Nati onal Army ) 
Ibid., p . 214. 
23Huxley, op, cit, , p . 156. 
780 men, Jrd Kin3 ' s African Rifles 
260 men, armed pollee 
10 :1acf1ine .:;'U:ls 
2 armoured trains on the Uganda Railway 
1000 l·.asai levies 
100 Somali levies 
500 armed porters 
3400 unarmed porters24 
He notes that the above did not include some 80 British 
officers, numerous medical personnel and veterinary and vari-
ous other non-combatant services . 
Martial law was proclaimed in the district and the Brit-
ish military who were "keen to gain new glory and a medaln25 
moved in to break up the popular resistance . The superior for · 
ces, of course , won . Total casualties are not available , but 
by November 7, 1905, it was reported that at least "500 warri-
ors" had been killed , 10,000 head of cattle and 70,000 sheep 
26 
and goats confiscated. 
Armistice was arranged and its terms, dictated by the 
Government, included: 
1 . all murderers (that is, African) must be given up. 
2. all stolen government and private property must be re~ 
turned. (No mention \las mc,.de of land stolen by Europeans . ) 
J, recoval of the Nandi to a reserve a~ay from the Ugan· 
da Railway within a month . 
"Now that the Nandi have been driven out of their coun-
try, " Me1nertzhagen concluded the unforgettable episode, "it 
24} eincrtzhagen, p. 224. 
25Ibid, , p. 223 . 
26Ibid., p. 249. 
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h&s been thrown open to European settlement.n27 
The Laibon died in controversial circumstances. hCcom-
paniod by hia aides , he approached the British with intentione 
to negcti~te ter:ns for perJJlanent peo.ce. He co.rried in his 
· hand a "bunch of grcss" to symbolize his peaceful intentions . 
In great politenesa the Laibon extended hi s nand for a friend-
ship r.undi.)hake with a British ol';icer, his host. I Pretending 
to return politeness in kind, the of fi~er 'dthdrew a revolver 
and shot him dead . That it:l one version. The; other is that 
ono of t.he :!..aibon 's ll"1en ~ttempc.ed tbe life of the officer Ctild 
in 5clf-defence the Brit.ioher killed the African leader. 
\:hichever is true , tt.e Bri tisl.1. o..Lf.i.cer \\l~o killed the Laibon 
\.us reco:m:Aended for tl1e Victuri& Cross . 2g 
Tho first genuine :ct:vol~ in l~enys cagttinst co:i.onial op-
pression had failed. The Br·itish crO\·.n v.as riding high. Hav-
ing ~ccomplished :1. ts purvose., the t.a.ndi Field Force tJas demo-
bilized in February, 1906. 
'rbG restiveness ~hich uccorupucied lund &lienCJ.tion led 
the Government to &ppoiut a local Col!l.lliit.tee in 1904 to look in 
to the 'nrc and mc&ns to allay /\fricsn feurs. '1'he conunittee 
rccvt.!:Iended r.tlmt in viel'f of the difficulties arising from the 
dispossession of n&tives , ~re~s bo reserved for them"; adding , 
"the fixing of such reserves should precede the further exten-
~~------------------------------------------------------------
27Ibtd u P • 291 
28Ibid , , p . 2.3 5. 
1. 
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sion of European settlement . "~~ 
The Government accepted the policy of native reservatioll s 
as recommended and in the subsequent years such reserves ~•re 
set aside . Most of them ~ere hardly suitable for human habi-
tation. One Englishman, Sir Frederick Jackson , has aptly des-
cribed them as areas where "no sane European would accept a 
f n30 ree gift of 500 ,000 acres • ••• It became evident as Lord 
Hailey points out that the purpose of native reservations was 
to secure the highlands for European occupation by the process 
of delimiting in the forms of native reserves the areas to 
which it intended that surrounding tribes should be restricted 
The creation of reserves did not, of course, lift the 
fears among the Africans. It strengthened them. They inter-
preted creation of African reserves, next to European tarms , 
as an attempt to ensure easy and constant availability of cheap 
labor. It ~as not long after that that Africans were compelled 
to work for European farmers . 
Gradually many settlers began to feel that the 1902 Or-
dinance was too weak an instrument to advance the program of 
colonization. The Advisory Land Board, formed in 1904, at-
tacked the terms under which leases were granted . It advised 
that 1f colonization ~re to be saved , it was necessary to havE 
"perpet ual leases without reassessment of rent . " The Colonial 
Offi ce , London , which had suggested 21 year leases, gave up in 
29Hailey, op . ci~ ., P• 745. 
30 Leys , op. cit. , p. 159 
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the face of the settlers' pressure and agreed to increase the 
leases to 99 years. 
By now,there ~ere some differences between the powerful 
local settlers and the authorities in London. The settlers 
were more aggressive and ferocious and wanted quick alienation 
of land and consolidation of European po~er. The Colonial Of-
fice, of course, supported an uninterrupted program of coloni-
zation but warned against undue haste. It was in keeping ~th 
the "go-slow" policy that the Government decided to restrain 
the voracious settlers by imposing a surtax for the landhold-
ers whose annual rents amounted to more than the prescribed 
maximum for new grants. At the same time it was made illegal 
- punishable by a tine - to acquire more than 100,000 acres.3l 
A Land Bill containing these proposals was presented to 
the all- white Kenya Legislative Council in 1908. It ~as re-
jected outright by the settlers ' spokesmen. The bill was sub-
sequently withdraw. A similar bill submitted to the legisla-
ture in 1913 was similarly defeated. 
The increasing gains scored by the settlers encouraged 
them and made them more confident. They felt certain they 
could get everything for the asking. It ~as in this spirit 
they pressed for the enactment of the Crown Lands Ordinance , 
1915, the most crippling single act; it was passed. 
The principal terms \tere: 
1. leases were increased from 99 years to 
999 years; 
JlRoss , QPa cit., P• 73. 
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2. the Governor was given the right to for-
bid transfer of land bet~een members of 
different races; 
) . Crown lands were redefined so as to in-
clude "all lands occupied by the native 
tribes of the protectorate , and lands re-
served fQr the use of the members of any 
tribes. nJ2 
It will be seen that the last provision runs contrary to 
the 1904 law which recognized the establishment of native re-
serves. Now it meant that African areas were throltn open to 
further alienation if some European l'lanted a farm. Lord Haile 
explains that lightening of the land laws, as no~ achieved 
through the 1915 ordinance , was inevitable because "the settl~s 
bad never accepted the reserve policy, as finally debarring 
Europeans from obtaining grants in the reserves . " 
The prohibition of transferring lands b t~een various 
races was not primarily aimed at keeping the fricans out of 
the highlands. They were already excluded. The target was th• 
Indians who , too , felt they were entitled to a slice of Afric~ 
land. This particular provision was in violation of Lord El-
gi n's pledge of 190a. As Secretary of State for the Colonies , 
Lord Elgin had declared , that it was not consonant with the 
vi ew of Hi s Majesty's Government to impose legal restrictions 
upon any parti cular section of the community in regard to the 
a cquisi t i on of land. 33 
For practical purposes , the extension of leases to 999 
years meant , as far as Africans were concerned , that the land 
32Ib1d,, p. 71. 
33I b1<1., p, 72, 
I 
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had been leased perpetually. This had been the goal of set-
tlers fifteen years before. If the new law were carried out 
faithfully, there was no reason to believe that there ~ould 
come a time when Atri cans l¥0 uld regain their lands. But , 
thanks to African nationalism, the lost lands ~ill be regained 
much sooner than envisaged by the leases. That is, if Africaa 
following independence , do not remain acquiescent and docile 
about their land rights . 
It seems always a problem to know 'trhat type of program 
to draw up for ~ar veterans once the war is over. hile the 
First World war was going on , the Governor of Kenya , Sir Henry 
Belfield , created a ar Council composed of settlers to advise 
him on ~ar and post- 'trar developments . The Council, foreseeing 
the possible plight that might befall the war veterans, recom-
mended that a Soldier Settlement Scheme be set up to settle ex 
soldiers who might not wish to live in England after the ~ar. 
The proposal was approved in 1919. 
McGreggor Ross reveals that 1, 246 square miles ~ere made 
~vailable for the purpose . These ~ere "free grants of from 
~60 to JOO acres , " and in addition , the ex-soldiers "were free 
~o lease land up to as much as 5, 000 acres."34 The Government 
~as lenient with the ex- soldiers and willing to help them in 
various ways . They were given the liberty to turn their lease 
holds into freeholds by buying the farms within a period of 
34Ibid., p. g2. 
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~en years, without interest, at the rate of four to fifty shil 
~ings an acre. The Government promised to allow them to impor 
~eeded machinery free of duty and to transport their produce 
bY the state railroad below the normal cost. Finally, the Gov 
ernment made it kno~n · that the ex-soldiers Who went out to Ken 
ya and for one reason or another were dissatisfied would be 
~iven a free passage back to England. 
At the same time it was proposed to found a speciai co-
~ony of disabled officers and their families where they could 
~ive peacefully on pension. "A fairly large tract of land wa~ 
put at the disposal of men ho had been partially disabled," 
~ays Rosa , "and these men received financial assistance from 
~he Imperial Government in the form of training grants in addi· 
tion to a free grant of land.n35 The land for this extra 
scheme, ~hich eventually failed, ~as obtained from the Lumbwa 
area. 
In order to make enough room available for the veterans, 
~he Government found it necessary to slice off 100 square mile1 
in the Nandi area. Africans were simply driven off and in sa. 
instances, Ross says, given 6s Sd (less than $1) for each of 
vhe1r dwellings demolished. A total of 4,560 square miles was 
~1ven to the ex-soldiers . 
Many of the successful applicants never sho~ed up to 
claim their free grants. They decided to make fast money by 
selling their freely given lands at fantastically high prices. 
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ILand speculation bece.me rife and it w~s one of the evils at-
tendant to land alienation . No~n Leys gives an example of 
the lucrative rackets in which speculators engaged. He tells 
of a 640 acre farm sold to a European by the Government for 85 
Pounds, (approximately ~238) . It changed hands two more times 
and in the course of time some improvement was made on it. In 
the f1nal bid t t~n years later, it ~as sold for 17 , 500 Pounds 
($49 ,000). 
By Order in Council, 1921, ~nya ~as made a Crown Colony 
In the same year, the Supreme Court of Kenya passed a mocemcu~ 
decision. In ruline over a land dispute bet~een two contest-
ing African parties , it declared that private native land 
rights no longer existed, that they had disappeared as soon as 
the 1915 Ordinance had been put into effect. Africans were 
henceforth, tbe Court emphasized, to be regarded as tenants at 
will of the Oro~ ~herever they lived. 36 
It seems fair to say that the Court's pronouncement had 
in effect made the people and their country the property of 
the British Crown. 
That is why it sounded more pretentious than genuinewhe~ 
the East African Commission was appointed in 1924 ostensibly 
to look into the most effective guarantee of the security of 
Whut was left of African reserves. As a result, African re-
serves ere ga~etted in 1926. The Land Trust Ordinance , pass« 
earlier, was revised in 1930, and it was reiterated that the 
36Ross, op. cit,, p. 87 . 
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reserves were set aside for the benefit of the natives forever 
A body call ed Native Lands Trust, consisting of -white men , was 
set up to look after African interests. 
The following year , 1931 , something happened which 
caught the authorities unexpectedly. Gold was discovered at 
Kakamega , a point deep in a heavily African populated area of 
Nyanza Province. l-iore than thirty years before the British 
government had warned that the government, and the government 
alone , O\'med mining rights. But it wets still unclear \tith re• 
gard to the surface rights on land where minerals had been 
found . To disentangle itself from what looked like an intri-
cate position, the Government leaned on a provision in the 1930 
ordinance. It was provided that the Government could detach 
the area from the reserve provided it obtained equivalent land 
elsewhere for the dispossessed. It was also specified that 
this must be done with the consent of the Central Lands T~ust 
Board (members white) , the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
and the Local Native Council (mainly African). An alternative 
was that if it was found essential to preserve African inter-
ests , a 30 year lease could be given to the mining company , or 
up to 99 years, provided that the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies did not object. 
The Government left its intentions unconcealed when an 
amendment was cade in 1932. It provided that land covered by 
a mining lease could be excluded from the reserve without e-
quifalent land compensation elsewhere . This could be carried 
~ut ~ithout consulting the Local Native Council.J1 This mea-
sure signalled the opening of prospecting in the African areas 
Africans were once again removed. 
And once again, because of the indignation ~hich this de 
cision aroused , another oomnission ~as a)pointed to investigat 
land grievances among Africans . By no~ Kenya had become known 
as the "land of Commissions." 
The Carter Commission of 1933 recommended that a clear 
~nd peroanent demarcation line be made separating African land 
from European land. It noted that European area so far amount 
~d to 10, 345 square miles and that 27.5 per cent of it was not 
~n use at all. After making this shocking revelation the com-
~ission made a more shocking proposal. It recommended that th 
European lands be increased to 16,700 square miles, adding tha 
guarantee be made "that the area would not be invaded by non-
Europeans." This was done by the p&ssing in 1939 of the High-
lands Order in Council. It bcrred the Governor from disposing 
of land in the Highlands without previous approval of the High 
lands Board, a consultative body made up of European die-hards 
The Board's purpose las t o protect the interests of the white 
farmers. This is substantiated by a clause in the Highlands 
Order in Council wrich forbids the Governor to "issue a permit 
to a tribe to occupy Crown land which is in the Highlands.n38 
To implement the new proposals fully it ~as seen neces-
37 Hailey, op. cit,, PP• 751-752. 
JSibid., PP• 750-751 
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sary to drive out Africans living in the f~rming district of 
Tigoni. Also 30,000 Africans of 01- Eugreone were evicted from 
their homes and their property - cattle and goats - confiscate 
!because uthey had refused to go and pick pyrethrum on a Europe 
~n farm at 1Ceringet . "39 Another scheme to settle ex-service.tretl 
was attempted after the end of the Second "Jorld ~:ar . It was 
leas successful than the first although it brought in 700 new 
settlera . 40 
Today a European farming community of 2700 families , as 
quoted earlier in .!.W2 Guardian ( ·~nchester) is occupying , or 
has at its disposal , 16 , 700 aquarP. miles. Between 6,000 , 000 
and 7,000 ,000 Africans have bet~een them , accordin~ to Hailey , 
~3 , 500 square miles . The rest of the country is mamly waste . 
The picture in the Afrlcan area is dismal. Certain rura 
~reas in the Nyanza and CPntral Provinces, have a density of 
1 , 000 to the square mile . In the Dagoretti location (the au-
t hor' s home area) a lucky nfrican family has a maximum of 1 . 3 
41 
acres . The Government issued a report several years ago in 
~hich it admi tted that in the Kiambu Distrlct of Kikuyu re-
serve , "40 per cent of its populat ion 't;as landless and that 
90 , 000 might become without means of support within a short,t.1me. ~ 
39George ~admore1 Africa: Britain ' s Third Empire (London Dennis Dobson , Ltd •• 1~49T, p. 61 . 
4°Far~on , op . ctt. , p. 66 . 
41Norman Leys , ~ Last C~1nce in Kenya (London : Hogarth 
Pr ess, 1931), p. 59 . 
42Pankhurst , op. cit ., p. 34. 
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[ In any economic system there are three basic essentialst 
I 
~and, capitcl and labor. Kenya settlers h&d secured for them-
selves land (more than they needed) and, \ith the help of the 
Povernment, were forming the nece~sary capital. To complete 
the cycle, an inexpensive system of adequate labor supply \-'0.5 
~orked out. 
From 1904 various attempts ~ere made to legalize effect-
~ve methods for obtaining African labor for European farms. 
!Finally in 1919, a labor circular ,;as issued, grandly entitled 
~Native Labor Reguirements for Non-Native Farms and Other Pri-
~ate Undertaki~zs ."43 
After reviewing the previous efforts to induce hfricans 
~o work for their masters, tho circular declured 1) tl~t there 
~1as a shortage of labor due to reluctance of Africans to re• 
port to labor camps; 2) thht ho.rmonious r13lettion s bet\'ieen the 
Africans and the settlers on one hand , and the settlers and th4 
lovcrnmcnt on the other, depended on more satisfactory and con· 
tinuous supply of African labor; and 3} that the Government wal 
determined to keep African laborers under supervision and re-
stricted in the labor camps . 
Suhsequently the GovP.rnrnent instruct~d its officials in 
the countryside to round up men, women and children and compel 
t,hem to go to \'·ork. Tho chiefs ond headmen who were coopera-
~ive or non··cooperative \"Jere reported either for reward or pun· 
ILShment. Stories have been told of hot\ young girls 'riere routec 
4JLeys , op, cit, , P• 411. 
7'-- ~,. 
from their homes, dri ver1 to rHlitinf; Europeans l'lho viol<:. tet4 
them and mude tl·-= Dl pregnant • 44 
Thus forced labor ~as introduced in Kenya . The Church 
of Scotland, Kenya branch , accepted the spirit of the circular~ 
but suggested that its undiplot:iatic lan6UE.t;e be etltered. '£he 
Church suggested sev~ral amendments , one of ~hich was to use 
"compulsory" rather than "forced" (referring to labor) because 
the latter denoted slavery. Theoretical arcument of the cler-
gy made little difference. Slaver/ in one form. or another has 
&lways existed in Kenya . 
Bet~een 1920 and 1927 the number of African lcborcrs on 
European far~ jumped fro~ 53 ,709 to 102 , 074 . 45 By 1945 the 
number had risen to 202 ,944. 46 I-c i~ believed there arc c.t 
least a q~rter of a millior. of them today. 
They are officially called 3quutters , ~ descriptive tern 
l'~hich underlines their unstable and temporary position . Souat 
ters come from C·ne of tl-;o b£1ckgrounds. First , they &re the 
Afric.:ana \'1ho used to 11 ve on the highlc.nds ond remained there 
after being deprived of their lands becauoe they had no \~here 
else to go. Second, they are the Africans \Vho \:ere forced to 
seek emrloym.ent on the ranns in order to pay hiGh taxation and 
to meet the ~hite farmer ' s demands for labor. 
The squatters ere obliged to enter into a contract with 
44 6 Ross, op. cit., pp. 225-22. 
45s. and K. Aaronovitch , Crisis in Kenya (London: Law-
rence and Wishart , 1947 ), p. 101. 
46 Ip~d .. , p . 104. 
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their 1:~·hi ta be Goes fer a period of ono to five y~arCl. •+r They 
may be gi vcn a plot cf lcmd on ~hich to culti·rate crops to 
keep a fe\·: animals us prescribed by the farrr:er. They must tier 
on the farms for at ln~st 180 days a ye~r (not counting Sun-
days , 31ck days or holidays). The 'ork requir~ment \'&~ raisec 
48 to a ninimuc of 240 days , with a le5al maxium cf 270. 
Freedom of movement in stringently restricted. For ~anJ 
years the laborers (and other Africans as \';ell) 'ere subjecte< 
to the indignities of kipande, ' form of registration certifi· 
cate applicoble only to the Africans . The Native iegistratior 
Ordinance and E~ployment of Servant which gave birth to k~ryana 
in 19.37, "prohibited the Africans ," Pankhur~t recall~ , "from 
obtaining \o\ork for more than 24 hours \~ithout having been fin· 
gerprinted and supplied V\i th kiparH!e . " In this infamous docu· 
ment the \'orker's personal and employment pnrticulars wet:<e re· 
corded and the bearer had to carry it ~ith him at all times . 
The police or an authorized person (European far~-o~ner) mi~h1 
demand production of the kipnnde. One found ,,ithout it or re 
fusing to cooperate or not having it in o~der ~as subject to 
arrest and "a possible punishment of fine not exceeding J 
Pounds (~a. 40 ) with or \d thout i:nprismunen t." 
The police quite often abused their power .in the en-
forcement or klJ?ande regulations 3.nd brought before the law 
many per30:1s w~o t~ere :mjustly arrested. f, acGreg~or Ross 
47see Resident Laborers ' Ordinance , 1937, in Pankhurst , 
gQ. gill·., pp. 39-40. 
48Aaronovi tch , 9I?• cit., p. 117. 
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notes th8t \'.i~:.h:.n a period of 18 l!lcntha , fJ ,377 Africuns \\ere urrl: r-
.Lndictment ::cr htr-/!.ng violated the ordinance. He poin s out 
th'-t in order to esca e the l urchnesc of the kipar,de system 
and the o.troci ties of tl.£! police many \.crke:::-~ sought ssnctuui") 
in the Zorest or fled the country pcrc.anently. 
tion. 
t'ingerpriz!t.in..; \.es , of course, u source of great irrita· 
.fricu.1 s oLjccted tc being ~cnerully categorized us 
criminttls and haWlted constantly by the CID (Kenya's FBI) for 
minor infraccicns of an unjust ~ystem. 
Forced l abor by co:!scripticn - to oeet special tasks , 
for exa plo , hcrvest - t1as legl.!lized in 1942. i•aronovitcl:. , 
<1uoted previcusly , says tb~ t c!t. the er .. d of 1944 tl.ere ~ere 
20 , Lt69 conscripts lJorking on siee.l , ~ugr..r end. pyrethrum plQn-
ts. tions . He explc:.i ns th~ t the aim of the conscription is to 
prevent labor shortuge forcing ~ gener~l rise i~ w~&es . The 
\\ll e for conscript la.bor , he s<:!ys , l'.a:J fbted at 8 to 10 shil-
lings {~1 . 40) a u~1th. 
Child labor hc:.s b{!en ..... ..t.!attel' of rcutine: acc£.pteC: rom 
early d&ys. But ln 1927, to !!!ake sure t.t.ere \'.as no =Ust~kt 
~l::cut the Goverr..llient ' s position , it M:!.s :proposed not only to 
contil'!ue 'Wi th it but to legalize it. Reason: it 'h'Ould bene-
fie the children bJ providinb discipline and tr~inillb as t;ell 
as b"!tter living co:1ditic:1s. ...ar:::::1ovitch estimate~ t~t in 
1944 Cl.ild labor force tot&lled 49 , 915 , more than SO per cent 
of them employed en oonthly terms in agriculture.49 He ex-
49 lbid t' p . 104. 
plains hov chilu of t~nier age is ~~red fer: "The 1&~ ~1-
lo\·s children c·f ~:1 ~get; ~o be emplcJed in a{;ricult.ur-..1 ur.del -
t akint;s, the p .... oviso be in_; tr~ t; Ci!ildrer. under ten ruust be ac-
companied by a rel_tive." J. . not.her l.ritcr, l.hc c..c-:no•:. ledgcs 
that ".:'..abor armies o! children were shipped off to plant.ations •" 
quotct~ an advertisement circulated by a European farr:er \\ho 
apparently harl at. his dispo~c:l a surplus of ju\enilc l£.&.bor. 
It says "I sh;;.ll be glad if any coffee gro\lers who may like tc 
employ these chil ·lrcn -will write his naue thereon t statin6 thE 
number required, the t.ime for \',hidl they may be ne!.!ded. n50 
To IrL.ke doubly sure t.hat frican8 could not cv!.l.de being 
dr.-.. f~ed for labor, a te.xt~tiun sy!.lt.em ·::c.s .3el. up. '!'he p:.1rpoa~ 
of it ,.as clearl· stc..ted in a leadi!'!& a_ tic::!.e, q'..4oted b~' .t>.aroiJ ~ 
ovi tch, v;hich appe~re:d irl the E~gt Ai'rica.'} ;;Jt;mdard , Febru~ry 
c, 19:'..3. It scqs, in part , "ttumtici is the only possible 
1i ethod of conpelllrlC the x~at.i ve to lctlve the reserve for tho 
p:.;.rpone c;,f seeking ., ork. '' 
Nol~an L~.;.fS dcsc:.. . ibes th.: et direct t ~ec t'..t.t l:ere iu. 
posed on l..fr~ccm3 . The firs~ , ~.he hut &'!d poll t<..;: , called 
f0r a ruinirr.um of 12 nhilli ngs . 5l The .fi.:;ure i:3 daccpti ".e. For 
it uennt that & mtm mu~t p~y 12 nhillu:gs for each of the huts 
he.: t'l&Y o. n ~r.ti ..~."'or an unemployed non over 16 years of age. Un 
5°George Pedmore, The Life and Strw!~le of Ne"'ro Toilers 
{London: International Trarle Union Cocnittee of Negro ~orkers , 
1931), P• 20 
5lro~man Lcys, Colo~ Bar in East Atrica (London: Hogarth 
Press, 1941) , p. 59. 
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til 1927, when a special education tax was introduced, Europe-
ans paid a fixed tax of .30 shillings ( t 4 • .30) annually. 
The second type of taxation , called a cess or rate, was 
collected in the reserves by the Tribal Committee tor Govern-
ment use , 52 in public projects, such as roads and education, 
mainly for European purposes . 
Finally, says Leys, there was a direct taxation in the 
form of unpaid forced labor. Six days of unpaid work might be 
required every three months. A heavy fine or imprisonment 
followed in default . 
As a sidelight it is interesting to note that the mining 
interests were required to pay a 5 per cent tax. In 19.38, witl-
out giving reasons, Leys stresses, the Government announced 
that the tax ~ould no longer be levied. 
As of now, fall, 1961, Kenya's land problem remains un-
solved. The latest proposals in the direction of a solution 
were put forward in 1959 . They essentially sought the ways 
and means that l'lould ultioately make Africans return to the 
forbidden Highlands. A multi- racial Central Land Advisory 
Board , consisting of six Afri cans, six Asians , and eight Euro· 
peans, was suggested Which would advise the Governor on all 
land policy , 53 in particular, those cases which might involve 
52 Leys, op. cit. , pp. 24-)5. 
53see "Land Tenure and Control Outside the Native Lands' 
Sessional Paper no . 10 o£ 1958- 59, in East Africa and Rh"'n"'si~ 
October 22 , 1959, also New YQtk Time~ , June 16• 1960. P• 10. 
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land transactions between members of different races. 
The proposals invoked ~rath from both African and Euro-
pean communities. The Europeans attacked them because they 
aimed to de t~ the sanctity of the white Highlands. The Af-
ricans' condemnation was based on the belief that the propo-
sals were eo rigged that it would be extremely difficult, it 
not impossible , to achieve even a "token integration" of farm-
ere. 
The issue it seems has been put aside until after inde-
pendence, when no doubt, it will be revived with greater ~igor 
with African population demanding a final solution. Meantime 
European settlers, ~ho fear that their hold on the Highlands 
is slipping, are demanding establishment of a resettlement 
fund of.&om 5 to .30 million pounds. South Africans and Aus-
tralians are inviting them to settle in their countries and 
offers for settlement recruitment have been opened in Nairobi. 
Latest reports say Europeans have been leaving Kenya at the 
rate of 100 a month. 
Europeans have often accused the Africans of being un-
reasonable in their approach toward the land question. This 
has tended to obscure the obduracy of the accusers and the 
great injustice they have inflicted on the Africans . 
A few things must be kept in mind. There was no land 
problem in Kenya until the British came. Even today, if equit 
able land redistribution and proper land utilization are car-
ried out, there is enough land to support more than the six to 
'-· 
I 
-82-
seven million people ~o live in Kenya. The core of the prob-
lem is that the white man has built up a legalistic fiction 
through which he has deprived the Africans of their best part 
of the country and reserved it for himself. The Africans , on 
the other hand, can reserve the right to say, once in po~er , 
that they were not consulted in the making of the land laws. 
Such laws compounded over half a centruy can therefore be de-
clared null and void by a stroke of a pen and Europeans would 
stand to lose "their" lands with or without compensation. 
This is a likely eventuality. 
Secondly, it serves no purpose for European extremists 
to keep harping on a false theory that some of the land was un 
occupied when they claimed it. They should instead accept the 
challenge that their zeal for colonization left them with lit-
tle patience to study the frican system of land ownership . 
Shift-cultivation used to be an accepted form of traditional 
farming . A farming family would temporarily abandon an over-
used plot , move to another , before returning to the first . 
The belief was prevalent that if a piece of land were ~ft fal 
low for a season or two, it would regain its fertility and thu 
become more productive once farming was resumed. While in thi~ 
wild and neglected state a farm may deceptively appear unoccu-
pied and ownerless. A stranger looking for a place to settle 
may rejoice to have stumbled into a God-send. 
Kenya Europeans should remember that they did not bring 
with them , as they did the Bible or pencil, the land which 
they occupy today. They found it there, already occupied. Anc 
I 
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~f they keep insisting, as some have, that Africans too came 
.~o Kenya from some~here else , let them bear in mind that , gran -
ing their view is correct , Africans preceded Europeans by tho~ 
sands of years. 
Thirdly , it seems impossible for most Europeans to appre· 
~iate the African conception of the meaning of the land . Dur-
1ng pre-European days the people of Kenya engaged mainly in ag 
riculture. ~oday most of the people still engage in it , al-
though for most , it is a precarious living. Possession of a 
~ieee of land for a traditionally agricultural people , who are 
pot trained for anything else, is a matter of basic necessity. 
When land is taken away from an African peasant his very exis-
tence is threatened. Land constitutes his main insurance a-
gainst insecurity. The sense of insecurity, ~hich the dis-
possessed African of Kenya has experienced, and still is ex-
periencing , is perhaps comparable to a feeling which grips an 
American industrial ~orker when he loses his job without know-
ing when he might be rehired. But an American ~orker has sev-
eral advanta~es over an African peasant. An unemployed Ameri-
can worker can claim relief funds. A dispossessed African can 
claim no social security benefits in a country ~here such bene 
fits do not exist for him. He faces destitution. 
The African derives from land more than economic securi-
ty . There is the spiritual value. John Hatch , a pro-govern-
ment writer, has openly admitted this . 
Land has far more than an economic value 
to the African. Land has a deeply spiri-
tual significance to the African tribe . 
I 
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The ~hole of hie social and cultural out-
look , all his tribal customs and prac-
tices, are derived from the land. It is 
the primeval right of his Whole existence 
and ~·hen depri"ted of it he becomes rudder-
less and lost . ''+ 
Finally, land policies have inevitably made agricultural 
economy a European monopoly. Apart from the fact that a mono-
polistic system benefits a few who are on top, which is bad, 
~he set- up in Kenya has tended to hurt that country's economy. 
Pue to concentration of vast lands into lands of relatively 
lrew farmers, some farms in the highlands are under-farmed. And 
pf course , there are thousands of acres which are vacant. 
~his means that land segregation is barring ltenya from realiz-
lng her full agricultural capacity. 
Furthermore, for many years, African farmers were denied 
~he right to grow cash crops - coffee, tea, pyrethrum - in 
~heir own areas in order to keep white monopoly untarnished. 
Pbviously this \'Jas a further blow to Kenya' a economy. The ban 
~s been modified somewhat, but restrictions still remain. To 
~ay an African farmer is allowed to grow only 100 trees of cof· 
lree initially. 55 Further expansion is not permissible without 
~overnmen t approval . 
The reason given for restricting African gro~ers is the 
p:&onotonous one - that Africans are not capable of managing 
~cientific farming. When the few African farmers entered the 
54John Hatch, Afrisa Today - And Tomorrow (New York: 
,rederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 10. 
55Tom Mboya, Kenya Fftces the Future (New York: American 
Committee on Africa, 1959) , p. 10. 
ll 
I 
-85-
~offee business, the Government injudiciously decided to con-
~uct a series of competitions to justify its argument. The 
"incapable" Africans surprised their oppressors . 
A well-kno~n anti-African European magazine once pub-
lished, without comment, reports released by the Coffee B ard 
of Kenya. 
African coffee growers in Kenya are 
now producing higher proportion of high 
quality coffee than European estates. So 
far this season six out of ten African 
coffee areas have produced over half their 
crop in the first three classes of coffee, 
whereas only one of the sixteen European 
area~7claimed more than 50% in those clas-ses. 
56East Africa and Bhodesia, n.d. 
~· 
CHAPTER V 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
In the first t~enty years of British rule in Kenya, 1900 
1920, during ~hich time major land expropriations were carried 
out, Kenya Europeans exercised and enjoyed political supremacy 
without serious challenge from .either Africans or Asians. 
The establishment of Kenya's national legislature, enti~~ 
ly composed of white membership, in 190~ gave the settlers an 
official machinery to make laws t o facilitate the process of 
colonization. The lack of organized opposition prior to 1920 
left the burden of governing on the shoulders of the Kenya gov 
ernment , which was strongly influenced by the settlers. 
By virtue of their dominant position in the government, 
the settlers took an uncompromising position, upholding the 
absoluteness and morality of white supremacy and scorning any 
attempt to extend human rights to the Africans or anyone else. 
The colonial office in London usually acted on the advice of 
the colony's governor, who was himself under t he settler in-
fluence. This pattern did not change, as we shall see subse-
quently, even after Africans and Indians had stepped into poli~ 
tics. 
Organized opposition to British colonialism in Kenya be-
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gan in 1920. It gre~ out of hardships created by land aliena-
tion and other unpopular measures . 
It would help the reader to keep in mind that the land 
issue, more than any other factor, has constantly supplied the 
fuel to keep Kenya•s political embers dangerously aglow. When 
ever the land problem is brought before the public, it ignites 
emotional eruptions and causes somber and anxious moments. To 
the African it brings to mind suffering, deprivation, and inse 
curity, in sharp contrast with the handsome income , easy liv-
i ng , healthful climate, and po~er that are enjoyed by Europe-
ans. It is not surprising, therefore, to see an enraged Afri-
can politician, addressing a political rally, rip apart his 
English suit and declare that he would rather regain his lost 
lands than enjoy the comfort of the imported suit. Or when 
African political prisoners, condemned to death by public hang 
ing, pick up a lump of soil, kiss it, and after this demonstra 
tion of their love for the soil, ~alk proudly to the gallows . 
When the first African political party in Kenya was or-
ganized in 1920, the founders had foremost in their minds the 
land question. The main aims of the Kikuyu Central Associa-
tion1 (KCA), according to one source, 2 were three: 
(1) abolition of forced labor; 
1The original name was Kikuyu Association, changed in 
1921 to Young Kikuyu Association, then to East African Native 
Association, and finally to KCA. 
2Mbiyu Koinange, ~he People of Kenya SReak for Them-
selves (Detroit: Kenya ublication Fund, 1955), p. 3 
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{2) abolition of taxes; 
{J) recovery of the land. 
MeGreggor Ross has given additional complaints of the KCA 
~bout the followi_ng things: 
reduction in wages by one third; registra-
tion of Africans (~hich did not include other 
races); order to supply food without payment 
to tribal retainers and other hangers-on at 
government stations.and seizure of African 
cattle and sheep which were sol~ below the 
market price to help the trade. 
The leader of the KCA was Harry Thuku. Old and retired 
from politics, he is today described as a successful farmer . 
~t the time he organized Kenya's first political party he was 
a young post office clerk. Thuku's strategy and tactics show 
that he aimed to attain his goals with militant yet non-violen 
means. He showed his militancy and what is generally called 
"positive action" by ordering his followers to burn the regis-
tration cards which he condemned as a stigma of inferiority, 
and by organizing a general strike involving domestic, planta-
tion, and industrial workers. 4 Colonial rules at the time w~ 
strictly rigid, and Thuku's moves must be viewed as exception-
ally daring. 
His methods also suggest that he wanted his party to be 
purely an African organization, independent or outside control 
or influence. He tried to do this first by listing mass sup-
port . He toured the country , visiting heavy population cen-
)Ross, QP• kit., p. 228. 
4aeorge Padmore , Ihe Life and Struggle of Negro Toilers, 
ID, 85. 
I 
ters such as Kisumu, Fort Hall , and Nairobi, making public 
speeches. He was so successful that the government declared 
him a "dangerous" man who "wanted to destroy the government 
and establish a republic, himself as president . "5 The other 
indication of his desire for independence was his refusal to 
seek or accept help from Europeans--settlers, missionaries, or 
the government . The reason, Ross suggests, was that he had no 
friends among the white men. He did, however, receive some 
help from the Indians, who had their ow.n grievances against 
the government. But the aid given was of a technical nature, 
~in the framing and dispatching of cablegrams ." 
Thuku's call for a strike was effective. In retaliation 
the government arrested him on March 15, 1922. 
Hie arrest touched off a wave of frenzy among his follow 
ers. Ross tells of the crowd which followed Thuku to jail, in 
creasing by thousands and refusing to disband at the request 
of the police. The Riot Act was read. Tension increased. 
The government, in the words of Padmore, decided to dispense 
the defiant crowds with armored cars and machine guns. The 
police opened fire. Ross says twenty-five persons were kUUe~ 
Padmore quotes the Manchester Gyardian, March 20, 1929, which 
put the dead at one hundred and fifty , and adds that more died 
of wounds afterwards . Following the massacre, wholesale ar-
rests were conducted at gun point, and hundreds given two to 
three years in prison. Others were fined. 
I 
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Harry Thuku was sent to exile "untried in any court of 
law."6 He remained in exile--at various places within Kenya--
for eight years. The Thuku affair was a milestone i n Kenya 's 
political life. It marked the incipience of political awaken-
ing among the Africans. 
The banishment of Thuku left the leadership of the party 
in the hands of t wo prominent colleagues, Joseph Kang'ethe and 
Jesse Kariuki. The two men tried to rebuild a weakening party 
In 1925 they petitioned t he government 
for permission for Africans to grow coffee, 
for the a ppointment of a Kikuyu paramount 
chief, for the publication of the laws of 
the country in an African linguage, and f or 
the release of Harry Thuku.'l 
None of these requests was met. 
In 1922, a government worker named Jomo Kenyatta joined 
the KCA. He donated to the party his great talents of organi-
zation, oratory, and writing. These are the traits t hat gave 
Kenyatta, as we shall see subsequently, a name in Africa and 
the world. After becoming a member he rapidly became the par-
ty's general secretary and the editor of its organ, Mnimrl+h~-~ft 
In 1929 the KCA sent Kenyatta to England to present Afri~ 
can grievances to the British government and the public. He 
was prepared to talk about early complaints--the land problem, 
forced labor, high taxes, the color bar, low wages-- and to 
these he added "the demand for direct election by Africans to 
6 Ibid,, P• 237. 
7 Historical Suryey of the Orig*n§ §Pd 
Growth of the Mau l~u, p. 40. 
I 
-91-
the Legislative Counc11."0 Africans were not then represented 
in this body. Kenyatta' s mi~sion was not directly fruitful. 
He was ruled out for by-passing the Kenya government. However 
his direct petition to the British government set a precedent 
which served useful purposes in later years. 
The goverr~ent became perturbed about the popularity of 
the KCA and tried to count~ract it~ activity by helping to or-
ganize an anti-KCA movement. 
The movement consisted of eeveral parties, including the 
Kikuyu Loyal Ps riots, the Progressive Kikuyu Party, and the 
Kikuyu Provincial Association, made up of government-appointed 
chiefs, headmen, and other loyalists. That the British ~ere 
behind the organization of these parties is well illustrated 
by the phrasing of the constitution of the Kikuyu Provincial 
Association. One clause says, 
Every member of the organization will be 
pledged to be loyal to His l·!B.jesty, the 
King of Greet Britain, and the established 
Government and will be bound to do nothing 
which is not constitutional according to 
British traditions or do anything which is 
calculated to distu9b the peace, good or-
der and government . 
The missionaries were not happy either about the activit 
of the KCA. They sought to curb its activity on two fronts--
social and religious. Like the government, they set up variouJ 
groups to compete ¥ith the KCA. The best-known group at the 
time was the Kavirondo Taxpayers Association, founded in 1927, 
s Ibid,, P• 42. 
9 Ibid., p. 44. 
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~nd headed by Ven. Archdeacon Ch1en, a missionary. The goals o 
this body were non-political, mainly social , including child 
~elfare , education, improved housing , simple hygiene , and tree 
planting,10 
The missionaries soon clashed with the KCA members and 
other Africans over the usefulness of certain African customs. 
~he missionaries held that such customs as polygamy and circum 
cision of both sexes, particularly ~omen, were incocpatible 
~ith the Christian ideals. Africans replied that the Bible die 
:not specifically forbid such customs and that it "·as proper to 
adapt Christianity to their ltay of life.ll Each side stood 
firm on its grounds. 
The break was inevitable, 
The Church of Scotland Mission decided 
to adopt a firm if perhaps injudicious stand 
••• and laid it down that teachers in its 
schools should relinquish their employment 
unless they cade a solemn decf2ration that 
they abandon these practices. 
Sicilarly, children 1 hose parents believed in African cultural 
practices and customs were barred frol!l attending r.1iasion achml 
The Africans , led by the KCh, regarded the attitude of 
the Church as an attempt to destroy their cultural foundation, 
The KCA urged ita followers to set up their own schools and 
churches. This was done . T~o separate and independent bodies 
lORoss, op. cit,, p . 236 . 
11 Histgrical Survey of the Origin and 
GroMth of Mau Mau, p. 41 . 
12 Ibidu P• 42. 
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--the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association, and the Kikuyu 
Karinga Educ~tion Association --were set up. Also the African 
Orthodox Church was est&blished. 13 For those who were reject-
ed at mission schools and mission churches, at last there was 
a place to be educated and to worship. 
The KCA, ¥hich r4d started as a small protest political 
party, had gro~n tremendously. It now served political as wel 
as religious and educational needs. As it climbed to greater 
heights of ?Opularity it became suspect of ~hat the government 
called subversive activities. On May 30, 1940, the KCA was de~ 
cla red to be ~n illegal society and many of the leaders were 
arrested. Its membership at the time was said to be seven 
thousand. Four reasons ~ere given for its proscription: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
it had administered a secret oath des-
cribing the British as the enemy; 
it was in illegal possession of govern-
ment documents; 
it had issued false and misleading pub-
lications alleging that the government 
was plotting to seize and sell live 
stock in the Kamba areas; 
the leaders of the KCA ~ere in contact 
with the King's enemies or potential 
enemiesl4 (presumably the Italians). 
Indiana Strengthen Opposition 
To gain a broader political perspective on what we have 
said about the initial African opposition, we shall relate it 
to other relevant and timely events of the day. 
13Ib1d,, p. 41. 
l4Ibid., p. 4g. 
u 
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rhe so-called Indian question arose ~hen Indian i~ni­
grants bob&n to demand civil rights in 1920. Their deuund, 
which provoked the wrath of the settlers and almost led to a 
rebellion , succeeded in bringing about a series of constitu-
tional proposals, some of which ~era finally accepted and im-
plemented. 
The Indian demands "~ere as follows: 
(1 ) equal representation with Europeans on 
the legi slative, executive, and munici-
pal councils (by means of co~tmon roll); 
abolition of racial segregation; 
opening of land in the hitiblands to them; 
unrestricted Indian immigration; and 
promotion of persons according to their 
ability and irrespective of race to the 
highest position in t~~ administration, 
police, and the army. ' 
It has been argued that Kenya Indians were encouraged 
from outside in making these dec~ds . There is some evidence 
to support this view. In general , India, though under Britist 
control then , was influencing the course of events in Kenya. 
In currency, the Indian rupee wa3 used as the currency in Ken• 
ya until 1914. In luw, the Indian penal code ~aa applied in 
Kenya until lately superseded by a new code for East Africa. 
In land policies, the Indian Land Acquisition Act is still in 
force. In military strategy, during the First \iorld \var the 
East African ca~paign ~as run largely from India.16 In addi-
tion, outstanding Indian statesmen acted as advisers during 
the Indian struggle for civil rights. 
15Elspeth Huxley, White Min'§ CountrY (London: Macmilla1 
and Co., Ltd.) , II, P• 115 • 
.. £t.f.-.11 -- -- .... .c.. - , 1d 
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The other source of encouracement \':as the favorabl~ at-
titude of the British dominionn, with a few exceptions, to~erdf 
I ndian co~unities resident in these dooini0ns ~nd coloni0s. 
The Imperial {Common~ealth Prime Ministers') Conference of 
1921 "passed a ~"esolutio•! in fa.V01lr of tho removal of Indian 
disabilities in the domini ens . nl7 This \,as an extension of a 
similar propoonl mc;de c t the Imperial Conference three years 
earlier urging the removal of restrictions on Indian immigra• 
tion into tho dotdnions. The Indian governroP-nt had become 
sensiti vc t.o the Ne}r Indian itr..;:;igrants were beir.~ treated in 
South Africa, ~nd ~esentful that Australia would not admit In-
dians into the country. The Indian government \owos nfraid that 
Indians wishing to settle in Kenya might be confronted ~ith 
similar problems . 
The Kenya settlers , ... ere not at all plea sed ~i th the pros~ 
pect of having equality with the Indians. They launched a ve~~ 
omous campaign against the local Indians, attacking them as a 
depraved people, corrupt and susceptible to all sorts of vices . 
It is our firm conviction that •• • phy-
sically, the Indian is not a wholesome in-
fluence because of his incurable repugnance 
to sanitation and hygiene. In this restect 
the African is more civilized than the ~g 
dian, being naturally clean in his ways. 
The settlers' mission was "to adapt the native to our 
civilization. " They felt they would be committing a breach 
-17 
cit . , 165. Hailey, SHh P• 
H! Huxley , QP• <(it I J P• 113. 
oj 
.-
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trust if they coillplicated this t&sk "by C04t1nuing to expose 
the :~rrican t.o the. antagonistic influence of Asiatic, as dis-
tinct from 'Suropean, philoscphy."l9 
The settlers ll·ere particularly sensitive on three issues 
Politically , they ~1~~ tnnt if an equal franchise on a 
common roll wer~ &ccepted they \ould be submerged. The 1921 
census sho~1s that there \~ere 9651 Europeans, as compared to 
22 , e22 Indians. This i s rcugl.ly c:. rt.tio of 2-to-1. Europeans 
had already acquired political po-wer \'.hich they \Jere not \ 11-
ling to surrender t.o the India."ls . Creatior. of &n Indi~ colo-
ny would bring to c..n end Buropec..n control. This liaS unthinka-
ble. 
Cn the l~nd issue , ths settlers argued that the Indian 
was essentially a trader , not a farmer . He had been on the 
coastline many generations before the British arrived , but had 
never ventured to penetrate the hinterland until the railway 
was built. 
In regard to immigration , the settlers contended it was 
not right to allo\0. "a brown \':edge to be driven between black 
and white in Africa." The British had responsibility over Af-
ricans, \'Jhich they should not relinquish to "an Asiatic race 
i nexperienced in colonization and unqualified for ruling an 
unenlightened, savage people . " 20 The British and Indian sys-
tems of government, of ethics, of religion, of law, did not 
19Ibid,, p. 114. 
20Ibid,, p. llS. 
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d could not mix. 
No solution to this political crisis could be readily 
ound, for several reasons. The Indians and Europeans were 
taking a position unacceptable to the other. Secondly, 
lack of a firm policy on the part of the British 
aggravated, if not caused, by changes of govern-
t in England . Instead of having one definitive policy, a 
~ere tried until finally some sort of 
was reached. 
The first important proposals, the Lord Milner proposals 
lished in the 0tfi9ill Gazette in August, 1920, contained 
five articles: 
(1) 
(2) 
( .3) 
rejecting the elective principle, but 
accepting election of two Indian mem-
bers to the legislative council on a 
separate franchise; 
rejecting restrictions on Indian immi-
gration; 
refusing to open the highlands to the 
Indians; and 
upholding segregation as "the best 
principle for all races on the grounds 
of sanitation and social convenience.n21 
These proposals were generally in favor of the Europeans 
although they were not pleased with the British government's 
attitude on Indian immigration . The Indian reaction was una 
prisingly violent . They even refused to elect their two 
sentatives, declaring that "nothing less than CO!.&plete politi-
cal equality with ~bites would satisfy them." 
21 I\)i d., p. 120 . 
I 
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~benever faced with a difficult problem the Kenya Indian 
appealed to the British government through British India where 
Indians played influential role in government ~!fairs. This 
way Kenya Indians were able to secure moral, financial and le-
gal help from ~~ther India . In this particular matter the In-
dian government sent Sir Benjamin Robertson, himself an Englis -
man, long acquainted with Indian problems in both India and 
Kenya. Huxley points out th~t Sir Benjamin's advice to the 
Kenya Indians l>~as not to retreat from their demands of "a com-
mon roll, abolition of segregati on , and the right to settle i 
the highlands. " 
This announcement gave the local Indians an impetus to 
speak with great flamboyancy and obvious exaggeration unrelatet 
to facts. Mangal Dass , an Indian leader, said, 
India has an overcrowded population, she 
wants room for expansion. She looks for 
expansion in the British Empire~ as she 
has every right to do •••• For ~uropeans 
to claim this colony as their special 
preserve is grossly unfair. \aJe have been 
promised time after time that this coun22 try {Kenya) should be an Indian colony. 
This theme that Kenya should be colonized by India was 
heavily played up by local Indians . "I would go so far as to 
advocate the annexation of this African territory to the Indi-
an Empire , " declared Lee Vangee , a prominent Indian leader, 
"with provincial government under the Indian Viceroy , and let 
it be opened to us, and in a very few years it will be a se~ 
India." It is strange that an Indian leader should speak of 
22 Ibid .,, p. 121. 
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an Indian empire ~hich was not known to exist. 
The European-settler community could not tolerate Indian 
intentions. Their organization, the Convention of Association , 
drew up a series of countermeasures and ~arningly called them 
an uirreducible minimum." As summarized by Huxley these in-
cluded: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
strictly controlled Indian immigration 
at first, leading to ultimate prohibi-
tion; 
two nominated (that is, acceptable) In-
dian members, but not elected; 
continued segregation in residential 
areas and in commercial areas where 
possible; 
stoppage of further alienation of land 
to Indians in upland areas . 
The settlers said no respectable person could have any 
dealings with Indians most of whom constituted the Untoucha-
bles , the lowest Indian caste. Outcasts in India, they wanted 
to rule Kenya. They accused Indians of having financed and 
provided arms for the slave trade. And during the First World 
War they (the local Indians) had withheld their military coop-
eration in fighting the Germans in East Africa . hile 50,000 
Africans had been killed or ~ounded , the settlers said, the 
records showed not a single local Indian had died or been 
wounded. The Indians had not even bothered to educate African 
and had gone on strike when African artisans were hired to wor 
with them. 
To bolster their position the European settlers, apparen~ 
ly following the Indian example, sought eutside help . They 
found a sympathetic friend, the Union of South Africa , with 
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I handy advice. General Smuts , as reported by Huxley, found 
Kenya to be a natural part of the stronghold of western civili 
zatian in Africa. He advised the Kenya settlers to demonstrata 
firmness and ceaseless resistance to every attempt to force 
from the white community concessions to Asiatic claims. 
I 
The result was a threatening deadlock. The settlers 
threatened tc use force if necessary to defeat the intentions 
of Indians. As a first step towards this end, they formed 
vigilance committees. 
Meanwhile , Winston Churchill succeeded Lord Milner as 
colonial secretary. In an attempt to solve the political cri-
si s he had inherited , Churchill met with a Kenya settler dele-
~ation and in a dinner speech on January 27, 1922,he resolved: 
(1) 
{2) 
(J) 
to reserve the Kenya highlands exclusive-
ly for European settlers; 
to apply the principle of equal riGhts 
for all civilized men so that Africans 
and Indians alike who reach and conform 
to well- marked European standards shall 
not be denied the fullest exercise and 
enjoyment of civic and political rights (this tias declared without, of course, 
spelling out how Africans and Indians, 
already denied civil and political 
rights , could achieve the expected stan-
dards); 
to impose strict regulation on future 
Indian immigration because interests of 
thr settlers and the native population 
alike so demanded; and 
to shape Kenya into becoming a charac-
teristi~~lly and distinctly British 
colony. J 
Although this declaration did much to calm down the angr, 
23 Ibid ,, p. 130. 
..--· 
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I settlers, it was but a temporary measure. A joint Parliamen-
tary committee was already at work to find a compromise plan. 
When the Wood-Winterton Plan 24 came out. it had modified Chur-
chill views. The Plan offered a common electoral roll with a 
qualifying test so designed that only 10 per cent of the India 
population could vote, leaving Europeans the dominant voice in 
the legislature. It urged immigration to be unrestricted, a-
bolished urban segregation, but maintained segregation in the 
highlands. 
The settlers decided to revolt. In what McGreggor Ross 
has called nthe coup d'etat tha t was not needed," the settlers 
laid down elaborate military plans to seize power. The gover-
nor was to be kidnapped and exiled to a remote place within 
Kenya. As for the Indians, it was proposed they be removed 
!rom the capital, with a possibility of being shipped back to 
India. 
Most settlers, the majority of whom had had rich militar 
experience, respended to the call enthusiastically, and made a 
British general, a resident in Kenya, their commander. Their 
motto was "For King and Kenya." They were confident that the 
British government would not send white tr~pps against them. 
~~rmore, South Africa was a sympathetic ally, close by. 
It was a revolution inspired by the vital 
principle of safeguarding the future of Kenya 
colonists of today and European generations of 
Kenyans yet unborn. The great issue was wheth-
er Kenya colony should take an Eastern or a 
24Edward Wood was Under Secretary for the Colonies, whil 
Lord Winterton ~as Under Secretary for India. 
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European orientation.G5 
To save the situation, the Labour government came up ~it 
new proposals which constituted a milestone in the British co-
lonial policy. Up to the time of impending revolt the contest 
centered primarily between Europeans and Indians. The third 
party--Africans·-~ere almost forgotten. But now, as if to 
strike a compro~ise, the official attention ~as focussed on th4 
~frican position. 
The Devonshire \•hi te Paper, 1923, declared in part: 
It is a matter of satisfaction that 
however irreconcilable the vie~s of the 
European and Indian communities in Kenya 
on many points may be, there is one point 
on which both are agreed , namely, the im-
port ance of safeguardin~6the interests of the African natives •••• 
After recognizing the frican interests, the declaration 
put on record what has become the most quoted statement in re-
gard to the British colonial policy in Kenya. 
Primarily , Kenya is an African terri-
tory, and His ~jesty ' s Government think it 
necessary definitely to record their con-
sidered opinion that the interests of the 
African natives must be paramount, and that 
if, and when , those interests and the inter-
ests of the immigrant races should conflict , 
the former shall prevail. 
Although the l'rhite Paper conceded that the interests of 
pther communities, European , Indian , or ~rab, must be "several· 
~Y safeguarded , n it subtly rebuked the settlers for their in-
25 H.J. Robertson, Chton1c4es of Kenya (~ondon: Odhams 
Press Ltd., 1928) , p. 59 . 
26 -~ E.~1. Hill , Kenya. The Lanu of Endeavour (Nairobi: East 
!lfrican Standard T on.. 21 . 
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transigence and their unbridled quest for power. 
His lllajesty' s Government regard them-
selves as exercising a trust on behalf of 
the African population, and t hey are unable 
to delegate or share this trust, the object 
of \~hich may be defined as the protection 
and advancement of the Native races. 
In regard to the Anglo-Indian fight, specific terms ~ere 
proposed as a basis for a truce: 
(l) 
(2) 
elections on legislative council to re-
main on communal (racial) basis; 
the composition of the legislature was 
to be: 11 European elected members (same 
number as before) , 5 Indian elected mem-
bers (6 short of ~t they would have 
wished), one Arab elected, and one nomi-
nated European unofficially to represent 
African i~terests; 
the policy of racial segregation in urban 
centers was (theoretically) abolished; 
reservation of the highlands for European 
settlement was maintained; an~ finally, 
some further control over immigration in 
the economic interests of the natives was 
thoughtapr ropriate, although no definite 
measures were recommended. 
No longer was there need for revolt. The settlers did 
not win on each of their points but theyemerged batter off thw 
the Indians. They, ho\•Jever, resolved to continue fighting for 
their cause. The Indians were disappointed. 
Up to 1931 the Indian Community ex-
pressed their dissa~isfaction by boycotting 
the elections and in that year they reversed 
their policy only to the extent that they 
elected representatives pledged to take no 
part in the council2~til the introduction 
of the common roll. 
Chances of their success dwindling, the Indians abandoned this 
policy of non-cooperation in 1934. 
27Hailev on .. cit ... P• 
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The controversy was not entirely over. A debate ensued 
on the meaning of the "doctrine of paramountcy." Those con-
cerned gave it different interpretations. A series of officia 
interpretations given 1dthin a period of eight years by both 
the Labour and the Conservative governments were hardly satis-
fying. 
For example, the Churchill White Paper of 1927 said that 
His l4ajesty's Government "desire to associate more closely in 
~his high and honorable task (responsibilities of trusteeship) 
lwi.th those "'ho, as colonists and residents, have identified 
their interests l'dth the prosperity of the country. n 28 It is 
!obvious that this Conserva.ti ve viel'J upheld the viev.•point ex-
~ressed by the settlers. 
Three years later the Labour government issued the Pass-
~ied White Paper. It differed slightly from the above state-
~ent . It defended firmly the principle of trusteeship, includ· 
~ng the interests of immigrant races, but went on to say that 
~dominion status was the ultimate goal"29 for Kenya. This , 
~owever , could not be attained until the native community were 
~ble to participate in self-governing institutions . 
Local Europeans held that this particular statement faile< 
~o appreciate their problems and ~hat they called their legiti~ 
~te interests, Their views received sympathy from a Joint Se· 
~ect Committee of Parliament, which in its report recommended 
28Hill, op, cit., p. 22. 
29Hailey , op. cit,, p. 137. 
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that the European community should "have a right to effective 
representation, and to protection against policies which would 
fundamentally change the economic conditions on the basis of 
which they settled in the country." 
In defining the principle of paramountcy t he committee 
declared that the 
doctrine of paramountcy means no more than 
that the interests of the overwhelming ma-jority of the indigenous population should 
not be subordinated to those of a minority 
belonging to anobher race, however impor-
tant in itself. J 
Africans and Indians gained very little. The settlers 
lost nothing • 
.30 _ _. Hill . nn . c1t • . , p. 2.3. 
CHAPTER VI 
AFR:tCAN NA TIOOALISJ.1 
Following the controversy over the 1923 declaration, no 
major political changes took place in Kenya until after the E!lld 
of the Second .orld ~ar. Then a chain of events began to in-
fluence the course of political development. 
For the Africans , the first factor was the appointment o 
an African, Eliud Mathu , to the legislative council in 1944. 
Mathu was educated in South Africa and England, and at the tim 
of his appointment he was a teacher. He was respected for his 
intelligen ce and debating skill. Mathu was the first African 
ever to sit in the legislature. Though a nominated member, hi! 
presence among the ~bite law-makers stirred the emotions ofthE 
Africans, many of whom came from far away just to have a glimp~ e 
of him. 
People had hoped that ~~thu would successfully represent 
their demands. But as time went by his star began to fade be-
cause he ~as "moderate and cooperative"1 with the colonial gov 
erncent. The people were indignant, for example, when he put 
his stacp of approval on the Beecher Report on AfricQn Educa-
tion, which recommended intense Christianization of African ed 
laden ~leeker , Report on Afris;a (Netl York: Charles Scrib-
ner's Sons, 1954), p. 308. 
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ucation, recruitment of English teachers for African schools 
{ignoring the local African talents) and limiting expansion of 
African higher education. People ~ere unhappy also about ~­
thu's constant fraternization with European circles, a habit 
which tended to detach him from African opinion. His election 
defeat in 1957 at the hands of a ne,.comer, Dr. Gikonyo Kiano, 
who had just returned from his studies in the United States , 
signalled the end of his political career. His early politica 
activity, however , particularly his part in organizing the Ken 
ya African Union (KAU), was a substantial contribution to Ken-
ya's African nationalism. 
The second factor contributing to the postwar African na 
tionalism was the organization in 1944 of the KAU. The KAU 
was the first African political party with a mass following an 
constituted on democratic principles to represent African in-
terests. 
The third factor was the effect of the return of African 
soldiers who had fought on the British side. During the war 
the BBC and the British ministry of information, Pankhurst 
writes , had "poured forth ideas of freedom, equality, progress 
and self-determination"2 which Naziism was bent on destroying. 
The Africans took arms to preserve these principles ~orth d~ 
for. But when they returned to their homeland they found "op-
pression and racial discrimination." For them the enemy ~as 
not Nazi Germany, far away, but British colonial domination in 
2 Pankhurst, op. cit., p. 
~. 
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I their own villages and to~ns. 
The fourth , and final, factor was the return of Jomo Ken 
yatta to Kenya after a long stay in Europe. Kenyatta, more 
than any other single African, has influenced Kenya politics 
during his forty years in politics. 
Jomo Kenyatta who , like many Africans of his time, does 
not know when he was born, believes he is seventy years old. 
He looks ten years younger. He is an interesting blend of bo~ 
the African and European cultures. In his book, Facing Moun~ 
K§nya, reprinted five times since it was first published in 
1938, he has demonstrated a penetrating knowledge of African 
customs and traditions. In it he also spells out his backgroun~ 
"My grandfather was a seer and a magician, and in travelling a 
bout with him and carrying his bag of equipment I served a kin 
of apprenticeship in the principles of the art.n3 
Many years later he became a scholar of distinction and 
established himself as "the most prominent intellectual among 
African political circles in London."4 He is a man who has 
travelled from one cultural pole to another, picking up what i 
best for his own self-development. 
How do Kenya Europeans feel about Kenyatta? Respect? 
~dmiration? Hostility? Blind hatred? It is a mixture of all 
[this. 
When I first met him, in Geneva in 1931 
3Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mgypt Kenya (London: Seeker and 
!Warburg, 1959), Preface, p. xx. 
4Rawcl1£fe . oD. cit~. p. 37. 
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at the League of Nations, recalls a former 
Governor of Kenya and a lando~ner, Sir Phil· 
lip Mitchell, and every time I have met him 
since, I have felt the force of this extra-
ordinary personality. He is a big, burly, 
bearded man and he has the most piercing 
eyes I have ever seen in any man.' 
How did Kenyatta manage to keep the Kenya people together 
~or the sixteen years he was away in Europe? "How he estab~ 
~he extraordinary hold over the (people)," Sir Phillip specu-
~ates, "is one of those mysteries of the human mind and spirit 
ror ~hi ch no satisfactory explanation has been given." 
./ 
Colonel Grogan, of all people, has enough admiration for 
i{enyatta to place him in a class by himself. nor the Africans 
ff my time, only one will live in history--Jomo Kenyatta ••• one 
lr/ho undoubtedly is a great African patriot."6 
Kenyatta was born in the central province of Kenya. At 
~n early age he became acquainted with the cissionaries who in-
produced to him the ABC's of learning. Organized education did 
~ot then exist in Kenya for the Africans. He worked as a kit-
phen boy and as a carpenter, then drifted to Nairobi ~here he 
pook up a job with the government as water inspector. It was 
~hen that he acquired a taste for politics. He joined the Ki. 
~uyu Central Association and soon emerged as its dominating 
~igure. As its general secretary and the editor of its organ, 
~ui~uithania , he raised to a higher level the party's organiza-
~ohn 
5Afr1ca Today , ed. Charles Grove Haines {Baltimore: The 
Hopkins Preas, 1955), p. 487. , 
~ast 
6Rbode§ia ~ East AfricT , ed. F. s. J oelson (London: 
Africa and. odesia, 1958 , p. 58. 
1 tion and strategy. 
In 1929 the party and the people sent him to London to 
present to the British government their grievances against 
forced labor and land alienation.? He returned in 1930 with 
discouraging news. He left again for London in 1931, and did 
not return till 1946, sixteen years later. But during this 
long period he acted as a public relations man for his party, 
trying to arouse the British conscience &gainst the oppressive 
~olicy Britain was pursuing in Kenya. He also took active in-
~erest in international issues affecting Africa, such as his 
~trong opposition to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia , as re-
ported by Pankhurst. He was instrumental in organizing, and 
finally presiding over, the Pan-African conference which met ir 
Kanehester, England, in 1945, with delegates from the black 
~orld including Africa, the United States, and the Vest Indies-
He attended loodbrook College, a Quaker college in Birm-
~ngham, England, and later London University. It is believed 
~hat it was at this time that he consolidated his political i-
ieas. His acquaintance with prominent English Fabians such as 
~i~ney ebb, Ramsay Y~cDonald, and Harold Laski, and such scho· 
~ars as Professor Bronislaw Malinowski, who wrote an introduc-
~ion to his book, undoubtedly influenced his political thinking 
le also visited the Soviet Union a few times, and the progress 
~hich this revolutionary giant was making from an agrarian , 
packward country to a progressive , industrialized, and unified 
7Farson, Last Chapce in Africa, p. 114. 
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nation must have impressed him as an inhabitant of a neglected 
colony. 
\lihen he returned to Kenya in 1946 nobody was certain on 
what level Kenyatta would begin his political activity. On th~ 
one hand, by virtue of his training and knowledge of the prob-
lems besetting Kenya , he was entitled to a responsible positio 
in public administration. On the other hand, a color bar ex-
isted in Kenya ~nich pr~cluded Africans from higher positions 
in government . There was no prospect whatever that Kenya Euro 
peans would be prepared to share equality in service and salar 
with a man of Kenyatta ' s calibre. When Kenyatta discussed wha 
role he might play with the authorities , the Governor, Sir 
Phillip Mitchell, offered him a minor post in the local govern 
ment administration , which Kenyatta rejected. 
Thereafter he took up politics on a full-time basis and 
seriousl y . ~bile in England Kenyatta had acquired an effectiv 
writi ng technique. In the 1923 document Britain had assigned 
i tself the task of training and educating the Africans "toward 
a higher intellectual , moral , and economic level than" before . 
In attacking this hypoc risy , Kenyatta wrote, 
It is beyond our comprehension to see how 
a people can reach a so-called ' higher level' 
while they are denied the most elementary 
human rights of self- expression, freedom of 
speech , the right to form social organiza-
tions to improve their conditions , and above 
all , thegright to move freely in their own 
country. 
Emphasizing the physical , spiritual , and intellectual 
8 Kenyatta , op . cit ,, p. 197. 
I 
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destruction which colonialism had inflicted on the African, 
Kenyatta continued, 
The African has been reduced to a state of 
serfdom; his initiative in social, economic, 
and political structure has been denied, his 
spirit of manhood has been kiDed and he has 
been subjected to the inferior position in 
human society. Oppressive laws and ordi-
nances, "hich alone engross the monopoly of 
thought, of will, and of judgment, have been 
imposed on the African people. 
He warned that the African is not blind, that once &~ake 
a running river cannot be dammed forever without breaking its 
bounds." 
He warned further that it is not in the African nature t 
accept serfdom forever: 
He realizes that he must fight unceasingly 
for hi s own complete emancipation; for with-
out this he is doomed to remain the prey of 
r i val imperialisms , which in every success-
ful year will drive their fangs9oore deeply i nto his vi tall ty and strength. 
This was the sort of gospel of African nationalism Ken-
yatta brought t o the people when he returned to Kenya. It mad' 
him a popular and effective leader and within a few months af-
ter his return he was proclaimed the president of the Kenya Af 
rican Union and the director of the African independent school , 
totalling three hundred . 
He and his KAU colleagues drew up a charter for emancipa 
tion wh~h incorporated Kenyatta's political principles. His 
colleagues included Mbiyu Koinange, a Columbia graduate and th4 
founder of the Kenya Teachers College; James Gichuru, a school 
9Ibid •. 1 p. Jlg. 
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teacher; and F. W. Odede, a lecturer in veterinary science. 
The aims of KAU were: 
(1) 
( 2) 
( 3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
increased African representation on 
the legislative council, leading to 
self-government by Africans for Af-
ricans, the rights of all racial mi-
norities being safeguarded, 
settlem~nt in the "White highlands by 
African families, 
free compulsory education for African 
children, 
abolition of kipande (pass system) 
and other humiliating regulations, and 
equal pay for equal work accompanied 
by improved working and housing condi-
tions for the African ~orkers .IO 
That the Africans had any political views worth consider 
ing, Rawcliffe observes, struck the Kenya settlers as ridicu-
lous. United as ever, their organization, the European Kenya 
Electors' Union, passed a resolution requesting the government 
to deport Kenyatta ~ediately. "The government, however, re-
fused to arrest Kenyatta on the ground that premature action 
would merely add to his popularity.~11 
The European Kenya Electors' Union had one unmistakable 
object, that is, to dominate Kenya affairs with no intention 
whatsoever, immediate or distant, to surrender their control. 
The aims included: 
(1) (2) 
(3) 
(4) 
permanency of British settlement; 
British leadership and inter-racial 
cooperation; 
increased European settlement; 12 a British East African dominion. 
lOpankhurst, QP• cit,, pp. 80-81, 
11 d Ibid,, P• ol. 
12Koinange, on. c~, P• 88, 
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Nothing was done soon enough to alleviate the difficul-
ties which \o~ere separating the Jl.fricans and the British. Nothi ~ 
~as done even to raise a ray of hope that some day freedom and 
independence would replace colonial domination. 
Dark clouds , unnoticed by high government officials • were 
gathering over Kenya, A movement that ~as to draw ~orld wide 
a t tenti on ~as rising. 
The l·.lau :f.~u \Hl s a revolutionary movament made up of vio-
lent , uncompromising hfrican men who VO\'led to liquidate Britisl 
colonialism by violent means . They were not necessarily well-
educated men , nor ~ere they suffi ciently equipped militarily. 
They decided t o strike nevertheless . They struck with crude 
weapons and stolen \'lea pons. They struck with hatr ed and bitte -
~ess . Their best wenpon ~as their ~ill. They made tne forest 
their military base. They made no pretence of their aims: to 
ki ll the ~hiteman and his black henchmen; to recover the stoleJ 
land and the right to govern Kenya. They took a binding oath 
subjecting them to face death if necessary, never to retreat , 
in order td realize their sacred aims. 
The British , alarmed, outlawed the Mau l>lau, declared a 
state of emergency, and , in turn, vowed to wipe out the fight-
era of freedom , uning all uncivilized methods thinkable. 
The war , in which the nau ll.au nationalists \'oere over-
~elmed by the so-called securi ty forces 1 at the rayio tof 5-t~ ~ 
lasted for three- and-one -half years. By August 1954 there ~er~ 
7109 troops, normally based in the United Kingdom, employed a-
gainst the !~u Mau national i sts in addition to 6279 African 
troops and 22,130 members of the Home Guard, making a total of 
~5,518 men pitted against the )~u ~~u strength of 7000 men. 4 3 
The Mau ~~u killed a total of 1875 people. By 1955 1 Bri -
ish forces had killed 9514 Mau Mau. This did not include casuc -
ties caused by the Royal hir Force, ~hich ~as operating at "2~< 
strikes a month," nor the 791 ~~u l~u members hanged by porta-
~le gallows.14 The number of Africans arrested reached 175,000 
~he same year, and 82,000 of them were sent to concentration 
camps for periods varying from a fe~ months to eight years. 
The British forces committed hideous atrocities. Pank• 
hurst says that they burned the homes of the persons detained; 
they raped women in the open and in the daytime, pregnant or 
soon after birth; they beat people, broke their arms and ribs 
and skulls and shot them. The British officers organized a 
murder competition, with a reward of five to ten shillings a 
~ead for an African killed. As a result, a "tremendous rival-
rr" developed among the soldiers. 15 
The African independent schools "catering for 62 ,000 pu-
~1ls" were closed. These had been "built up at the cost of 
~reat self- sacrifice to make up for the government ' s neglect o 
~ducat1on . nl6 The reason for closing ~as that children ~ere 
l3ntwo Years of Bloodshed in Kenya , " East Africa and Rho· 
~esia , October , 1954. 
14EisM Africa and Rhodesia , February 3, 1955 , p . 718; al· 
~o September 8, 1955 . 
15 Pankhurst , op. cit., Chap. 
l6Tertor in Kenxa (London: . ~ . T . U . Publications , Ltd., 
1952) , p . ) . 
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learning "the right to national independence."~' 
Jomo Kenyatta and 180 other top leaders \iere arrested an 
flown ou~ to the desert. Kenyatta and five others were tried 
and sentenced to seven years' hard labor for "managing Mau l-!au." 
They were to be placed under restriction after completion of 
their sentence. 
A question has been rais~d as to ~hether Kenyatta was 
guilty. Peter Evans, a noted la'Wyer who uas expelled from Ken 
ya for exposing British atrocities, raises serious doubts abou 
Kenyatta's guilt. He is one of millions. He notes that Ken-
yatta was tried without the benefit of a jury or even assessor • 
Kenyatta's fate was placed in the hands of an English judge, 
himself a Kenya settler, and tried under the English law. Ken 
yatta was "tried and sentenced on the conclusion reached by on 
single erring mortal.n18 Furthermore , Evans says that among 
the wi tnessea \iho testified against Kenyatta there were a po-
lice-paid informer, a prostitute, and a former convict. 
A shattering blow at the British verdict against Kenyatt 
came six years after the passing of the sentence. A key wit-
ness at the trial, Rawson Mbugua ~~charia , confessed in an af-
fidavit that he had been bribed by the government to bring 
false witness against Kenyatta. The East Atrica and Rhodesia 
of February 19, 1959, gave a sensational headline to the story 
"Government Paid l-facharia 2000" ( equ1 valent to 3600). Mr. 
17 Ibid. , p. 4. 
18Peter Kvans, La~ and Disorder (London: Seeker and ar-
burg, 1956), p. 143. 
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ohn Haydon Lewis, then an employee at the i~ttorney General's 
office , '"ho \;as keeping the accounts, said that the "payments 
ade by the Kenya Government to or on behalf of Hacharia had 
totalled 2070 ( ~.3796)." The article continues, "Mr. Le~is 
then itemized paymf!nts made to or on behalf of fl.acharia for a 
local government course in Englund, travel, outfit, books, liv 
ing expenses, and subsistence allowance for his ~ife." He was 
also offered government employment &t 500. 
Macharia \<:as not alone. There were six others lvho \':ere 
persuaded 'tli th handsonte gifts to conspire against Kenyatta. 
One of these, guthondu Nduti, "got 6000 shillings (:856) and a 
piece of land.nl9 
Kenyatt~ himself mbintained throughout the trial, as he 
does today. that he \':as not guilty. "V:e are not guilty," he 
t old the judbe after the announcement of the sentence, '"and we 
do not accept your findings." 20 The case had been arranged to 
ade scapegoats of African leaders and to strangle the Kenya 
frican Union , the only African political organization ~hich 
f~ught for the rights of the African people, Kenyatta said. 
He made it clear that he was "not asking for mercy but that 
justice shall be done and that the injusticeo that exist may b 
righted." 
Was justice done in the case? "l ~ould say ~ithout hes-
itation , " Peter Evans writes, "that I cannot conceive that any 
l9East Africa and Rhodesia, March 5, 1959, p . 794. 
20tkmtagu Slater, The Trial of J omo Kenyatta (London: 
ecker and Varburg , 1955), p . 240 . 
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jury in England \:ould httve convicted." Remembering that Judge 
Thacker, Who tried and sentenced Kenyatta, ~as a Kenya settler 
and as such rr.ay have had a political bias, Evanrl goes a step 
further. nr do not think t1'.at a magistr&te appointed from out 
side would have convicted. I! 
Kenyatta l:as a revolutionary, com'litted to complete libe -
ation of Kenya froia colonial oppression. He did not preach th 
doctrine of violence end terrorism. He preached and taught th 
concepts of freedom and hu.ruan rights. His approt.tch \',as peace-
ful and constitutional . He would have core than welcomed an 
opportunity to settle many of the colonial problems through 
peaceful negotiation \\ith the Kenya government. But his way 
~as closed. Instead, he \ias ridiculed, persecuted, and im-
prisoned. Today Kenyatta has regained his freedom after nine 
years of i:nprisonment and deter!. tion. He returned to the helm 
of leadership from which the British attempted to topple him. 
He has, as he did before i~prisonment, expressed his abhorrenc 
for violence and appealed to the people to unite, in order to 
gain independence peacefully and immediately. 
Those \~ho are accustomed to the struggle against colonia 
rule have long learned that colonial justice is not just. Ken 
yatta was not guilty. He ~as fighting against a British systet 
~hich was held by the people of Kenya to be wrong. He was not 
~ighting against the British people. 'rhe colonial rule was , 
~nd is, unjust, and the British people responsible for it can-
not escape the blame for bringing death, misery, and despair t( 
the p_eoole of Kenva. No person familiar 'IZi th colonial oolicie: 
! in Kenya \lould raise his finger t.o condeL'm the activities of 
"'he Mau f.~au or even apologize for \-;hat the M'au ll.au did. 
I 
, 
The .Muu l·~"lu changed ~hP. picture of Kenya drastically. 
li"rom one aspect it gEtVe Kenya a tremendous world-\Jide publici t~ • 
Beyond asnall circle of :"ine:.nc :i.hl investors and students of co· 
~ 21 
r"onial mutters, Kenyn \1-.'as hardly kno\m. 
l.tore important \\ere the political consequences which the 
tau Mau brousht about. ii'.Lany Europeans became a\-o~ c-re for the 
~irst time of the African political corsciousness und thelr 
~enuine grievances. In the British Parliament in London, Ken-
'/3 becma.e a subject of animated and controversial debate. It 
.d3 not a..~en that a colonial question arouses a . eeneral and sus .. 
~.rained foe ling among the Dri ti sh parlian1entarians. Some Euro-
peans, in Nairobi and London, sa\\ the visdom of accepting some 
political changes. Others, unable to free themselves fromtheh 
~"'eactionary vie·Hs, decided to resist any changes at all • 
. vttel ton Plan 
The first change \<It as the introduction into Kenya ' s poli ti ~ 
:al system of a concept called multi - racialism. This was a de· 
~arture from the previous doctrine of ~hit~ supremacy to ~hich 
nany settlers still clung. The multi - racial approach was based 
21This v1ri ter \':as astonished to find an &larming degree a1 
gnorance about hfrica in general and Kenya in particular amon~ 
!\mericans he met in the early 1950's . By 1956 , when the 1·'4aull.a 
war was coming to a close, many ~mericans he knew had improved 
~ heir knowledge about Kenya, and were seeking more . The author 
~as especially gratified that many had discovered that Kenya 
~as actually located in Africa and not in South America. 
I 
! 
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on the necessity of setting up a government comprised of the 
various racial representatives to run the country. Theoretic-
ally the aim of the Lyttelton constitution of 1954 was to mini 
mize the importance of European control and to prom<?te racial 
cooperation. The hope ~as that "some of the political differ-
ences between the races could best be settled by an experiment 
in multi-racial government." 
According to the terms of the Lyttelton Plan, hich em-
bodied the spirit of multi- racialism, a council of ministers , 
consisting of sixteen members , was created for the firs~ ~ime 
in Kenya's history . The composition of this body ~as dis~ribu 
ted on racial lines. Europeans ~ere given 13 seats, Asians 2, 
and Africans 1 seat. The council of ministers was desc~ibed 
as the "principal instrument of government in the colony which 
will exercise a collective responsibility for decisions on gov 
ernmen~ policy. n22 This was "racial partnership" in action. 
The members of the council of ministers were, upon taking of-
fice, to commit themselves to broad objectives covering 
(1) 
(2) 
{3) 
fighting against terrorism (that is, 
the Mau ~lau) , 
building within the British Common-
wealth a strong and prosperous Kenya 
owing loyalty to the British Crown , 
promoting racial harmony and friend-
liness, and 
respecting individual rights and pri-
vate property. 
Significantly, "any changes in the communal basis of 
franchise" before the 1960 elections were forbidden. This 
22E§§~ Africa and Rhodesiq , March 18, 1954, P• 886. 
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I meant Kenya was to be constitutionally frozen for another six 
years. 
Reaction of the various races varied !rom lukewarm ac-
ceptance to outright disappointment. For the Europeans, "it 
became quickly kno·wn that seven of the fourteen European elect 
ed members in the Legislature had supported ~r. Blundell (thei 
leader) in unconditional acceptance of the proposals.n23 
The African nominated members said, 
We do not consider the aims and objects of 
a multi-racial society can be a chieved by 
providing only one seat for Africans in 
the proposed council of ministers, with a 
total of 16 seats. The endeavours of one 
person, however strong, ha!~ no chance of 
influencing public policy. 
Looking at the multi-racial policy both objectively and 
critically under the circumstances in which it was introduced 
in Kenya, it is important to keep in mind a few points. 
The first, we may say. is a sociological consideration. 
~ben peoples of three different races live together, as they d 
in Kenya, it is of utmost importance to evolve a social basis 
upon which their relations can rest. The multi-racial concept 
is a sound one because it seeks a solution to problems related 
to race relations. Unfortunately, racial contact fostered by 
a spirit of understanding and friendliness has never been al-
lowed to take its natural course of development in Kenya. The 
failure is due to the habit of thinking in terms of racial 
23Ibid. 
24 l'Qid,, P• 887. 
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preference. With this background of racism, ~hich has done 
much to create bitterness and intolerance, it is too much to 
expect that a sudden political change professing racial part-
nership can solve the long- standing problems. The multi-racia~ 
idea is not in essence a bad idea , but it is bound to fail: 
firstly , because it came too late; secondly, because the ma-
jority of the people--African , Asian, and European-- who are 
used to fighting for their own goals on racial lines are psy-
chologically unprepared to embrace it; and, thirdly, because 
it is grossly unequal. 
The other consideration is political. There are several 
aspects to it. The multi-racial constitution was not the firs 
official plan designed to end Kenya ' s recurring political cri-
ses. Several others, as we have seen , had been proposed , only 
to be imposed or replaced by others unacceptable ~ one racial 
group or another. There was no reason to believe that the Ly,t 
telton constitution ~ould escape the fate ~hat befell others . 
The coloni al secretary himself must have foreseen t he defeat 
of his o~ proposals when he said , "They (the proposals) do 
not and ••• cannot satisfy all the aspirations of any racial 
group . " 
Truly, the multi - racial plan as constituted was a politi 
cal sham. This was clearly the implication of the African 
statement when African nominated members said that multi-racia 
aims could not be achieved by the presence of one African mini -
ter out of a total of sixteen. To assign only one ministry to 
the Africans, and on top of that to make that ministry that of 
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community development which was of little importance, ~as to 
prove to the Africans that those ~ho preached multi - racial co-
operation were not prepared to cooperate. The aim of this ~ 
was not a multi-racial government as stated, but continued Eur -
pean control in a different guise as supported by facts. It 
was another in a series of political trickeries designed to be 
guile the Africans. 
The fact is that a multi-racial government cannot work i 
the present circumstances in which Kenya is locked. Serious 
doubts exist if the future governments of Kenya will ever. he 
, multi-racial in character. Contrary to the propaganda spread 
by colonial policy strategists, Kenya is not a multi-racial 
country, It is an African country in lo.hich some immigrant 
races--European and Asian--happen to live. The nationalists 
hold that no f1rm basis exists now, indeed no firm basis will 
exist in the near future or possibly in the foreseeable future 
for a multi-racial government in Kenya. The feeling against 
the British rule and all the horrors and deprivations it has 
caused is so strong among the Africans that it is impossible tc 
imagine that they would tolerate the presence of former coloni· 
alists in an independent Kenya government cabinet. This will 
raise the question whether Kenya is an Afro-European country, 
or African . It would be difficult to come across an African 
~ationalist who really believed that Kenya was going to be ot-
iher than an African country governed by Africans. If it is an 
~frican state, which it is, then it must be rid of European coJ~ 
~rol in any form. That is the supreme aim of African national· 
I 
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ism. 
This is not to say that Europeans who will remain in Ken 
ya after independence ~ill not have a role to play in the af-
fairs of the state. Although their role will be mainly non-
political , those among them who ure politically ambitious may 
not lose hope entirely. If democracy adapted to Kenya's specu 
needs ldll be given a chance to grow , it is possible that a 
few Europeans ~ill be elected to the Kenya parliament und pose -
bly to other government bodies. 
It must be remembered th&t the Lyttelton plan was intro-
duced at a time ~hen Kenya was under a state of emergency. Af 
rican politi cal parties had been banned and political meetings 
forbi dden . The only persons tiho spoke for the Africans \~ere 
the African nominated members of the legislative council. The 
-were hampered in their t~ork as spokesmen not only because emer· 
gency laws suppressed even mild political criticism but also 
because as nooinated members they lacked the mandate of the pee -
ple . The Africans felt that the lSO top African leaders who 
~ud been arrested in 1952 and ~~re still in prison or in deten· 
tion were the real leaders. 
The removal of older leadership created a vacuum ~hich 
~as gradually filled up by a new and younger leadership. Poli ~­
cal organization being out of the question, the new crop of lea ~ 
~rs began to express themselves through the labor movement. 
This is how the name of Tom boya , general secretary of the Ket-
ya Federation of Labor , came to the forefront--first as a labo 
spokesman and then gradually as a strong competitor for new 
I 
LJ 
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leadership. 
wben the political atmosphere relaxed a little, the gov-
ernment allowed political organization again, but restricted i 
to a district, that is a mostly tribal, basis. By early 1960 
"When the state of emergency was lifted there were more than 60 
African district parties. Not until later in 1960 could Afri-
cans organize themselves into national parties. By t his time 
their political sentiment ~as expressed by a few elected Afri-
can members who sat in the legislature enjoying but a loose 
connection with the people, due to the emergency. 
As for the Europeans, the Lyttelton plan caused an irre-
!Parable cleavage in their leadership. Such terms as "European 
~oderates" and "Right t•ing extremists" became i nnovations in 
~enya's political vocabul~ry. Before the break became completj 
~mong Europeans, they had tried to solidify their front under 
such party names as Kenya Country party, Kenya Empire party , 
land Federal Independence party. t hen their reorganization ef-
fort failed they fell into two ideological camps. 
The moderates or the multi-racialists who emerged as a 
consolidated group ~ere led by ~achael Blundell, w1 English 
~and owner in Kenya. Blundell and his New Kenya party believe 
~hat Kenya's \bites and Kenya blacks still have a chance to 
~use politically and run the country jointly as a team. 
The United party, the organization of vociferous right-
wing settlers, was led up to the time of his death in 1960 by 
Group Captain Briggs , also a settler. 
/ 
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Q.o.utts Reoort 
While the Lyttelton constitution barred any changes in 
~acial composition in the legislature for ten years, it did no 
~e out the possibility of extending franchise to the African2 • 
It did in fact intimate that franchise might be granted "in s1J 
~onths after ••• the state of emergency at present existing in 
~he colony has come to an end, or on June 30, 1955, whichever 
is later." 
It was for this reason that Mr. w. F. Coutts, Kenya's 
Chief Secretary, was appointed and charged "to investigate and 
advise on the best system or systems to be adopted in choosing 
African Representative Members for the Legislative Council in 
Kenya.n25 
The Coutts Report was submitted in August, 1955. After 
the government of Kenya had made the necessary amendments, the 
report was accepted as an official document and subsequently 
~sed as a frame of reference for Kenya Africans' first electkns . 
The Coutts Report rejected the universal adult franchis' 
but recommended "a limited qualitative franchise based on edu-
cation• experience, public service, and cbaracter.n26 
There were seven distinct categories under which African~ 
could qualify to vote: 
(1) proved incane of 120 ($336), or proved 
25w.F. Coutts, Methods for Selection of African Reoresen~ 
tatives to Len:.islative Council (Nairobi: Government Printer, 
~955}, P• 1. 
26 East Afri£§ and RhQdesia , January 12, 1956, P• 677. 
I 
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property worth 500 ($1400); 
education up to second year in high school; 
long service varying from five years in 
the armed forces, police, and prisons to 
seven years in government service or· seven 
years in commerce, industry, or agricul-
ture; 
seniority, which meant anyone 45 years of 
age or over; 
higher education, that is, an academic 
degree or diploma acquired from an ap-
proved institution of learning; 
legislative experience or three years in 
local go vern men t; and 
meritorious service. 
It was possible for a single person to qualify for more 
~han one of these, th~s entitling him to more than one vote. 
n order to avoid excessive exploitation of this strange ar-
r.angement, the document stipulated that "those e>:cep.tionally 
~ualified in education, character, and service could have addi· 
1-ional votes, up to a rr.aximum of three votes." It l":as tbere-
rore possible for one hfrican to have three votes, for another 
~o have two votes, another one vote, and still another no vote 
t all. 
Voting age \:as to be twenty-one, and voting Wlis to be by 
~ecret ballot. 
However, special arrangements ~ere made for the people of 
entral province (Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru). These are the peopu 
~ho the government said ~ere mostly involved in the "anti~Euro­
~ean, anti-Christian" l-"lB.u r.Iau movement. Those among them who 
~ere known to have taken the movement's oath--committing them 
o kill the '\ihite men--were automtically disqualified from vo-
ing. The rest l'.ere to take a loyalty test, designed to certi-
i y that they had "given active support to the Cro~n during the 
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~mer~,;ency." Only then could the screened indi viduaTs oe cate-
~orized according to the seven rules. 
It was stated th<.. t all candidates for election must be 
able to speak the English language fluently and be at least 
~~enty-five years of age . A ~25 ($700) deposit was required of 
~ach candidate ~hich he was bound to forfeit if he failed to 
1ccumulate a certain number of votes. 
Any person who had been convicted of a criminal offence 
~d had been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of six monthE 
pr more could not become a candidate. 
The Coutts aeport had its own merits and demerits . On 
~he credit side , it sought means through which the African peo· 
~le of Kenya could exercise their frnnchise for the f irst time. 
~he right to vote in itself is a measure of political educatior, 
:hich should not be den ied a society that is striving for con-
6titutional advancement . The African people of Kenya, for no 
justifiable reasons and despite their strong and persistent re-
::tuests. had been denied the right to vote. Voting as regardec 
py the Kenya Europeans as a privilege which must be earned ra-
"'her than as a right to \·;hi ch a normal human being is entitled. 
~t long last , the voice of reason was allo\'1ed to be heard, and 
~lthough it was responded to but faintly it ~as nevertheless 
~eard--and listened to. That 1s \1hy March 6, 1957, the day 
~hat Kenya Africans went to the polls , became n political land-
~rk in that country's history. By allowing Africans to vote 
Britain was making a concession not \dthout realizing that suet 
i 1 concession would be a beginning of a process that would have 
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far-reachine effects on the political future of Kenya. To a 
white settler the granting or franchise to the hfrican--which 
had been his preserve for a long time--was not comfortable ne~~. 
To the African nationalist it was prosress of a kind, apprecia 
ted but not satisfactory. 
It is significant thttt Kenya, which is faced with more 
crucial issues than its sister-territories Uganda and Tanganyi~ 
ka, went to the polls before Africans in either of these t"'o 
countries did. Perhaps the explano.tion lies in the fact that 
the internal development in Kenya, involving violent struggle, 
demanded this change. 
There is also one aspect of the Coutts aeport--consider-
ing constitutional development in more advc..nced countries, not 
excluding the United States--that is interesting. The report 
refused to recommend sex discrimination in voting rights. Af-
rican women, like men, we re given the qualified right to vote 
so long as they met the specified (slightly modified for women 
requirements. 
A number of criticisms can be L~de about this report. 
First of all, the timin& was wrong. The elections came 
immediately after Kenya had experienced perhaps its t;reatest 
tragedy O•Jau Mau) and \~hen the country \':as still restive and 
unstable. A propitious time for elections would have been ten 
yeo.rs earlier, \'then the proscribed l~enya Afric~m Union \';as at 
its peak of strength and '~hen this mass movecent was vigorous-
ly cacpa1gn1ng for free African elections. It is probable tha 
if the KAU demand had then been met there would never have bee 
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I the Mau Mau. 
Secondly, convincing argument is lacking thut an educate 
person, a propertied person, an aging man, a government ser-
vant, or even a legislator has neceRsarily a becter sense of 
judgment than one l-lho is illiterate or rJaterially poor. In 
some known African countries still under colonial rule, and in 
free states of Asiat illiterates and men of letters mingle to-
gether on polling grounds , exercising "one man, one vote" prin-
ciple rather than the crippling multiple vote 1-1hich the B~i tis 
decided to impose on Kenya. 
Thirdly, the multiple vote -v1as highly discriminatory. It 
openly favored the African elite and discriminated against th 
African proletariat and peasants. The property qualification, 
for example, ~as defined as "proved income from all sourc~s 
amo\mting to 120 during 12 mQnths oreceding f!Q?l!~g~iQll !Q[ 
registration 27 or property \''orth 500." The prohibitive claus 
is underlined. During the Mau l1au uprising , thousands and tho 
sands of ~fricana were unemployed. By the tine elections ap-
proached, the unemployment had increased due to the thousands 
of detainees ~ho had been freed. ~ost of them had lost their 
property and were living precariously and were not in a finan" 
cial position to possess ~336 in order to vote. Further , the 
$J)6 requirement is burdening because the earning capacity of 
~ost people is not that high. Although statistics b~sed on in 
come per capita do not al~ays convey reliably the economic 
27Italics mine. 
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plight of a people , one: might be able to imagine ho~ hopeless 
it l\as for G. Kenya frican, ~d th an income per capita of only 
e7o, to be sold his franchise , ordinarily costless, for ~.336. 
The requireocnt for legislative experience was a pri vi-
lege limited to only a few Africans \~ho bed earned the eood 
graces of the governor to be nor.-:ina.ted to the legislative coun 
cil. Similarly , tr.e qualification for higher ~ducation was 
limited to a small fr&ction of the popula.tion that had been 
able to attend college. 
'fhe object of the recommendation ,,·hich forbade anyone 
'Nith a criminal cor.viction to stand for elections was to keep 
out popular leaders !rom the contest, leaders v;ho \·Jere in con-
flict ..,,ith the British, but not as criminals but as political 
prisoners. A mnn such as Jomo Kenyatta, who , .. as then in priso , 
could not , like K\\ame rkrume.h of Ghana, \ialk out of hi~ prison 
cell to the national legislature. 
The Coutts Report was more absurd than co~structive. It 
\J~S loaded with favoritism . It had succeeded in creating a 
mockery of the votir~ system. 
Tho Africans did, however , go to the polls. Up to this 
time, March of 1957, the number of Africans in the logislative 
council had risen from one in 1944 to eight, all of them hand-
picked , against sixteen European elected members, six Asian 
elected members , and one Arab , also elected. The Coutts Re-
port did not affect the number of Africans ~itting in t~e leg-
islature ; it could not , only constitutional agreement could de 
I so . It simply changed the methods of choosing African repre-
,.... -
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1 ncntatives, from nomination to election. The Africnns there-
fore were to elect eight representatives. The Africans' objec -
ing attitude to\vard the nomination method wrts demonstrated by 
the fact t:b..a t only t\vO of the previouo nominees \'iCre returned. 
Eliud Methu, the first nominated M.L.C. (mer~ber of the legisla 
tive council) and a member for more than ten years, suffered a 
crushing defeat. 
The newly elected members \~ent into action at once. The 
issued a statement declaring their stand in relation to the 
multi-racial Lyttelton constitution \''h:ic h v;as still in force. 
TI1~ first African elections in Kenya 
have just been held, The Eaet Africa and 
Rhodesia commented, and 'hi thin a fe\'-1 hours 
of the declaration of the results the new 
African xreobers of the lee;islative council 
announced that none of them would accept 
a ministerial or '3~:gilD r post, in the multi-
racial government . 
They expressed their determination to wreck the Lyttelto 
constitution because 1t maintained and upheld unfair represen-
tation. 
"We demand," the new spokesmen dec~red in a statement 
published in the same paper. "another 15 African members , whic 
would make 23 and give us parity with the non-African non-offi 
cial members, there being 16 Europeans , 6 Asians, and one ~~~ 
Their ultimate aim, they said, was to build a government and 
society 1n ~ich all enjoyed equal rights and opportunities an 
no one enjoyed privileges. In addition to their decision not 
28Eg,st Africa and llhodesia , l~rch 21 , 1957, p. 963. 
29Ibid., July 17, 1957 , p. 1598. 
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to accept any ministerial posts and to continue to attack the 
Lyttelton constitution, the African elected leaders also decid. 
ed to boycott the legislative council. The boycott lasted for 
many months, and the only thing that broke it was the announce .. 
ment by Her Majesty's Government that it was willing to insti-
tute new constitutional reforms. 
The Lyttelton plan , which had a life expectancy of at 
least ten years, lasted for four only. It had been so much 
bombarded by African nationalism that even the British govern-
ment realized that it was a case of self-deception to maintain 
a constitutional corpse , while a new lively approach might sav 
the surviving links between the African people and the British 
government. 
The Lenox-Boyd constitution, ~hich was announced only 
eight months after the African elections, attempted to revive, 
in a rehabilitated form, the badly damaged spirit of multi- ra-
cialism. While it attempted to palliate the injured feelings 
of the Africans, it made it clear th~t the retention of a mul-
ti-racial foundation, regardless of ho shaken that foundation 
might continue to be , was the object of the British government 
The European pillars of this foundation, the new constitution 
made it clear, ~ere going to be the stronger. "The political 
control of Kenya , " the preamble to the Lenox-Boyd constitution 
ran, "must be retained by Hor ~~jesty's Government in the Unit d 
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Kingdom for the forseeable future." 
The major provisions of the constitution, ~ccording to 
the East Africa god Rhode§ia, November 21, 1957, were: 
(1) six African new seats, raising the total to 14; 
(2) twelve special seats--four European, four African, 
and four Asian--to be elected by the legislative council sit~ 
as an electoral college; 
(3) two (formerly one) African ministries, those of houe 
ing, und adult education and community development; and 
(4) a council of state, the function of which would be ~ 
"protect any one community against discriminatory legislation 
harmful to its interests. n30 
The new constitutional reforms fell short of A£r1can ob-
jectives. The African elected members attacked the colonial 
secretary, Lenox-Boyd, bitterly, and accused him of imposing 
a new constitution without consulting them fully. He had wro~­
ly decided "to resort to old-fashioned, colonial, and imperia-
list technique used in the past to preserve colonial rule and 
in this case continue to ensure white settler domination . n31 
For the Europeans who were told the European control 
~ould be retained in Kenya for generations and who saw that 
African seats were not substantially increased, the constitu-
if;ion was reassuring. They let the furious Africans speak for 
~hem when they surmised that "the Europeans are happy because 
3°Ibid,, November 21 , 1957, p. 331. 
3llgid,, November 21, 1957, p. 366, 
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they think the current proposals ensure for their future." 
Despite their fury and serious reservations, the African 
thought it risky to their progress to reject the Lenox-Boyd 
constitution outright and categorically. They accepted it cold 
heartedly , elected the additional members , but refused unmova-
bly to join their assigned ministries. Thereupon the governor 
nominated one African , Musa Amalemba, to the ministry of hous-
ing, and left the other ministry vacant . 
From about 1958 three distinct political trends began t o 
emerge , each represented by a political party. European divi-
sion had led to creation of two political parties . Africans 
were still unable to organize themselves into national politi-
cal parties due to emergency laws . The government, however , 
allowed organization of political parties based on distrtct or 
tribe . As a result numerous rivaling parties came into being. 
\ie shall now examine the activities of the various political 
parties. 
United Partv 
The United Party, which has had ttany names and many 
spokesmen in the past , represents the political viewpoint of 
righ t wing settlers. \';e shall gain a helpful insight into 
their political thinking by presenting tl-10 policy statements is 
sued in 1956 and 1959 . 
The 1956 statement issued by their political party of th 
time t the Federal Independence party , proclaimed the party be-
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lief that "provincial autonomy is the only system of Governanc 
which will end the struggle for racial power in Kenya.n32 
The party suggested that Kenya should be re-arranged geo 
graphically into a number of five provinces, one European , tire 
African, and one Arab , each racial group exercising complete 
control within its domain. 
The central government would, under this plan, be stnpp~ 
of most of its power. It ~ould , in the first place, consist o 
12 Europeans and 12 Africans and Arabs. Its functions \tiould 11: 
elude full control ot the railway, the highways, national de-
fense, postal and telegraph systems, long distance air communi 
cations, ports, collection of taxes, and appointment of the ju 
diciary. lt would also exercise control in non-European areas 
for an indefinite period of time over finance, internal securi 
ty, public health, veterinary and agricultural matters , and ed 
ucation. But "in the interest of all races the over-all con-
trol of internal security must bemtirely in the hands of Euro 
peans, and be a Central Government responsibility.n 
The 1959 manifesto ~as issued by Group Captain L. R. 
Briggs and J. R. Maxwell, the top leaders of the United party. 
It said, 
32 
)) 
Our policy is founded on the fact that the 
peoples of Kenya comprise a number of dis-
tinct races, each of Which has a right to 
be and to remain here and a heritage which 
must be protected in a land where law and 
order prevail.)) 
Ibid., August 2), 1956, P• 1822. 
Ibid •• A~ust 20. 19 59. D. ll.27. 
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The ultimate control, the statement said, must remain in 
the hands of Her )~jesty's government for a considerable perio 
~nd "thereafter forever in the hands of responsible people," 
~nd stopped ~ithout defining these responsible people. 
The statement ruled out any plan that would "allow the 
dominant power to be placed in the hands of an African majoriq " 
~nd since this plan would have to be democratic in character, 
~he manifesto gave its attitude toward democratic evolution in 
~enya. "Current events have persuaded us that parliamentary 
~emocratio pattern will be unsuitable in Kenya for a very long 
!time to come." 
It therefore recommended, like the previous statement, 
devolution of power to local governments and conversion of the 
central government into a sterile body made up of appointees 
"from the Colonial Service. " 
The party statement went a step further to say that ther• 
lt;as no such thing as "the Africans . " " '1'his name is misleading 
and should not be interpreted to denote a homogeneous group . " 
~t called attention to "a strong desire of every tribe to re-
tain its identity and to manage its own affairs. " It was not 
~ight to lump all these peoples together and 'consider t hem as 
one; their differences necessitated different tribal laws in 
the various tribal areas , different systems of land tenure, 
different rules regarding property, inheritance , marriage . 
This was in line with a plan sugeested long ago by Lord 
~ltrincham , who was a Governor of Kenya in the 1920's. Lord 
~ltrincham saw "confederation of tribes" as "a charter ensurinl 
for every tribe control of its o~n land , security upon it and 
the maximum of local self-government . n34 
These statements have rai sed interesting points which 
illuminate some of the hard-core problems which Kenya has been 
so unfortunate as to inherit from its own history. 
Let us address ourselves to t\'10 questions in an effort t ~ 
comprehend fully the repercussions which such proclamations ma 
cause. First , what are the motives of Kenya settlers in draw-
ing these plans? Second, are their plans practical? 
There are compelling reasons to suggest tha t the Euro-
pean settlors' plans aro completely unworkable because of their 
many weaknesses and their unrealistic approach. 
Firstly , they are racially inspired. ~hen one of the 
statements proclaims that "the choice before the European elec 
torate today is racial integration or separation , " it is echo-
ing the official segregation policy of the government of the 
Union of South ~rrica. The dreaded shadow of South Africa, 
where Africans have been cruelly deprived of their sense of 
humanity, has for more than half a century hung terrifyingly 
over Kenya . Many of Ktnya's detestable policies--land aliena-
tion, denial of civil liberties, convict labor--have been in-
fluenced by South African racial laws. For Kenya to be asso-
ciated in any form with the oppressive , callous government of 
South Africa is , in the minds of Africans , a damnable thing . 
It would evoke great wrath in them. By suggesting partition o 
34 Lord Altrincham, Kenya's OppQr~un!~v (London: Faber an 
1 Faber) . p. 150. 
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Kenya into racial provinces dominc.ted by v.hi tes, the Kenya eet 
tlers ~ere deriving from South Afri ca political inspiration 
thnt was unsuited to Kenya political climate. 
Secondly, it is clear from the aforementioned statements 
that the Kenya settlers repudiated democracy as the basis for 
Kenya's political evolution. They \iOuld be prepared to take 
up arms to prevent the development of democracy in an African 
country in hhich they are residing. Democracy as practised in 
England benefits all citizens, including the man in the street 
The prospect that such benefits might be extended to Kenya Af-
ricans some day was contrary to the settlers' conception of 
human development in a colony. When they declared that the 
"overall control of internal security must be retained entire-
ly in the hbnds of Europeans," the idea \..:as to forestall any 
move by the Africans, military or political, that might upset 
the current political, economic, and military structure which 
favored the Europeans. 
Group Captain Briggs and other captains of white suprema 
cy OU8ht to have acknowledged the fact that their doctrine base 
on racial superiority was a myth which could no longer be al-
lowed to govern Kenya. 
The Kenya settlers are afraid that if democracy is al~ 
lowed to take root they will eventually lose the country's con 
trol to the Africans. What they seem to overlook is that whet -
er it is going to be democracy or any other political system, 
they will lose all the same . The best thing for them is to 
prepare themselves for their inevitable defeat. 
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On this point of race relations the Kenya European ra-
cists rnised a cry, not uncommon among the United States segre· 
~ationists, that the multi-racial policy (~hich they vehem~ntl 
~ondemned) would condition "the young folk of all races for in 
~er-racial marriage." They implored that they might be saved 
from "the embarrassment of multi-racial education and in~egra­
tion." 
The Nationalists believe that the African people of· Ken-
ya can get along \Jell \-vi thout racial integration. They are no 
asking for integration \,ith Europeans. Such a request "'·ould 
~gnify the import~ce of Europeans. Africans are not ·begging 
to be allo\•led to live in European suburbs or to cultivate in 
the white highlands. They ~ant to chase the colonialists out, 
and recover their occupied lands. What they are asking for is 
independence so that they may establish justice, equality, and 
freedom. 
~fuen the Kenya settler defends publicly the sanctity of 
white womanhood and vows to protect it from molestation by Af-
rican males, he makes Africans gape with surprise. There is n 
evidence that the black male is making special efforts to so-
cialize with white women or to marry them. Any African male 
who decides to marry a white girl, which he can do, has to ad-
mit to himself privately that such a marriage would be confron -
ed with peculiar problems. For example,a mixed couple may not 
be accepted either by Africans or Europeans. Such problems ma 
place both the parents and their children in an extremely diff -
cult position. 
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The apparent fear of the settler that inter-racial mar-
~iuge will automatically result from integration is baseless. 
~~rriage is a happy result of mutually agreeable relationships 
petween t~o members of the opposite sex. Such an intimate in-
~er-personal relationship cannot be enforced by legislation. 
It is a natural gro~th of free ~ill, free choice, dedication, 
and love. \;bile the Kenya \\hite male condemns the relationshi; 
which black wen may have ~ith white ~omen, he fails to say any· 
~hing about the pro~iscuoua dealings he carries on with fricar 
~10rr:en. 
To clarify further the baseless fear of Europeans , let 11 
pe pointed out that integration of races in Kenya has fe\· chan· 
pes of success in the foreseeable future. The European communj~ 
~y lives in its preferred places--the highlands and segregated 
~rban centers--where it has but limited contact with the Afri-
pan population, which is still solidly rural. The relationshii 
pet~een the two races has a strong commercial, official, or 
naster-servant touch. It is a distant sort of relationship 
which offers fe · social ingredien ts that would contribute and 
~e ad to inter-racial m&rriage. Worse still, this poor contact 
~s infrequent except for members of all races who intermingle 
ror official and business reasons. A rural African can stay 
ror weeks , even for months, ~ithout ever seeing a white man, 
~et alone having a chance to d~velop an intimate social rela-
~ionship ~ith him. 
Thirdly, the settlers' plans ~hich were to partition the 
~ountry according to geographical location of each race fumblec 
..---
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on certain £eo graphical facts. tl.any of Kenya's to\ms and citi~ ~ • 
ineludin£, the capital (!lairoti) , Kisumu, and the largest port 
(l-lombasa), are not \dthin the European area. Hecosnizin8 the 
~alue of these centers, the Europeans said that such centers 
~hould be taken a~~ay from the non-Europeans and given to the 
Europeans. "Nairobi ~culd be included in the European area," 
said one of the state~ents, adding, "The party envisages that 
~'lombasa l';ould be included in the European area ," bu.t \'iould al-
llo~l the Arabs to have a sc:y in the affairs of the port. This 
special provision made it only too obvious that the intention 
pf the settlers ~as to maintain the entire control of the coun· 
~ry. 
Fourthly, the Asiann, who outnumber the Europ~ans by two 
~o one , were relegated to a position of no importcnce under th 
~ew plan. The statement said the Asian had no inherent riBht 
to a share in government in Kenya. In a tone reminiscent of 
settler denunciation of Indians in the 1920's, the statement 
said, "The British Government has done a disservice to the in-
~igenous peoples in permitting the entry into Kenya of so many 
~mmigrants of a culture and habits of life ~hich are so com-
pletely different from those of the European, and their own." 
Only a post for an Asian Under-Secretary for Asian Affairs 
~ould be allowed. 
The Britisher ~ould denounce the Asian and restrict his 
political rights because as a colonial ruler he believes he 
has more rights in Kenya than the Asian . But the African re-
jects this theory. To him, both are immigrants contending on 
,..---
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his own soil for political and com .. 1ercial supremacy. To him, 
the question is not whether the European has more rights and 
:vhe Asian fe\'.er . He is comi 1i tted to liberating himself and re· 
storing the mastery of his country to himself. Then if Euro-
peans and Indians have a quarrel betlVeen ther..sel ves , he cran ar. 
lbitrate. 
Finally, the picture l'ihich has been created that tri balls 
~s a deterring factor in J.frican unity and a necessity for tri 
~al and raciol confederation is exag~erated. rribalism was a 
~ay of life for the past . By and large it has b€en supplanted 
.,Y nationalism , and lingering tribalists who dare st.and in the 
~ay of progress are denounced as enemies of African freedom. 
lrrue, sollle Africans are prisoners of tribal fantasy and \vould 
~ike to maintain tribalism because they stand to lese in a mor~ 
~nlightened world. The reader is entitled to knO\·~ th&t Euro-
peans, ~!ho find it diffi cult to adjust themselves to a Kenya 
ll.n \'1hi ch their pO\\er is progress! vely diminishin& , are guilty 
pf whipping up tribal sentiment among the unsophisticated Afri· 
pans. As has been pointed out previously, Kenya settlers would 
~mploy any methods to destroy African unity and struggle for 
~reedom. Tribalism is their latest weapon. 
Confederation of tribes ~ould of course perpetuate both 
~ribalism and racism. It is precisely for these reasons that a 
Ponfederation plan or provincial autonomy Hould be rejected by 
~fricans . For a country like Kenya, which has been an unhappy 
~d bleeding victim of colonial exploitation, aggravated by ra-
cial strife and a limited amount of tribalism. onl_Z_ a strong 
I 
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entral government would bring stability and progress. 
The objectives of the New Kenya party \'.ere in part in a-
reement with the views of the European rightists, although ul-
imate achievement of a harmonious multi-racial society was the 
arty's professed goal . 
The New Kenya party accepted the inevitable truth that in 
ependence for Kenya was certain. But until such time comes, 
the responsibility ot H. • Government must be maintained." 
The party upheld the rights of private property and the 
anctity of contract; supported the establishment of non-racial 
carding schools on a high school level; recommended the open-
ng of the highlands "to competent farmers of any race"; recom-
ended creation of a second parliamentary chamber, a Bill of 
ights, and an independent judiciary.J5 It supported the "gen-
ral principle of a Federation of East African territories (Ken 
a, Uganda, and Tanganyika)," and the establishment of military 
ases in Kenya and the stationing of foreign troops. "East Af-
ica can best contribute to the defence of the free world by 
ine service bases available for that purpose, thereby not on 
y accepting our collective responsibility for defence, but en-
eying the economic benefit stemming from such bases," said the 
nifesto of the New Kenya party. It became imperative there-
35ra~t Africa and Rhorlesin, November 12, 1959, p. 242: 
~~· December 15, 1960, p. 431. 
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fore to maintain "facilities in Ker .. ye. for the defence of Afri-
' 
ca and the free l''orld provided from overseas." 'l'he party re-
jected "introduction of a . syste~ of universal sufferage on· a 
common electoral roll for all the people of Kenya ," because it 
"v.ould lead rupidly to chaos or dictatorship. n 
On the Indian question the party attitude was revealed 
by 1 ts loader, Michnel Blundell , '~hen he said in 1956, "I do 
net believe in Kenya co~ins under Asian influence and I am de-
termined t:1at the Colony shall be developed on v.estern lines 
of thought.n36 This attitude has been ~odified since in order 
to accon>odatc the Asi&.n political views to further the cause 
' 
of multi-racial idealisc. In 1959 Blundell admitted tbat Asjar. ~ 
like other communities , ~ere part of the country by long-es-
t~blished right. and contribution to its \-.ell-being. .\nd in 
1960 he said th~t Asians \\·ill have a permanent a.nd important 
part to play in an independent Kenya. 
There are a n'..liDber of points which an African nationalis r.o 
~ill naturally disagree \vith 1n this manifesto. One feels a 
compulsion, ho\ .. ever, to commend the Ne\' Kenya party members 
for their courage in breaking ~ith the past . Their suggestion 
that African farmers (after a heavy screening) could farm on 
the heretofore ~hite highlands was a surprising move . True. 
initially only a trickle of African farmers would be selected 
for the rig~cd sattle~ent s cheme . bu~ they would represent an 
opening in a previously impregnable ~all , an opening that wo~ 
36 6 Ibid,, September 27 , 195 , p . 117. 
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widen gradually and could never again be closed. 
Respect for the riehts of private property, as upheld by 
the New Kenya party, might appear humane and fair to n \<Jestern 
political analyst, but may strike a Kenya Afric~ nationalist , 
in the lieht of Kenya's internal political conditions, as be-
ing deceptive and imperialist in intent. It i s basically in 
conformity ~ith human rights to speak of protection of the 
right of private property, especially in a free society. But 
in 2 colonial territory to proclaim the general acceptance of 
guch a principle, ~ithout first righting basic problems relat-
ed to it, would be to compound ano condone, in case of Kenya, 
injustices of sixty years of colonialism. Every r~sponoible 
and right-thinking Kenya African l:nows that overy ounce of his 
country ' s soil no~ in European hand~ is African property and 
that the mE>thods used to aCC1uire and maintain it \'iGre morally , 
legally, and custornrily l'lrong. f/J. chacl Blundell, the leader 
of the New f.enya party, "0\.n s" 1200 ncres of Afri cc.n lund. 
\':hen he, and other big land owners, piously speak of the right 
of private propert.y, they ·nnt to preserve for thcmseh·es and 
their children l-fhat coJ.oniali~m genflrously creat(!'d for them. 
Most of the land leases in Kenya run for 999 years . No Afri-
can has enoU[;h patience to \mit for nearly a thousand years 
before he can abolish calculated injustices. 
Secondly , the African :ets weury of hei~g tolrt the necea 
si ty of acquiri~£;, and of cnnforming to, l·Jest0rn thouezht , as 
if that is all thnt matters. Will an African not be bett~r 
off if hr is Given the ri~ht to enrich his cultural heritage 
I 
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by borrowing the suitable western .values than by being subject 
ed to propaganda on the superiority of western culture? 
Similarly, to be reminded constantly that Kenya will re-
main under British control until certain standards are reached 
is not encouraging news to a progressive African who does not 
accept the standards set for him and who can no longer tolerat 
foreign rule in his country. Such utterances are poor element 
with which to build a multi-racial society. 
Thirdly , the maintenance of military bases and foreign 
troops is, of course, the most objectionable part of the party 
declaration . It is ironical that multi-racialists want Kenya , 
an unfree country, to form a free - world defence against com-
munism. I£ Kenya had to defend itself against an enemy, it 
would be British colonialism. its most hated enemy. To defend 
freedom , a country must first of all be free. In the past Ken 
ya has defended freedom for other countries. It is a mistake 
it cannot afford to repeat. 
"Free ~orld" is an intriguing term. Also misleading . 
Candidates for this marvelous world are certain of automatic 
admission and warm embrace if they only condemn communism per-
sistently and unreservedly, regardless of the various motives 
for doing so. Hatred for communism is the cement that binds 
the "free l';Orld" together. A tyrant who denies freedom in his 
domain is as valuable as an honest statesman who cherishes freE 
dom. In defence of this world Kenya is expected to align it-
self with white South Africa , the most~eacherous foe of free-
dom, and with Portugal , its closest partner , both of which havE 
I 
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entrenched interests in Africa and are hailed for their anti-
communist commitment. Blundell and his followers believe that 
Africans can be ~de to fall into such a trap . 
African Parl(ies 
African political leaders , under the shadow of emergency 
managed to collect their political thoughts and issued a well-
prepared statement. 
"The aims of our political struggle are based on the ob-
vious factor that Kenya geographically , historically, and popu 
larly is an African country. The fact that Kenya also has tho -
sands of non-Africans does not alter this fundamental fact tha 
Kenya is essentially an African country.n37 
Everything else , they said , must be adjusted to this fun 
damental fact. What is neverything else?" It included equal 
pay for equal »ork; respect for rights of private property pro 
vided that such rights were not built on exploitation and in-
justice (in which circumstances the State \-vould intervene); 
parliamentary form of government \lhi ch allowed for "undiluted 
democracy" based on "one-man , one-vote" principle; safeguards 
for the minorities; a Bill of Rights; an independent judiciary 
exercising t he right of judicial revie~. They also stated tha 
constitutional development should advance fast enough culminat 
ing in independence. 
After the state of emergency was lifted in 1960 , African 
37Ibid., December 4 , 1958 , P• 416. 
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formed two political parties, the Kenya African National Union 
and the Kenya J:.frican Democratic Union , and botr. of them , in 
pursuit of previous aims , issued a stateffient, appearing in the 
~frica Reoort , January 1960 , describing the conditions which 
should prevail prior to independence. 
They called for complete Africanization of the Civil Ser 
vice; extensive land reform; abolition of all foreign military 
bases in Kenya; a foreign policy of friendly non-alignment; 
creation of jobs to ease unemployment , of facilities for mass 
edacation, and of a suitable economic climate for industriali-
zation , and the release of all detained and restricted persons ~g 
'fhe militant nationalists cannot find much fault with 
the stated African expression . \ere it not for the uneasiness 
that pervaded the country during and after the emergency, Af-
rican nationalists \'lould no doubt have made stiff-er demands. 
They did not t.ant to jeopardize realization of indepen-
dence. That is why they probably chose to insert in their 
statement such phrases as "parliamentary democracy," "safe-
guards for the minorities , n and "just compensation," which 
would normally appeal to the British public. It is possible 
they did not mean to abide by these political express.:.ons. 
In a ttore relaxed political atmosphere , in a time ' ihen 
~fricans are securely in the saddle of po"er, their leaders 
~iould be specific in their definitions of crucial expressions. 
This tendency will become clearer after i ndependence . 
38Africa Special rteport , January 1960, p. 12. 
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liuch !iS this writer is a nationalist, and precisely for 
that reason, he cannot condone the political behavior of cer-
tain African leaders which led to a serious split of leader-
ship. Existence of t.'!ho African political parties in a country 
that needed unity to achieve a common aim was no t justified . 
What lvere the causes of disunity among African leaders? 
Ideologically , no ~rreconciliable differences existed to war-
rant political rivalry. The manifesto quoted above , sufficien -
ly substantiated by other public statements, points out that 
the t\ooJo parties were funda nentally in harmony. Both \ooJanted in 
dependence--soon and honorably . 
Tribalism has been counted as a contributing factor to 
the spli t. Tribal ism has existed in the past and it s vestiges 
are fading out . It is notable that it i s a fe\\ European Se1'-
tlers \'oiho have talked strongly of preserving trical identity. 
Afr icans in overwhelming majority have condemned tribalism, as 
they have done coloni&lism, to death. A European who urges 
Afri cans to fight to retain their tribal structure and finance 
the formati on of tribal political parties is desperately try-
ing to save his Ol''n position and to defy the tide of African 
nationalism. It is unfortunate that some Africans professing 
to be leaders have succumbed to the courtly but deceptive over 
tures of their European mast ers . 
If the course of rivalry ~as not ideological or tribal , 
what was it? In short , personal jealousy. The arrest of Jomo 
Kenyatta i n 1952, fol l owed by his long imprisonment , created a 
vacuum i n leadership of the nationalist movement . None of the 
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junior politicians l·.ho tried to seize renyatta t s mantle of 
leader~~ip cucceeded . But the strug~le was sharp and ersonal 
The personal accusations these nationalists m~de concerning 
each. other \-:0re a discredit to th~ noble cause they'\\ ere fi,cht 
ing for. 
At one point five Africans \~ere competine for top polit1 
c 1 leudership . Roland Ngala led hi2 faction , assist d by his 
close colleague, Ib2inde Uuliro . The t·.,o men later became the 
leaders of the Ke!1ya t .fr·ican Denocratic Union. In the other 
faction , Tom .1boya , Oginga Odinga, and Dr . Gikonyo Kia.no , ;tu::~ 
together :or a ":hile before tney started slapping each other. 
Arg\dns Kodhek l".ho , unlike the rest , was not a l!ll~mbcr of the 
legisle ti ve council ''as contiucting his ov.n fight. This group 
Of 1bovr· Odin~~ ;'1.' "~' o "'' "dek •·.·t'l~ J'cined b'! J:>!l.es GJ.' c .U"' .. H, 
'l <~"'J • 0 a , .. '-"• , '" .... • ""'- - -- -
after being released from seven years of detenticn. They 
formed the Kenya .~fr~c .... n .;ational Union with Gichuru as presi-
dent and Mboya as gener~l secret ry . 
Two young !!:en in particular in this nev. crop of Afr· can 
lcade ... -ship h d more than a chon ce to succeed in pulling people 
behind them. Dr. Kiano , e le rned man in the sciences of eco-
nomics and politics end Kenya's first Doctor of Philosophy , wa 
regarded as a rare je"Wel that ..,,cu ... d 2ilne hopefully in the con 
fusion tl.a existed. His impressive election victory in 1958 , 
his subseq'..... nt upp L'1tment as the m.:.nister for industry mHl 
commerce , and his position as the theoretician of the p rt)· , 
\>:ent a long \lay to\'lard proving his political genius . But to 
1 many people Kiano ·.1as a disappointment, u less capable man tha 
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they had expectEdo His f:..i.!ure t.., cor:1r C:I'!d e natiorP l f0llo ~­
ing \'.as p<..rtly due perhaps to his uncoP ;:>elling, unc:.agnetic per 
sonuli ty o Eut .})erL_ps it \ .. as due more to the fc-.ct that oen 
wl.o did not measur·c up to his academic training were almost 
beating him in his m-m game &s a trainee politician. 
Tom I-lboy.1 almo.:.t \•On the gume. After t't~O yea::-3 of high 
scuool , dboya 1;ent 0~1 1;.4 onc··yea:- scholarship to Oxford to stu'l 
tr~de ~1~onism. nc re urned tc Kenya to look for a future in 
the l~bor ~oveucnt ~~d ~n politics. He became 3e1eral sccre 
t<iry of the .... enya I'edcr::...l.io .. of ~c;. bot> and an elected member of 
the national legislature. These u.re positions of authority 
and prestige , Gven for an {.ducated man . The'1. he Has catapulte 
overnight into A.fri~un politics and the .:.nternational limeligh , 
"vv<hen he was elected as chairman of the All-Africa Peoples Con-
ference in 195g , mainly through the personal poV:Je::- of Dr. Kwam 
Nkrumah of Ghana , the Lost of the conferer1ce. 
This extremely i;:rportant position fitted l•1boya ' s ego welJ 
\dth his eviden"t youthful charm (he was nearly thirty) , his 
gifted oratory , he exploited his ne'•J prestige both for ~tfrica 
and for himself. \iestern interests noticed him and saw in him 
a potential infl uenti~l partner of the free v1orld. American 
foundati ons professin;; humani tarianisrn in l~fr:!.cn financed his 
several trips to the United States and other NATO countries. 
The AFL-CIO g~ve him r::.oney to fu!"the ... r:.s ~fc4hor and political 
ambition~ . For exa~Lple , t.hey built hi1n Solidarity House in 
~Iuirol.i (named after v.ulter Reuther' s Solidarity House in Dc-
troi t) as his labor- hct.dqtu:lrte.cs ar.d. rHiJed df fense funds for 
I 
I 
i 
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Ilboya and his colleagues for libel charces brought against 
them (a case · lli ch resulted in ninor fines) . He beca e u. dar-
line of the Acerican press . This \!~rit .... , ~ho follo-..ed closely 
th African events of 1959 as he does each yec ~ J believes that 
no Afri car~ leader , &nd there are a number much more important , 
received e r eater publicity it'! \.,he Unit~' ""tates than l.boy"'" . 
Educational prog:ams in \lhich Ilboya played a pror.inent role 
\\ere st(;lrted to brin~ Keny students to !.L'lerica . .1.hey fil led 
impo!'tent needs o: cducat:in ... under-priv.:.le~ed Africar-. students 
But the Ame:r-icans who fina!'!ced them, i th the full e.pp!·ova.l 
aad blessing of the St te DerorttJent , tlid hope that American 
education would cast ~~ e youne students i nto r:boya ' s image--
malleable beines 1·ith pro-west and anti -comr:lurL.i.s·i; vie\·Js . 
The pu, ~Lcity I'boya received in-lated his self-pride to 
a danger point . For example , he made a verbal a t tack publicly 
on K•,ame !lkrumah , pres.:dent of Gl ana , and on other African 
leaders noted fo!' their non-compromising stand on African lib-
eration an unity . That l,boya , a man of comp ratively small 
statt>..re , should recklessly attack a head of state shocked .any 
.'l.fricans. In Ghana he \'ias pt~blicly condem .. l1ed as a stc. vt,... of 
\1est.nrn imperialism. In Paris , dism yed Afr::..can students 
called him the mouthp.:.ece of neo-colonia:ism. In ltcirobi , A ... -
ricans told him bluntly they did not \lant A:nerican money. 
hboya is still a for-midable force in 1\e!lya ' s olit cs. 
But \":.:th Kenyat\ja back in polit:.cs, &nd other senior politi-
cians , und \-:ith 1boyu' s ri vuls still opposed to him, hboya has 
been considera ly tamed and reduced to h.:G proper size. 
I 
CHAPTER Vll 
1960 CCN S TI TU TI ON .t~L CON FERENCE 
These then were the three schools of political thought 
that existed before the 1960 constitutional conference was 
called-- the European right-wingers who insisted on the continu 
ation of their supre~cy, the multi-racial gradualists who the -
retically sought i nter-racial cooperation on the government 
level but \ho in fact upheld British control over Kenya for an 
indefinite period of time , and African nationalists who spoke 
of a democratic form of uovernment in which they would predomi 
nate. 
All three groups were represented at the constitutional 
conference \\h ich was held in London and lasted for t\'JO weeks. 
Quarrelling Africans decided to close their ranks and present 
a united front at least for the duration of the conference. 
"Independence--! hope within the Commonwealth , " Colonial 
Secretary Iain hacleod told the forty-eight delegates attend-
ing, adding, "\ie should remember that both Africans are easily 
the majority of all the people of Kenya and also that all tho~ 
who have made their homes in Kenya are entitled to make a full 
contribution to the work of governing their country." ~hat 
type of nation was the British government striving to build in 
Kenya? "A nation based on parliamentary institutions on the 
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\·estminister model . " Kenyt. would thll" be made unable to de-
velop its o\n personality so that it may become a product of 
~ictorian traditions. 
The constitutional proposals made by the British govern-
ment ;.;·ere as fol:ows: 
(1) 
(2) 
( 3) 
tl.c. legisl~t.ive council tv co1sist of 
65 menbers, 53 of these to be elected 
on & Cvl .1or. rol: md 12 b.r the h. 0 iSG 
lative co\mcil; 
twent)· of the 53 seats to bs reserved 
for immigrant races , 10 of them allo-
cated tc LUropefns, 8 Jo~1ns, ru d 2 
Arabs (Africans \\'Ould thus have 33 seats); 
franchise qualificat.:ons for all comcon 
roll seats ~ere described as ability to 
read or \ ri tc ol'm language (or over 40 
years of age) , or office-holder in l'Jide 
range of scheduled posts , or incor1e of 
75 { $210); 
national seLts to be distributed (like 
anything else) on racial lines--4 Afri-
cans, 4 Buro ~c c: ~ s, 3 Asians, c;,nd one 
Arab ; 
the council of ministers to consist of 
12 ministers--4 Africans , 3 Europeans , 
and one Asian (all elected) , the1rest to be appointed by the governor. 
Africans expressed some reservations on the ne\v proposau 
although their voice would be dominant in the legislature. ''~e 
are prepared to give the 1-1acleod plan a chance," said Roland 
Ngala , le~der of the African delegation. "We have made our 
strong reservations on his stand. We shall go on pressing for 
every adult to get his basic right of one vote and for indepen 
dence for our country ."2 In llairobi 15 , 000 jubilant Africans 
1
"Full Text of hhlte 0 "per on Kenya Cop..,titutional Con-
ference , " East Africa and Rhodesia, March 3 , 1960 , p. 632 . 
2East Jifrica and t~hodesia, February 18, 1960 , p . 585 . 
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welcomed t! eir delegates ard jn 1 isumu 11000 of theCJ. performed 
a "dance of success.tt 
The European moderates greeted the ne' constitution with 
mixed e~otions. They held l.o,)e , expressed r(...3ervations) and 
sLol'ted anger . 
~lichacl Bltmdell , the o , timi stic leader of the Ne\: Kenya 
party , called the constitution a ''victory . " "'rhc conference 
'"as a victory for moder·ation and , us moderates, \ l e in our par-
ty are pleased v;ith the results . "3 But his collE:ague , C. \:. P 
Harris , differed \\:i.dely. He expressed his nervousness at let-
ting Africans assume government control. He implied tl1at Af-
ricans \'Jere being remotely guided and controlled like sputniks 
ttPoli ti ca.l space rockets , ull of them black, v.ere being lamche< 
all over Africa , perhaps due to influence or pressure from Ame -
ica or Hussi&. n 4 No p ... oof \~as available , he saic. , that these 
rockets \iould h:..t their turget- - true democracy . "Some could 
go off course and land in the Soviet orbit (becoce Communist), 
and some might run out of fuel {sound economy) and fall back 
into savagery." 
It \·ms left to the European extremists to l et out their 
boundless fury . To European die-hards, the ~cleod constitu-
tion was a ttshock , " a "terrible thing , " a "sad thought . rt It 
mean t "dictatorshipn in Kenya . It meant a "political death-
blown to the European commtmity. The w-hole plan \as a "disas-
3 Ibid., February 25 , lq6o , p . 618 . 
4Ibid., February 4, 1060 , p . 541 . 
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ter," a "victory," for the .·.au J.'lU. It \vc..'3 "ubandonment" of 
5 the Euroneans in Kenya. 
Group Captain Brit;gs stressed that "the common roll prin ~ 
ciple is U.'"1accept·•tle to us." ~tlthough he l:ne' i1dependence 
would now come at some future date under a government predomi-
nantly African, he sai~ !~and hi- party would c ~tinue to op-
pose such "disastrous proposals 'W..:.th all the means at our (Uni t-
ted pa:r-ty) disposal." One of the means at his disposal \.a3 tc 
write the British Prime ?-1i~i'Jt'):::-, Harold Mad1illan , a letter 
appealing to hirn to intervene on behalf of t1e c0lonialists. 
"The circumstances in \'which •~e are placed if.:'er consid-
erably fror.1 those affecting other ; roups," the letter sai<.L 
"The European comm-.mity," it continued to lament , "\hom ~.e 
solely represent, is threatened with political extinction if 
the present constitutional proposals are ioplemented in the ex 
isting form. n He asked for a special intervi.e\" with the Prime 
Hini::;ter . But "Hr. !1acllillan again recused to see Grot.:.p Cap-
tain Briggs, lho deeply regretted his decision."6 
~1ichael Blundell described Group Captain Briggs ' atti tud 
as "drippine defeatism." 
In retalint:.on , the United party 's angry r!len gave Bltm-
dell a hostile reception in Nairobi , called him a t .rai tor , and 
"threw thirty pieces of silvern at his feet for having "sold 
)'l'hese expressions \verc used by Group Captain Briggs , in 
a series of intervie\vS and <Jpoeches in Februnry and l~arch, 196 , 
as reported in East Africa and Rhodesia. 
6East Africa and Hhodefi.i.P. 1 February 25 , 1960 , p . 618. 
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I yo;..~.r O\ n people •. , 
The next performer in this comedy was tir Co~modore How-
lard-~iilliams , a notable \,hite suprenacist, \lho was suspended 
from the party for violating its discipline code , &nd wt..o fo1·ce< 
t11e Kenyu government--which has shown unmistakable sympathy to· 
wards the settlers--to proscribe his paper , the Kep ra CQmment , 
for its acrimonious r cist editorials • 
• fricans want r.uhuru , " whi~h mea.ns :n pr&ctice not free-
dom but license , said Howurd-~illiams . Africans have no sense 
of responsibility . ~ike others of his il~ , it \as rightfully 
proper to find c: scap€..,;o(.4t for his troubles. 
"s.merican noney is on the 'a:y in , u he said. "We accept 
the \'Jhole matter as having been engineered by AmE>ric.a. n7 He 
revec.led his knO\vledt;£. about some undeniable trutr in regard t 
the racial problem in the United Stc;;.tcs, even tho..1gh irrelevan 
to Kenya's constitutional aiscussion . 
America--\'ihcre .:.n some states they do 
not give the vote to Negroe s; where there i s 
not a :::ir. :e tl&ch. uerator ; 'lihere a mere 18 
coloured lnot str aight Ilegro) in the House 
of Representatives represent 18 million Ne-
groes; and \'Jhere lynch la''~ reigns . 
He concl uded this phase of it with ,. "The American passio 
for democracy in Africa i s just nonsense . " Fearing that Brit-
ain was creating ideal conditions for "all-black dictatorship , 
Hmrard- l1lliams promised to "leave the political scene in Ken-
ya, as the Home Government heavet~ a'\-way our heritage . " But Air 
Coomodore Hovard-1iTilliams h; s not left Kenya . Ironically he i s 
7Ibid., April 14 , 1960 , P• 774 . 
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the rnin.:.ster life in the curJ.·cnt Kenya gov 
ernment . 
Ono other inc.:dcnt \.as t e :- sign ... tion of t . e pec.l~or o 
job , as a protest <.... u..i.nst. ~. m, nc, <.;Oll~h .. J.. ... uv ... on. .~. he purty , e 
formed after\~ ... rll.., , ~.he E •rope n ... c ...~. ...... J..o .. , ;.a.., intended to r 1 
ly , , ......... Kenya Luropcans b h.:.r.d In the l,~vv gcn 
er 1 elections i .o.., !Lci::d · l v ~ ..... "'c .. e # ... ~ +- ' r '"l e ~ ._..., ... Ul, J CUl._. .... .. ._. ~, v4 
Ferdinand's hopes -of o ... l ... in .... di in.:..., .. in -..h tv c.olO.IlY i • 
enya . 
Concerning th ·~cleod cor. .. t utior:. a.."1d t .c esu ti .g re 
ac ion , 11one of he politi al g oups c:!4erged .... c..lc~r ,; .. ~.,~.vr. 
fricans expo Cl.~u , o:-e tha • e 0 0 t.. :or c~u ple , vnoir 
ma ds fo!" a universal ~dult fran chi..,(, , . ..rr ~ c.. •. w c hl. ef in.:.s-
t or , and a o:nmanding nu:r.ber of .. .:nis .. er.i.c.l l"oot..;, ere not f 
filled , even seriou.sly considered . But judging in J.0•1b-te:om 
obje ctives , ~.~he no,, onsti ution s a step for,., rd , <l ste p in 
the right airecti.on , for African neit.:.cno.lism . ' e ::::.ay 
say , a li. ited victory--far fro being ~"1 i~p:'essive one--for 
the J.fri cans . 
In Briggs , Hm,ard-\.i lliams , and Bentincks , one see~ mis-
used courage , determination , and strong \:ill . Their i::npressiv 
qualit i es \,ere not being utilized to build a U.'1J. ved Kenju. , but 
a united European community at the expense of others . Tney 
fought to r.l.:lir. ~;u.in tl c stutus qt...o cg ... .:.r s ~, <.4 vJ.dc o er:1otions 
that was bent on destroying it . ~heir obduracy ~as uncalled 
for and detrimental to Kenya's \.el ~re ond .:. ... 1s unfortunate 
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.• ho real ..... :t \,..,..;;~ res pen si blc for the .clco .. tc , ~.~tuUt,h limit 
ed , consti tut.lol,al ch&nge? The settlers sc..id l. "' \~<ls either 
Ru~sians or Americ nu . Tl.cy ...... id it deliber.:...tely , l nm . ..:.ng thG. 
by J..nvol ving • tri ~-. .... ns ""nd . ussians th y \lcre r~ising <... point 
't.hich \JU.S wl•llcrs~lly SCll..>J.l.. ... VC in t t. <-utirc .frican national 
l.Sv LO\IC!..lCnt . .., ... s v. 1.4C t ...... ~; " cricc:;,n wOllCJ' \ ..... s Sbi.v tv l:cn-
viser to tl. 1\fJ. .i."-w• c nsti..,ut..:.::.. 1 conferenc ... \ .... ,.) ""'•• • .: er.:.can 
ciation .~.c .... the Hdv ... ce:. crlt. of olorcd People, u \.ell-kno~ .• 
~· . 
... 1.gure l. • e Lnitcd ~t tes bee ·sc of ~ ,. , c • ... ..:.> ... (:;) .... 
tain civil righ for 1 egrocs . 
It is reputedly trut.. ... L .... t ..,or. I.eny~ 1 ft..:.st poll. v..:.~iuns 
notably Ogingu. Odin a , 1-I.Clvc rccei ved ccmmu.'1..:.st s~mpathy .. -cor 1 
c..l.C.. fi 1un cial. 
h.:.lc the effect of .. ericai! I h • 1-, • \\ . :.. c.. l. s larger) or Russi& 
influence can~ot be discissed light · , .:. t 't.ould be grossly un-
fair and \~holly u~just.:.fiable to hint that : • • ericaus o.~ ... unsian 
gi.iVe .tlfricans he in.i. ..,iutive to seek d.cir freedo ... und inde-
p ndcnc.. t; . 
•\wericu. , the s ory goes , is r di t.:on lly <mti-co oniul-
ist and ..,t .... nd:> .:'or the ri:;;ht t.o self-de ern::in.:.t. im fer ~11 peo 
plcs . Yet when he Dccl r .... tion on t .. e Gru.nt · ng of Indcpendcn c 
to Colonia l Coun :rieb and Peopl~ ..., ,,. .... s i .t roduc..,l~ ut. ..,he Unit ed 
Hations in 1960 by '..,he Soviet Union , the United Sto.tes aootain 
from vo::.in · .i.11 nfric tln cuuntric~. Dy 
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issue~ have come up , the United St;:,.te h-;.'3 establi.~hPcl itself 
n s a champion for , not against, colon:i.<-1 ism. :'he explanatior 
t}1t it refuses to stand aeainst colonialism lest it displeaJc 
5~s N/TO allies, principally imperialist F!'ance , Britain ~ c:..nd 
o:-tugal , is simply inadmissible. The United St~ tes vwuld ga 
better name in Af..,..i'"'· if :.t stood y its declared moral and 
li t i cal principles. Thomas Jefferson and :. · ~' conter.1porarif c 
could \'lithout :-eservat O"' l desc-ilod as definitely ar .... i-..!o-
onialist. Their problems of the tir1e , being similar to the 
colonial &nd emerging lfrica today , Jefferson a~d 
s fellow Amf>ricans \1ould be able to underst&nd t.he current 
frican position much r.10re than their equals of todc:.J. 
The freedom oovcment in Africa '~as startt:cl, i 'J br; '1£; co 
t..cted, and '\'Jill be accomplished , by Africans themselves. 
0 nssians and An:ericans , first as onlookers, are now attempting 
o jump on the freedom 'agon so that they may change its rout~ 
· nd destine.tion for their own purpose . \':e feel , an African na 
ionalist Hould sty, the J .. fricc.n driver is the best . 
CONCLUSION 
The writer has done his best to mak this presentation 
as adequate and representative as possible. In conclusion it 
is fair to summarize a few major factors which have distin-
guished the British administration in Kenya. Britain has been 
given credit for her benevolent colonial policies in various 
parts of the world. In Kenya she failed to prove her benevo-
lence. Hence the summation of her major faults in administer-
ing Kenya. 
The politics and economics under colonial administration 
have been delicately interwoven. The monopoly of political an 
economic power enjoyed by the Kenya European community placed 
it in an almost invulnerable position. Its people thought the 
were forever securely fortified and that is why they strongly 
upheld the sanctity of white rule in Kenya. That attitude be-
came the cornerstone of the British policy in that country. 
It was an ill-fated policy which the best colonial strategists 
in England stubbornly refused to change even in face of obviou 
necessity. Finally they bowed to change--belatedly. 
Careful planning was needed for Kenya ' s future, the plan 
~ing which naturally should have taken into consideration , in-
stead of ignoring, the legitimate rights of the African people 
The honest attempt made in 1923 to declare the prime importanc 
of African interests, (soon abandoned), was the last act of goo 
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faith that the British performed in Kenya until the principle 
for independence was enunciated in 1960. 
Pe~ceful political evolution based on liberal and realis 
tic policies for Kenya could have been started forty years ago 
This was the time that the first signs of resistance against 
colonialism became manifest. Gradual colonial advancement lea -
ing eventually to independence was tried and worked beautiful-
ly in such former British dependencies as Australia and Canada 
They could have worked well , many believe, in Kenya. The Afri 
cans feel that the reason why such gradual and peaceful evolu-
tion was ruled out in Kenya was because Kenya was inhabited by 
a large population of black people. It became the policy to 
suppress rather than to elevate them. 
This is partly justified by the introduction of racism 
into Kenya politics. Racism , like colonialism, was imported 
into Kenya by the British--settlers, government officials, bus -
nessmen and missionaries. Previously Afri cans lived free of 
racial consciousness until they met white people who made them 
the object of racial discrimination and segregation. Practice 
of racism became another pillar, in addition to political and 
economic po\,er, of white supremacy in Kenya. 
lwlost Africans could not comprehend this phenomenon at 
first. And to some , even today, it does not make sense. But 
that all-important group--the educated Africans--experienced 
the full , bitter force of racial intolerance and racial rejec-
tion. They became determined to destroy the breeding ground 
for racial animosit --colonialism. 
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Racism , ho\';ever, is contagious. The \yorst victims of it 
that the best ~ay to blunt European racial attitude was 
tch it \'lith African racism. Some Africans still feel that 
al discrimination should be continued &fter independence but 
n the opposite direction. 
Finally , another \';eakness of British administration in 
is seen in the manner in \lhich the British , at long last 
troduced Africans into government adminstration. The train-
g started from the top and seemed to be going no\'1here from 
To illustrate this , today, fall of 1961 , there are 
African ministers in the Kenya government . But there 
s not yet a single African district commissioner in the whole 
Administrative training in a properly guided and de-
society starts at the lo\'er level and takes an upward 
rection. It ~as never so in Kenya. 
Independence ~ill not solve the past problems im~ediate­
It ~ill not prevent other problems from arising. In spi 
this , it is infinitely better to live as an independent and 
e people , exposed as we may to various dangers of such liv-
than to be securely bound under the fetters of coloniali 
I 
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